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This dissertation focuses on the governance of self-organization - a
topic that has increasingly received political and societal attention 
for its important role in upholding affordable and effective 
community services. Although the importance of community-based 
collectives, as a form of self-organization, has been widely
acknowledged by governments, research has shown that many 
collectives in reality function with difficulty.
To date, there has been a lack of systematic insight into preferred 
and effective governance strategies of municipalities to support 
community-based collectives. This lack of knowledge is 
problematic as governance efforts are essential to safeguard the 
development and performance of community-based collectives in 
today’s highly institutionalized and regularized society. In response 
to this gap, this dissertation uses a mixed-methods design to 
investigate the dynamics surrounding the governance of self-
organization in the Dutch welfare sector by combining governance 
and institutional theory with detailed empirical analysis.
The conclusions of this dissertation point to a new form of public 
governance where the government not only gives space, but also 
actively facilitates the self-governing capacities of community-
based collectives. This dissertation demonstrates that despite 
dominant academic and practitioner’s preferences, the governance 
of self-organization not only involves ‘soft’ processual strategies, 
but also requires ‘hard’ institutional governance strategies to 
safeguard the performance of community-based collectives. As 
such, this dissertation opens the way for a better understanding of 
the governance of self-organization, by demonstrating the 
importance of hierarchy, power, and politics.
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1.1 Introduction: The Governance of Self-Organization  
 
The preservation of modern welfare states is under pressure. As the result of an 
ageing population, health care costs will rise substantially to a level that countries 
are ill prepared for.1 Indeed, in the Netherlands the current welfare system is rapidly 
becoming untenable for governments to uphold. Social care budgets have already 
been cut up to an average of 22% (Binnenlands Bestuur 2015). Hence, relying on 
community-based networks increasingly becomes instrumental in continuing the 
realization of affordable and effective social care services (Pestoff 2006; Coule and 
Bennett 2016). We see a rapid increase of community-based collectives that define 
and provide local social care services (De Moor 2015; Bokhorst 2015).2 It seems that 
the number of care collectives have almost tripled from 2014 to 2016 (De Jong 
2016). These collectives provide services that range from providing social activities 
and social care, to providing residential long-term care facilities. Although the 
increasing importance of community-based collectives has been acknowledged by 
governments, research shows that many collectives in reality proceed with difficulty, 
particularly when they conflict with established rules and institutions (Baker et al. 
2009; Termeer 2009). Indeed, politicians and public officials are struggling with 
defining, adjusting and implementing governing strategies to react to and stimulate 
community self-organization (Gofen et al. 2014; Torfing et al. 2016; Kleinhans 
2017). Their struggle is a complex one, as systematic insight into which governance 
strategies are actually preferred by involved stakeholders and how these strategies 
affect community-based collectives is lacking. This lack of knowledge is 
problematic as the governance efforts of governments are essential to safeguard the 
development and performance of community-based collectives in today’s highly 
institutionalized and regularized society (Sørensen and Triantafillou 2009; Termeer 
et al. 2013; Edelenbos et al. 2018). Hence, a better understanding of how to govern 
community-based collectives is required.  
 
The studies in this dissertation are aimed at unraveling effective governance 
strategies to support community-based collectives. The first aim is to investigate how 
 
 
1 Recent estimates at the OECD level indicate that, whereas in 2015 there were 28 elderly 
people for every 100 working-age people, the ratio will have almost doubled to reach 53 
out of 100 in 2050 (OECD 2017). 
2 We use the term community-based collectives to refer formally organized, independent, 
non-profit distributing organizations, such as cooperatives, foundations or associations, that 
are initiated, owned and controlled by local community members (see Lindsay et al. 2013; 
Kleinhans 2017; Van Meerkerk et al. 2018). 
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the governance strategy of municipalities should ideally look from the perspective 
of key stakeholders at the national, local, and community level. Furthermore, 
because the governance strategy is not only designed in advance but is also—and 
mainly—the result of a complex interaction-process between actors, the second aim 
of this dissertation is to examine what form of governance is actually used and is 
effective in practice. The third and final aim of this dissertation is to examine how 
the governance strategy of municipalities affects the performance of community-
based collectives.  
 
1.2 Measuring performance  
 
Since performance is an important element in this dissertation, but also an essentially 
contested concept (see Johnsen 2005; Steward and Walsh 2009), we first elaborate 
how we define performance. The academic literature has examined performance, and 
its dimensions, in many different ways. In this dissertation, we focus on the 
dimensions ‘effectiveness’, ‘quality’, ‘legitimacy’ and ‘resilience’ ’to determine 
performance (see Hood 1991; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015). Accordingly, we define 
performance as perceptions of the effectiveness, quality, legitimacy and resilience of 
community-based collectives. The items that we use to further operationalize these 
four performance dimensions are based on the work of Igalla et al. (2019), who 
translated these performance dimensions in the context of community-based 
collectives: Does the collective achieve its objectives, deliver high-quality services, 
is considered important by the community and continues to exist if specific resources 
or people are omitted?    
 
The literature on performance further distinguishes objective and subjective 
measures to determine the level of performance. In this dissertation, we focus on 
subjective measures. Following Provan and Kenis (2008), we argue that measuring 
performance is a normative task. First, multiple actors have different beliefs about 
the criteria of performance, and, thus, selecting the preferences of one group over 
another or assigning weights to preferences is a normative decision; and second, the 
criteria for measuring performance are normative (Kenis and Provan 2009). 
According to Simon (1976), assessment criteria are elements of value rather than 
elements of facts. In this dissertation, we combine two different kinds of subjective 
measures: self-evaluations and external-evaluations. Combining these measures may 
help to overcome the limitations that are associated with each of these measures (see 
Meier and O’Toole 2013; Wang 2016). Whereas self-assessment measures are prone 
to personal bias, external-assessment measures lack in-depth knowledge and, thus, 
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may capture only the surface. Here self-evaluations will be based on the assessment 
of board members and key volunteers of collectives who have a broad oversight of 
the community-based collectives’ organization and services. External evaluations 
will be based on the assessment of public officials in the municipality who are 
familiar with the community and the collectives’ services.  
 
1.3 Theoretical Contributions  
 
Governments have become more dependent on societal actors to achieve their goals 
because of the increasing complexity of the challenges they face, such as climate 
change, poverty, and digitalization. Community-based collectives have been 
acclaimed for their distinct set of resources (Smith and Lipsky 1994; Brandsen et al. 
2017; Torfing et al 2016). They would be able to perform things governments can 
only dream of, such as reaching difficult target groups or setting up innovative 
services. In this light, the governance of community-based collectives is an important 
topic. We define governance in this dissertation as the strategic and reflexive attempt 
of politicians and public officials to steer developments and outcomes in order to 
realize particular public objectives (Kickert et al. 1997; Kooiman 2003; Klijn and 
Koppenjan 2016). Although we see a growing number of these community-based 
collectives and, accordingly, see a growing scholarly attention to how they are 
governed (see Lindsay et al 2013; Edelenbos et al., 2018), to date, some important 
theoretical challenges remain unsolved. These challenges range from examining 
what form of governance is preferred by policy officials and collectives, to what 
form of governance is actually used effectively in practice, to how governance 
strategies relate to the performance of community-based colletives. The major 
theoretical contribution of this dissertation is therefore threefold.    
 
Contribution 1: Perceptions on governance mixes 
The first contribution relates to identifying preferences for the governance of self-
organization. Although the self-organizing ability of citizens has been a longstanding 
concern of academic inquiry within the social sciences, the faming of this concern 
as being related to the state’s governance, that draws upon and facilitates these self-
organizing capacities of society is more recent (Sørensen and Triantafillou 2009).   
How should municipalities respond to the trend of community-based collectives; that 
is, which form of governance is appropriate for - and desired by - the actors involved? 
It is important to avoid such dichotomous and blunt thinking about governance 
strategies as ‘market versus state’ or ‘hierarchical versus collaborative’ (Howlett 
2014), as administrative practice usually involves combining governance strategies 
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and instruments. The nature of these combinations and how behavioural aspects of 
policymakers lead them to favour one design over another remains, however, 
understudied (Bressers and O’Toole; Eliadis et al 2005; Howlett 2018). Have 
traditional governance modes and instruments lost their significance in relation to 
this new context, and/or what combinations of traditional and more novel 
governance perspectives are preferred? Within the public administration literature, 
it is possible to distinguish coherent clusters or waves that share a specific focus on 
how to govern state-society relations and to use policy instruments to achieve public 
goals (Kettl 2002; Pierre and Peters 2000; Van der Steen et al. 2016). We identify 
four governance modes, Traditional Public Administration, New Public 
Management, Network Governance, and Self-Governance. Traditional Public 
Administration: This perspective focuses on governance as achieving political goals 
and safeguarding legalistic public values, such as equality, democracy, and legality 
(Wilson, 1989; Weber 1978). From this perspective, safeguarding such public values 
is especially important now that collectives are becoming increasingly prominent in 
public service provision. To compensate for failures within civil society, government 
should use rules and regulations to improve the democracy and equality of the 
service delivery of collectives. Addditionally, interaction with collectives should 
take place along the lines of clear regulations. New Public Management: This 
perspective focuses on governance as improving the efficiency and effectiveness of 
public service delivery. From this perspective, governments decide what they want, 
specify outputs, and then make use of business instruments (strategic and 
performance management techniques, performance indicators) to monitor the 
implementation (see Hood, 1991; Lane 2000; Pollitt et al. 2007). Interaction with 
collectives should take place along the lines of clear policy goals and performance 
indicators. Once performance indicators have been set, policy officials can take a 
more hands-off approach to their monitoring role. Network Governance: In this 
perspective governments relate to collectives in a more horizontal way, resulting in 
more intense interactions. Governing takes place through the usage of network 
management that is aimed at improving the interorganizational coordination, and 
quality of decision-making (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Klijn and Koppenjan 
2016). In this perspective, public goals and policies are defined and implemented 
through a process of interaction and negotiation. Managerial efforts of policy 
officials focus on activating actors, organizing joint-research meetings (joint fact 
finding), and composing a set of mutually agreed upon rules of behaviour. Self-
Governance: This perspective focuses on governance as improving self-governance 
of collectives. The key point of this perspective is that the dynamics that produce 
public value start within society and, as such, government relates to these often-
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uninvited actions (see Sørensen and Triantafillou 2009; Termeer et al. 2013). Self-
Governance is not equivalent to a laissez-faire approach to government (see also 
Rhodes 1997). However, the policy instruments appropriate for the Self-Governance 
perspective are more restrained and facilitating. They include removing barriers for 
collectives to function, supporting them by providing fast access to public decision-
making and encouraging collectives with small subsidies that do not damage the 
identities of collectives.  
 
Effective governance of community-based collectives can thus be perceived in very 
distinct ways (see Table 1). Unravelling governance preferences would not only 
provide a first step to identifying what mix of traditional and more novel governance 
perspectives and instruments is perceived appropriate to govern collectives, but 
would also allow for a comparison of to what extent these perceptions differ. A 
mismatch in preferences on how to govern community-based collectives may have 
important consequences for the chances of the success of collectives (Edelenbos et 
al. 2009). 
 
Table 1. Four dominant perspectives on governing self-organization  
 Traditional 
Public 
Administration 
New Public 
Management 
Network 
Governance 
Self-
Governance 
Focus Achieving 
political goals 
and safeguarding 
public values 
(such as 
equality, 
democracy) 
Improving 
efficiency and 
effectives of 
service 
delivery  
Improving 
inter-
organizational 
coordination 
and quality of 
decision- 
making 
Improving 
self-
governance of 
non-
governmental 
actors 
Roles of 
policy 
officials 
Neutral 
bureaucrat  
Monitoring 
entrepreneur 
Active 
Network 
Manager 
Distant 
facilitator 
Relation with 
government 
Interaction with 
collectives takes 
place along the 
lines of clear 
regulations 
Interaction 
with 
collectives 
takes place 
along the lines 
of clear policy 
goals and 
performance 
indicators 
Interactions 
with collectives 
is intense. 
Policy officials 
as prominent 
network 
managers 
Interactions 
between public 
actors and 
collectives is 
limited. Policy 
officials 
following 
rather than 
leading 
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Policy 
instruments 
Using rules and 
regulations to 
improve service 
delivery of 
collectives 
Using business 
instruments 
(modern 
management 
techniques, 
performance 
indicators) to 
improve 
service 
delivery of 
collectives 
Using network 
management: 
activating 
actors, 
organizing 
research 
gatherings 
(joint fact 
finding), 
process rules, 
etc. to improve 
services by 
collectives 
Using 
facilitating 
instruments 
(removing 
obstacles, 
providing 
access and 
encouraging 
with small 
subsidies that 
do not damage 
identities of 
collectives) 
 
Source: Nederhand, Klijn, Van der Steen and Van Twist (2019)  
 
Contribution 2: usage and effectiveness of strategies 
The second contribution relates to empirically unraveling the strategies that 
municipal politicians and officials actually use in day-to-day practice to govern 
community-based collectives. Although the governance relationship is 
acknowledged as being very important for the development of community-based 
collectives, more empirical research is needed to unravel the mechanisms behind the 
relationship (Edelenbos et al 2018). We make use of the meta-governance literature 
to explore how municipalities continue to use their state power by means of 
governance strategies in a network setting and how this, in turn, affects the 
conditions of the self-organization of community-based collectives (see Kooiman 
2003; Sørensen and Torfing 2009; Torfing et al. 2012). How are governance 
strategies combined in practice? And how do community-based collectives react to 
a particular mix of governance strategies? These empirical questions of how and with 
what effect governments steer processes of self-organization in accordance with 
particular public values and objectives is of key importance to the current, mostly 
theoretical, body of meta-governance literature (Sørensen and Torfing 2016). The 
choice for a particular governance strategy is not always a matter of straightforward 
planning. It can also be part of a messy and political process of mobilizing resources 
and people within organizations (see Baker et al. 2009; Termeer et al. 2013; Bartels 
2016). Therefore, in order to fully understand the usage and effect of governance 
strategies, we take a closer look at how the choice between governance strategies is 
being managed by key individuals within the municipality. We make use of the 
literature on boundary spanning and institutional logics to unravel which boundary-
spanning strategies are used by these key individuals to influence the choice between 
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different modes of governance (see Williams 2002; Meyer and Hammerschmid 
2006; Lodge and Wegrich 2014). Although the importance of boundary spanning for 
managing the governance relationship between government and community-based 
collectives has been widely acknowledged (Osborne 2010; Van Meerkerk and 
Edelenbos 2016), the current literature remains unclear about what this management 
process within public organizations entirely looks like. By providing insight into the 
strategic toolbox of boundary spanners and the perceived effectiveness of these tools, 
this study increases our empirical understanding of how the interplay between 
horizontal and vertical modes of governance and accompanying institutional logics 
within public organisations takes shape, and, in turn, influences the governance of 
community-based collectives.  
 
Contribution 3: effects of governance in a social network context 
Finally, the third aim of this dissertation is to empirically unravel under what 
conditions community-based collectives show outstanding performance. Do 
collectives perform well under the conditions of a hands-on collaborative 
governance approach, or, conversely, under the conditions of a hands-off governance 
approach? This dissertation combines three important bodies of literature, each of 
which has a different (ideal-typical) interpretation of the relationship between 
governance and performance: collaborative governance literature, nonprofit 
literature, and social capital literature. Although these theoretical interpretations are 
not mutually exclusive, they examine the relationship from different perspectives. 
The first interpretation, which builds on the collaborative governance literature, 
argues that collaboration with government (hands-on governance) is necessary for 
performance of community-based collectives. Entering into a collaborative 
relationship with government enables collectives to attract and acquire more critical 
resources (Provan & Milward 2001). For small-scale community-based collectives, 
the financial and regulatory resources that governments possess are especially 
critical for achieving excellent and durable outcomes as they generally lack these 
resources (Dale and Newman 2010). This perspective finds that collaboration with 
government (e.g. co-creating public value) boosts and safeguards performance (see 
Korosec and Bergman 2006). The second interpretation, which builds on the 
nonprofit literature perspective, argues that avoiding close collaboration with 
government (hands-off governance), in essence, is necessary for outstanding 
performance of collectives (Smith and Lipsky 1994; Brandsen et al. 2017). While 
the nonprofit literature agrees that collaboration between the public and nonprofit 
sector has both practical and political benefits, much of the relevant scholarship 
simultaneously highlight the potential disadvantages of a nonprofit sector that is too 
reliant on government funding and programs (see Brooks 2000; Guo 2007; O’Regan 
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and Oster 2002; Smith and Lipsky 1993). This ideal-typical interpretation, 
conversely, argues that, being the weaker actor in relation to government, the small-
scale local community-based collectives easily run the risk of being overruled and 
consequently lose some of its distinctive nature and qualities (see Anheir et al. 1997; 
Brooks 2002; Korosec and Berman 2006; Brandsen et al. 2017). The third 
interpretation builds on the perspective of social capital literature. This interpretation 
emphasizes the presence of network ties as a strategic opportunity for achieving 
outstanding performance (Lin 2001; Lewis 2010). The argument here is that the 
relationship between collaboration and performance depends on the power position 
of collectives in terms of their community and political network ties. Despite the 
fundamental theoretical debate on the relationship between government 
collaboration and the performance of community-based collectives, to date, there has 
been little empirical research that systematically assesses the key assumptions 
underlying this debate. Hence, the final purpose of this dissertation is to 
systematically test these key assumptions. 
 
1.4 Research Questions and overview 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to gain a better understanding of how municipalities 
should govern community-based collectives to safeguard their performance. The 
main research question addressed in this study is formulated as follows:  
 
How should municipalities govern community-based collectives to safeguard their 
performance?  
 
To answer the main research question, the following three research questions were 
examined.   
 
1. How do key stakeholders perceive effective governance of community-
based collectives by municipalities?   
2. What strategies are used by municipalities to govern community-based 
collectives and to what effect?  
3. Under what conditions do community-based collectives perform well?  
 
The first research question focuses on unravelling the governance perceptions of key 
stakeholders at the national, municipal, and community level. This multi-level 
approach enables us to not only identify what mix of traditional and more novel 
governance perspectives and policy instruments is considered appropriate to govern 
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community-based collectives, but also to compare to what extent the perspectives of 
municipalities and community-based collectives differ. The second research 
question considers the strategies that are actually used by municipal politicians and 
officials to govern community-based collectives, and to what effect. Do the strategies 
that are used in real-life cases match the strategies that are perceived to be effective? 
In answering this question, we look at how public officials govern community-based 
collectives (governance strategies), but also at how they govern their colleagues 
within municipalities (boundary-spanning strategies). With the third and final 
research question, the conditions under which community-based collectives perform 
well are examined. We study if and how the effects of municipal governance are 
contingent upon the social network composition of community-based collectives.  
 
1.5 Research methods and data collection  
 
To answer the main research question, this dissertation focuses on examining 
perceptions as well as the day-to-day activities around the governance of self-
organization. We use a mixed-methods approach to utilize the unique strengths of 
specific research methods. To analyze perceptions (RQ1), we make use of the 
document analysis and Q-Methodology research methods. In Chapter 2, we first 
analyze the frames that are communicated by national governments in policy 
documents on the governance role of municipalities. Using a document analysis is 
well-suited for the goal of analyzing how stakeholders perceive the effective 
governance of community-based collectives. We study the frames that inform, and 
are used as argumentation for, the major institutional care reforms between 2012 and 
2015. In addition to providing an overview of the wider policy context to which 
municipalities and community-based collectives should relate, the frames also 
communicate valuable information about the perception of the national government 
on the desired governance relationship between municipalities and community-
based collectives. Chapter 3 further explores the perceptions on the desired 
governance strategy at the municipal and community level by using Q-Methodology. 
Q-Methodology is a powerful methodology to identify shared viewpoints and 
individual differences towards a particular topic. The method combines the analysis 
of complexity – identifying and interpreting qualitative viewpoints - with a 
systematic quantitative cross-view comparison in order to detect consensus and 
contrasts in these viewpoints (Watts and Stenner 2012; Durose et al. 2016). Using 
Q-Methodology, therefore, enables us to systematically explore and compare the 
governance perceptions of 40 municipal public officials and 40 members of 
community-based collectives. These two groups are presented with 24 statements 
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that are based on the four dominant governance perspectives in the public 
administration literature. By conducting two separate Q analyses, the results enable 
us not only to determine how governance perspectives get combined, but also to what 
extent the perceptions of public officials and community-based collectives match or 
differ. This potential mismatch may have far-reaching consequences for the 
development and performance of community-based collectives.  
 
To analyze the strategies that are used by municipal politicians and officials to 
govern community-based collectives (RQ2), we make use of qualitative casestudies. 
Whereas this type of research does not, and cannot, yield generalizable empirical 
knowledge, it does provide a rich and contextualized understanding of how the 
governance of community-based collectives takes place (Yin 2003; Flyvbjerg 2006). 
Chapter 4 describes the first comparative case study that concerns the development 
of new social care services in Amersfoort and Amsterdam. Selecting two contrasting 
cases which co-vary on one independent factor should achieve a better analytical 
understanding of the interplay between relevant factors and mechanisms (Yin 2003; 
Haverland 2010). Both cases are selected on the difference in experience with 
community-based collectives and participatory processes between two 
municipalities. We have conducted 31 in-depth interviews to empirically unravel the 
governance strategies of politicians and public officials who have had experience in 
governing community-based collectives and, furthermore, to examine the effects of 
these strategies. The findings of this chapter highlight the crucial importance of 
boundary-spanners within municipalities to aligning different institutional logics. 
Therefore, Chapter 5 describes the second case study that specifically focuses on 
boundary-spanning strategies and their perceived effectiveness. In order to unravel 
the experiences of boundary spanners, we adopted a storytelling case study approach. 
We have conducted 16 storytelling interviews with boundary spanners in the 
municipality of Rotterdam to develop a typology of boundary-spanning strategies 
that they use within the municipality to prevent and overcome structural 
organizational barriers to working with community-based collectives.  Stories 
present highly textured depictions of practices in which the norms, beliefs, and 
decision rules that guide actions and choices become clear (Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno 2003). This method allows respondents to illustrate what particular 
situations call for certain routines and how the specifics of a case fit or do not fit 
standard practices (see Bartels 2013; Raaphorst 2018).    
 
In the final study, we examine under what conditions community-based collectives 
perform well (RQ3). In this last step of the dissertation we move beyond the richness 
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of in-depth case studies to more systematic theory testing, by using Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA). Unlike statistical analysis or comparative case 
studies, QCA allow for the use of both in-depth case knowledge and identifying 
commonoalities between cases by systematically comparing them (Rihoux & Ragin 
2009; Verweij and Gerrits 2013). This method allows us to explore the analytical 
middle range between case studies and large-N analysis. The set-theoretic approach 
of QCA is designed to assess subset relations in terms of necessity and sufficiency. 
Thus, a condition is necessary if performance cannot be produced without it; a 
condition is sufficient if it can produce the outcome by itself without the help of other 
conditions (Ragin 2000; Schneider and Wagemann 2010). Specifically, fuzzy set 
QCA is used to identify which particular combination(s) of conditions is sufficient 
and/or necessary for performance. Identifying set-relationships provides critical 
insight into whether governance works only, or mainly, in combination with certain 
conditions. We focus on four important performance dimensions: effectiveness, 
quality, legitimacy and resilience. In this chapter, we determine if and how the 
effects of municipal governance on the performance of community-based collectives 
is contingent upon the social network composition of these collectives. We 
conceptualize and evaluate the relation between governance and performance by 
combining social capital, nonprofit, and governance literature. We examine three 
ideal-typical theoretical interpretations of the government-nonprofit relationship by 
building on these theories: hands-on governance is necessary for collectives’ 
performance; hands-off governance is necessary for collectives’ performance; and 
how governance relates to performance is contingent on the collectives’ network. 
We use set-configurational analysis to conceptualize and to test the relationship 
within 14 case studies in the Netherlands. To guarantee a balanced sample, we 
ensured an even distribution of collectives over small, middle-small, middle-large 
and large municipalities. 
 
1.6 Outline of the dissertation  
 
To answer the main research questions, five studies are included in the dissertation, 
each described in a separate chapter. All five empirical chapters have been presented 
at international conferences and are either under review, accepted for publication, or 
already published in leading SSCI listed and international peer-reviewed journals. 
Table 2 provides an overview how the research questions (RQ) relate to the chapters 
in this dissertation. The first RQ is answered in Chapter 2 and 3. These chapters deal 
with the analysis of governance perceptions by making use of a document analysis 
and Q Methodology. The second RQ is answered in Chapters 4 and 5. These chapters 
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examine the strategies that municipalities use in governing community-based 
collectives by making use of qualitative case studies. The third RQ is answered in 
Chapter 6. Chapter 6 describes the final study of this dissertation on the performance 
of community-based collectives by making use of a set-theoretic approach.  
 
The results of this mixed-methods approach inform the final conclusions of the 
dissertation, which are presented in Chapter 7. These conclusions provide the 
building block to answering the main research question: How should municipalities 
govern community-based collectives to safeguard their performance? 
 
In answering this question, this dissertation contributes to innovating the study of 
governance in the field of public administration in two ways. First, by adopting a 
mixed-methods approach. It uses various innovative research techniques, such as Q-
Methodology and Set-Theoretic Methods, to study important theoretical and 
practical problems. These methods have received little or no attention in the 
governance literature, although their appeal is growing (see for recent examples 
Durose et al. 2016; Warsen et al. 2019). By employing and integrating various 
research methods, this dissertation contributes to improving the methodologogical 
sophistication and rigor of the field, especially in relation to mixed-methods research 
(see Gill & Meier 2000; Groeneveld et al. 2015). Second, by adopting a multilevel-
theoretical approach. Although the methodological rigor of public administration 
research has increased dramatically over the past several decades, an overreliance on 
grand theories makes that theory building within public administration has 
progressed at a slow pace (see Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2012; Abner et al. 
2017). By combining and empirically testing macro- and meso- level theories at the 
micro-level, this dissertation contributes to developing mid range theories that are 
derived from data rather than from general theorizing. This increases the likelihood 
that these theories are consistent with the complex reality of public administration. 
As a result, the gap between abstract theorizing and complex empirical facts is 
reduced.  
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Table 2. Overview of Dissertation 
Chapter      Research 
question 
Method Published 
 
1 Introduction - - - 
2 Activating Citizens in Dutch Care 
Reforms: Framing New Co-
Production Roles and Competences 
for Citizens and Professionals 
RQ1 Document 
analysis 
Policy & 
Politics  
3 The Governane of Self-
Organization: Which Governance 
Strategy do Public Officials and 
Citizens Prefer?   
RQ1 Q-
Methodology 
Policy 
Sciences 
4 Self-Organization and the Role of 
Government: How and Why does 
Self-Organization Evolve in the 
Shadow of Hierarchy?  
RQ2 Comparative 
case study 
Public 
Management 
Review 
5 Boundary-Spanning Strategies for 
Aligning Institutional Logics: a 
Typology 
RQ2 Storytelling 
case stuty 
Local 
Government 
Studies 
6 The Politics of Collaboration: 
Assessing the Determinants of 
Performance in Community-Based 
Non-profits 
RQ3 Set-theoretic 
configurational 
analysis 
Submitted to 
international 
peer-reviewed 
journal  
7 Conclusions - - - 
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Chapter 2 
Activating Citizens in Dutch Care Reforms: 
Framing New Co-Production Roles and 
Competences for Citizens and Professionals 
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Abstract 
This study explores the growing interest of governments in co-production and self-
organization by examining the framing of roles and responsibilities of citizens and 
professionals in care reforms. As in many other western countries, the Dutch welfare 
state is subject to major reforms, shifting responsibilities back towards society. A 
qualitative content analysis of policy letters of the Dutch national government shows 
that newer roles (citizen-as-co-producers) do not substitute traditional roles (citizen-
as-clients), but constitute a new layer resulting in an expansion and diversiﬁcation 
of roles for regular providers. Activating, supporting and partnering with citizens are 
framed as new competences of professionals. 
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2.1   Introduction 
 
In many western countries, public service provision is subject to major reforms. 
Activating citizens through shifting responsibilities ‘back to society’ or including 
citizens in the production of public services has increasingly come onto the agenda 
of policy makers. It is regarded as a possible solution to the public sector’s decreased 
legitimacy and dwindling resources (Brandsen and Honingh, 2016; Endo and Lim, 
2017; Lodge and Hood, 2012). In parallel with academic debates, the idea of 
coproducing and self-organising public services seems to have penetrated the 
discourse of politicians and governors all over the world. It is seen as part of a drive 
to reinvigorate voluntary participation and strengthen social cohesion in an 
increasingly fragmented and individualised society. Existing scholarship 
predominantly focuses on the theoretical conceptualisation of different forms of co-
production, either by theoretical argumentation or by examining experiences in co-
production and self-organization (Verschuere et al, 2012; Voorberg et al, 2015). Less 
attention has been paid to how governments actually frame the co-production and 
self-organization of public services in reform programmes (see, for an exception, 
Verhoeven and Tonkens, 2013). In this article, we analyse how governments frame 
the changing relationship between citizens and regular service produceres in the 
delivery of services in the context of budget cuts and changing societal demands. 
The reforms that have taken place in the Dutch care regime during the past four years 
provide a scenario to empirically examine the framing of the citizen–regular provider 
relationship. This sector, in which citizens have traditionally been targeted as clients, 
has been subject to major reforms in which emphasis is being put on shifting 
responsibilities ‘back’ towards society in order to keep care provision ‘affordable, 
accessible and in line with societal demands’ (Appendix, P10). We formulated the 
following research question: How does the Dutch national government frames the 
relationship between citizens and regular providers in the production of care services 
in the period 2012–2015 and how does this contribute to wider understanding of 
changing care provision? Next to contributing to our understanding on how 
governments justify change measures and trying to reshape citizen roles and 
responsibilities, this research contributes to the literature in two ways. First, as 
existing scholarship on coproduction and self-organization is predominantly based 
on case-studies (Verschuere et al, 2012; Voorberg et al, 2015), this research responds 
to recent calls to make the research methodologically more diverse (Brandsen and 
Honingh, 2016). By conducting a content analysis, this article examines how 
governments actually frame the co-production and self-organization of public 
services in reform programmes. Second, in the literature on co-production much 
attention is paid to the role of citizens, whereas the corresponding role of regular 
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producers in the process remains an understudied topic (Brandsen and Honingh, 
2016). In the analysis, we therefore explicitly focused on the role of regular service 
providers vis-à-vis citizens, thereby starting to ﬁll this gap in the literature. The 
following sections of this article discusses the literature on co-production and 
activation of citizens in current welfare state reforms. Next, we discuss our methods 
followed by the results. The article concludes with some reﬂections on the new 
public service ethos of professionals. 
 
2.2   Activating citizens: transforming public welfare states? 
 
Over the last two to three decades, promoting ‘active citizenship’ has become a key 
and recurring topic of policy-making and governmental reforms in many western 
welfare states (Newman, 2007; Rose, 2006; Verhoeven and Tonkens, 2013). Many 
of the literature on activation is focused on social services in relation to 
unemployment (see Borghi and Van Berkel, 2007). The general nature of the 
discourse in this context is that ‘citizens are increasingly considered to be responsible 
for their own lives, are expected to invest in their employability, and, when 
dependent on the welfare state, are granted rights and entitlements only on the 
condition that they fulﬁl the obligations society imposes on them’ (Borghi and Van 
Berkel, 2007, 413–14). Discourses of activation have also penetrated other areas 
such as healthcare services, liveability and community services. In these areas the 
state has fewer capabilities to force citizens to become active: to dedicate their spare 
time to support others in the community. Through volunteering, citizens are expected 
to shoulder tasks formerly performed by the state, such as providing support to 
disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, either by partnering and co-production with 
the state or by self-organization (Verhoeven and Tonkens, 2013). This implies an 
explicit departure from the traditional providercentric model of the welfare state. In 
fact, the care system is gradually shifting from an orientation on collective solidarity 
towards one that is predominantly based on individual responsibility (Van Oorschot, 
2006; Künzel, 2012). While research on activation has examined activation policies 
in relation to new forms of governance (Newman, 2007) and to the individualisation 
trend in the provision of services (Borghi and Van Berkel, 2007), less attention has 
been paid to the framing of roles and responsibilities in the relationship between 
citizens and regular service providers. To enhance our understanding of this 
relationship we draw on two growing bodies of literature in the ﬁeld of public 
administration: coproduction and self-organization. 
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2.3   Co-producing and self-organising public service delivery 
 
The idea of activating citizens in the production of public services is made explicit 
in the co-production literature. We can distinguish two waves of academic interest 
in the concept (Bryson et al, 2014; Bovaird et al, 2015). The ﬁrst wave of interest in 
co-production started in the 1970s. Early deﬁnitions of co-production focused upon 
the pooling of resources of users and providers to raise the quantity and/or quality of 
the service (Brudney, 1983; Bovaird et al, 2015). Hence, users and providers thus 
actively collaborate in the service provision. Recently, a second wave of interest in 
co-production has been triggered (Verschuere et al, 2012; Bovaird et al, 2015). This 
attention perfectly ﬁts within the rising scholarly recognition that public outcomes 
need multiple stakeholders for their realisation. Apart from the recognition that 
coproduction could be a means to effectively address social challenges (Boivard et 
al, 2015; Voorberg et al, 2015), there are also more practical reasons for this renewed 
interest in the potential of co-production. These reasons connect to the ﬁscal 
pressures many governments have faced since 2008. Some scholars suggest that 
governments eye co-production as a potential vehicle for doing more with less by 
involving societal resources in service production and delivery (Thomas, 2013; 
Brandsen et al, 2014). As a result, co-production has been embraced as a new reform 
strategy for the public sector thereby fundamentally changing the structure of service 
provision (Osborne and Strokosch, 2013). Whereas 40 years on co-production 
literature offers a variety of deﬁnitions of the concept, the foundational ideas remain 
the same: citizens are not only required for the consumption of public services but 
also for the production of these services. Thus, both regular providers and (groups 
of) citizens contribute to the provision of public services (Pestoff, 2006). Although, 
there are several deﬁnitions and forms of co-production discussed in the literature 
(see Voorberg et al, 2015), we focus on co-production between professionals and 
citizens, deﬁned as the development of long-term relationships between 
professionalised service providers and service users, or other members of the 
community, where all parties make substantial resource contributions and both take 
an active role in the direct delivery and design of a public service (see Bovaird, 2007, 
847; Brandsen and Honingh, 2015). Note that in this deﬁnition citizens can be a 
direct recipient of a service, but need not necessarily be so. For instance, family 
members or other relatives could also participate in the co-production process for the 
direct beneﬁciary (Pestoff, 2012). Another relevant literature stream to study 
fundamental changes in the provision of care services focuses on citizen self-
organization. This stream of literature examines citizen initiatives in the production 
of public services (Edelenbos and Van Meerkerk, 2016; Endo and Lim, 2017; 
Healey, 2015). These initiatives are sometimes organised as an addition to, but can 
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also be in competition with service delivery by market or government organisations. 
These bottom-up civic initiatives can arise from dissatisfaction or complaints with 
governmental policy and actions or emerge in spaces that governments withdraw 
from due to budget cuts (for example, Van Meerkerk et al, 2013; Wagenaar and Van 
der Heijden, 2015). The phenomenon of citizen self-organization is, historically 
speaking, not new, but the current ‘wave’ is getting shape in a different institutional 
context in which the role of government in society is stronger than ever and we face 
the curious situation of the state urging a reluctant citizenry to engage in civil society 
(Brandsen et al, 2014). The self-organising paradigm has an explicit focus on an 
active civil society in which citizens have a leading role in the design and 
implementation of particular public services. This does not mean public sector 
professionals are not involved. According to Bovaird (2007) professionals often 
have at least an indirect role (for example, advice, quality checks). Moreover, 
governments can take up a facilitating and/or monitoring role, safeguarding public 
values (Edelenbos et al, 2017). Citizen self-organization is different from traditional 
forms of government-centred citizen consultation as citizens determine the content 
– the subject matter, priorities and plans – and the processes under which their 
engagement takes place. Self-organization relates to the initiation, ownership and 
exploitation of service or product based initiatives by groups of citizens who deal 
with improving the social and/or physical environment. These civic initiatives take 
different forms and are emerging in different ﬁelds (Edelenbos and Van Meerkerk, 
2016). In the ﬁeld of healthcare, we see for example a rise in care cooperatives, 
providing community-led care services for older people as a response to severe 
budget cuts in long-term medical care, social care and care for the elderly. In this 
manifestation, citizens thus become providers of services themselves, in addition to, 
or instead of, regular providers. How do governments frame new relationships 
between regular providers and citizens in speciﬁc care reforms? In the following 
sections, we go deeper into the empirical study we conducted to enhance our 
understanding of changing relationships and new roles of citizens and regular 
providers as suggested by the various literature on co-production and self-
organization. 
 
2.4   Content analysis of policy documents 
 
Dutch care reforms provide a key case, referring to the capacity of a case to 
exemplify the analytical object of study (Thomas, 2011), to examine the 
reconceptualisation of the roles of citizens and regular providers in current care 
reforms. We deliberately picked this policy sector, as it is a key sector undergoing 
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intense reforms because of rising expenditures and an ageing population. Moreover, 
since the rise of the welfare state in the Netherlands, this sector has been 
characterised by strong governmental and professional dominance concerning the 
design and delivery of public services, and government is now trying to reshape roles 
and responsibilities in this respect (for example, Yerkes et al, 2011). Pushed by 
pressures on the ﬁnancial sustainability of the current system, the Dutch care system 
is undergoing substantial reforms, characterised by a so-called ‘turnaround’ of the 
system (Movisie, 2015; VNG, 2015). This turnaround implies a more prominent role 
for informal care in the care system in order to safeguard quality and long-term 
durability. In this reform, national government is calling upon the personal resources 
of people and their environments. This study proceeds from a content analysis of the 
narratives used in all national governmental policy letters on care and social support 
in the Netherlands published between January 2012 and December 2015. This was a 
(run-up) period in which the Dutch care system was reformed consequent to the 
signiﬁcant revision of existing regulatory systems (VNG, 2015). In our analysis, we 
focus upon policy letters, as these documents are the pre-eminent site in which 
national governments motivate and legitimise their policy choices and concrete plans 
for addressing public care service provision at local, regional and national level. 
Thereby, national governments communicate visions about the future of government 
actions and the key topics of interest at the time. Within these documents we focus 
upon the discursive legitimation that governments use in the presentation of their 
policies. The usage of particular frames and narratives help sustain the societal 
support for particular policy programmes and measures (Hajer, 2003). We selected 
relevant policy letters through the national government’s document database in 
which more than 158,500 national governmental documents are stored. We used 
different keywords, based on commonly used care jargon to ensure the sensitivity 
and speciﬁcity of the queries, to search for and extract policy documents on care and 
social support (see Table 1). This search resulted in 1,331 results of which 559 
documents were identiﬁed as policy letters. These documents were screened for their 
applicability on the basis of the content of the letters: title, abstract and/or full text. 
This resulted in 205 search results. For example, policy letters with titles such as 
‘education for asylum seekers’ or ‘reaction on questions about priorities in the policy 
on culture’ were excluded. We also excluded policy letters that concerned care 
services in the Caribbean Netherlands because of the different institutional context. 
The selected documents were read through to make sure that care policies were at 
the core of the document and not, for instance, mentioned only once in a sub-
paragraph. Excluding duplicates, this process resulted in the selection of 37 policy 
letters: four in 2012, six in 2013, 16 in 2014 and 11 in 2015. The large number of 
duplicates can be explained by the fact that many documents were covered by 
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multiple search terms. In line with our expectations, most documents emanated from 
the Ministry of Public Health (VWS) (see Appendix for list P1 to P37). In this study, 
we conducted a qualitative content analysis. To make valid and replicable inferences, 
we made use of the step-by-step approach of the constant comparative method 
(Boeije, 2002). We ﬁrst segmented our data into relevant categories, by making use 
of an open coding process. Open coding is the process of breaking down, examining, 
comparing, conceptualising and categorising data (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). The 
fragments were then compared among each other, grouped into categories dealing 
with the same subject, and labelled with a code. The list of codes was then grouped 
in categories by means of axial coding and reassembled into the ﬁndings that are 
presented in this article. In this process, we made use of ATLAS. ti software for 
qualitative data analysis. To ensure the validity of our research, we tested for inter-
coder reliability. To conduct this test we selected one policy document per year, for 
the period 2012–15, using a randomiser tool (P3, P10, P15 and P36, see Appendix). 
These four letters, representing over 10 per cent of the total number of analysed 
letters, were coded by a second coder. Krippendorff’s alpha test (Hayes and 
Krippendorff, 2007) resulted in an average inter-coder reliability coefficient of 0.83 
(range 0.77 to 0.89), which indicates good inter-coder reliability. In the coding 
process, we assigned codes only to sections of the policy letters that fall within our 
direct research scope of care and social support for people who are not self-sufficient. 
This excludes, for example, text sections on child abuse, youth care, ICT, personal 
budgets, forced marriages, energy savings, administrative burdens, security, 
healthcare packages and real estate.   
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Table 1. Overview selection process policy documents 
Search terms Results first 
search – 
including all 
sorts of 
documents 
Results first 
selection – 
including 
policy letters 
Results 
second 
selection – 
based on 
content 
Social Support Act + family care 101   45   30 
Social Support Act + informal care 100   50   16 
Social Support Act + respite care   26   13     9 
Social Support Act + voluntary care 107   64   22 
Long-term Care Act + family care   41   19   17 
Long-term Care Act + informal care   51   24     7 
Long-term Care Act + respite care   19     9     6 
Long-term Care Act + voluntary care   39   17     8 
Informal care 358 100   18 
Family care 191   82   36 
Respite care   31   16   10 
Voluntary care 267 120   26 
Total (including duplicates) 1331 559 205 
Total (excluding duplicates)     37 
 
2.5   Framing new roles for citizens and regular providers in 
public care reform 
 
Political discourse stresses the involvement of citizens in public service delivery, but 
how is this translated in governmental policy letters which enlist concrete policy 
goals and actions? We will now empirically examine the main themes that are 
present in the policy documents on care and social support. We start with an analysis 
of the themes that are used for legitimising the role changes of citizens and regular 
providers in the production of care services. 
 
Framing the problem(s) and proposed solutions  
Especially in the early period of the reorganisation of the care system, national 
government emphasises the inescapability of reorganising care provision. For 
example: ‘Transformation is required to make care future-proof. The place where we 
organize care, how we provide care and those who provide the care will change the 
next few years’ (P5, p 2). A strong sense of urgency is created around the necessity 
of governmental interventions. A typical quote in this respect: ‘If we don’t act now, 
severe future interventions will become unavoidable’ (P10, p 4). A turnaround of the 
system is needed to safeguard the long-term durability of care provision. The most 
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mentioned reasons to change the current system of care provision are the growth of 
demand (a growing population of elderly people), but also changing demands to care 
(societal demands): people want more customised care. Both reasons are connected 
to the ﬁnancial sustainability of the current system. The frame that high quality levels 
of care provision can only be maintained if changes are implemented rapidly to make 
the system future proof, prevails in the policy letters. This ‘change necessity’ frame 
is accompanied by policy goals such as: to keep care provision affordable, accessible 
and in line with changing societal demands. The turnaround implies the organisation 
of care to shift from ‘system-centred’ towards ‘people-centred’. Within this frame, 
in which national government emphasises the human dimension, the customisation 
of care is a central theme. Namely, people centred care implies custom-made care 
provision that matches the needs and abilities of individual citizens and their 
environments. ‘In a decentralized system, municipalities can connect to the power in 
society that differs from place to place’ (P14, p 3). In line with societal demands, 
national government wants individual citizens to live in their own neighbourhood 
and homes as long as possible. This is also where the activation of citizens as 
important actors in the production of care services comes in. In order to organise 
care and social support close to home in a customised way, informal carers should 
play a substantial role according to government. In this way of working, the national 
government is calling upon personal resources of people and their environments: a 
very prominent frame in the policy letters. Hence, a society in which people show 
concern for others is a necessary condition for the policy to work out. In Table 2 the 
different themes are depicted. This data clearly indicate that national government 
assumes the reorganisation of the care system to take place on the system and on the 
personal level: both professionals and citizens should adapt their roles to make the 
organisational and delivery of care services future proof. 
 
In the following sections, we probe the framing of roles and responsibilities of 
citizens and regular providers in the documents relating to this reform of Dutch care 
provision by distinguishing ﬁve differing narratives (see also Table 3). We 
subsequently discuss which roles as described in the literature are stressed in these 
narratives. 
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Table 2. Overview results on framing care reform 
Category Code Resultsa  Total 
Change is 
necessary  
Sustainability of care 43% (16/37)  65% (24/37)  
Changing demands 16% (6/37)   
Safeguard accessibility of care 22% (8/37)   
Affordability of care 8% (3/37)   
Quality and continuity of care  51% (19/37)   
System change Custom made care 54% (20/37)  70% (26/37)  
Care organized nearby 19% (7/37)   
People centred care 14% (5/37)   
Change/turnaround of positions 43% (16/37)   
Personal change Care in own environment 51% (19/37)  68% (25/37)  
Use of personal resources  49% (18/37)   
Show concern for each other 35% (13/37)   
Self-management  32% (12/37)   
Note: The results show the percentage of the documents containing the code 
 
 
Narratives used in policy documents  
Activation narrative  
The activation narrative, which we recognised in 68 per cent of the analysed policy 
documents (25 of 37), is made up of sentences in which national government 
explicitly describes the usage of citizen resources in care services as an inextricable, 
fundamental part of the system of care provision (P1, p 1). Being the dominant frame 
in only 5 per cent of the documents (two of 37) this narrative is used mainly as a 
starting point for the other narratives. In the activation narrative, care provision is 
primarily depicted as being a responsibility of citizens themselves. ‘Government 
cannot and should not take everything out of its citizens’ hands’ (P1, p 9). Hence, 
within district nurses’ care assessment, the capacity of citizens and informal carers 
to produce care is taken into account. ‘Rather than starting by looking at what people 
are entitled to according to regulations, we will ﬁrst look at what people can do 
themselves and how their personal environment can support them’ (P10, p 20). This 
entails an increase in the role of informal carers and volunteers and regular producers 
are made responsible for determining the amount of personal resources that is 
required from people and their environments in particular cases. Citizen action is 
portrayed as something that could be deployed by governments and/or should be 
expanded. Dedication and commitment from informal carers is needed and counted 
upon in the context of the transition of the care system (P6, p 5). Besides being 
important for enhancing well-being, informal care contributes indirectly to keeping 
the care provided by regular providers affordable, durable and of high quality. In this 
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sense, professional carers ‘lean’ on the contribution of informal carers to the care 
provision. In this respect, professionals, together with local governments, play a 
pivotal role in activating people and their social network: ‘To provide customized 
care, professionals start the conversation about the help request and the opportunities 
for self-management and self-reliance and the deployment of the social network of 
people’ (P10, p 23). The idea here is that if more people become ‘activated’, the care 
provided by other (informal) carers becomes more diluted and thus manageable 
(P33, p 8). In this narrative, national government addresses citizens not as ‘clients’ 
or ‘service users’ but as ‘citizens’. Here, encouraging active citizenship comes 
strongly to the fore. Both people in need and their environment are ‘activated’ to 
become active in the production of their care, while the role of regular care providers 
is framed to become smaller, though they have a task in mobilising citizens’ 
resources. As the resources of citizens are framed as being an inextricable part of the 
care system, of which local governments eventually remain responsible, this 
narrative clearly emphasises the importance of activating citizens in a process of co-
production. For regular care providers, this implies a mobilising and connecting role. 
The total amount of care is co-produced by regular and citizen providers.  
 
Supportive narrative  
Within the support narrative, governments work on creating a favourable and 
supportive policy climate for facilitating informal care provision. In formulating 
policy goals, government aims to support informal carers: a very prominent 
narrative, coming to the fore in 86 per cent of the analysed policy documents. 
Furthermore, the supportive narrative is dominating the discourse in 38 per cent of 
the policy documents (14 of 37). As governments increasingly rely upon informal 
carers’ efforts in care provision, informal-carer overload, which reduces their long-
term deployment, should be prevented (P9, p 4). In supporting informal carers, both 
local governments and regular care providers play crucial roles. The law stipulates 
that local governments are responsible for arranging customised support 
infrastructures for informal carers (P33, p 8). ‘A well-designed local support 
infrastructure should alleviate informal carers’ (P8, p 7). While people can still rely 
on professional care, this type of care is provided in collaboration with the people 
themselves and their environments. In this process, regular care providers should 
keep an eye out for the needs of informal carers and support them (P6, p 2; P8, p 12; 
P14, p 7). For regular care professionals, ‘this implies a different attitude’ and a 
‘professional development’. Identifying needs of and supporting informal carers 
have become part of the new competences of professionals (P5, p 7). Professionals 
could, for example, capacitate informal carers in taking speciﬁc care measures (for 
example, P1, p 3). In this narrative, the relationship between citizens and government 
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is framed as a co-production: citizens are addressed as important care producers 
(informal care providers), while regular providers should capacitate and facilitate 
them. This implies that regular care providers are not only responsible for activating 
citizens, they should also support citizens in their attempts to provide care. 
 
Partnership narrative  
Teamwork between informal and formal carers is key within the partnership 
narrative. ‘It is all about person-centred care in partnerships’ (P32, p 2). This 
narrative is present in 81 per cent of policy documents. However, only in 5 per cent 
of the cases (two of 37) is the partnership narrative dominant. Just like the 
‘activation’ narrative, this narrative plays a supporting and complementing role in 
the overall framing in the document. The speciﬁc deﬁnition that national 
governments use to deﬁne partnership in this narrative is that professionals act as 
back-up care providers when informal care provided by family and volunteers is 
insufficient. ‘When someone is insufficiently helped with the deployment of his/her 
own power/resources and with the help of other people in his/her family and social 
network, the municipality will provide individual customized care’ (P18, p 7). 
Thereby, professionals complement the informal care provision of individuals 
instead of the other way around. Actual interaction and teamwork, instead of a mere 
complementing partnership, is stressed in relation to the formal drafting of a care 
plan. Here, the national government talks about explicitly institutionalising the 
involvement of informal carers in the examination of individual requests for social 
support (P6, p 4). By strengthening the formal position of informal carers, 
government tries to create a level playing ﬁeld: ‘Professionals should see informal 
carers and volunteers as equal partners in care provision’ (P8, p 12).  
 
Competitive narrative  
Interestingly, the competitive narrative in which self-organised citizen service 
provision is presented as the alternative to current governmental care services is 
present in only 11 per cent of policy documents (4 of 37). In none of these documents 
does the competitive narrative dominate. Within the competing narrative, citizens 
are depicted as direct competitors of regular providers as they can compete for the 
same care budgets (‘parallel production’). In order to ‘self-organize care services’ 
(P37, p 6), citizens can, for instance, set up care cooperatives (P14, p 5) or avail 
themselves of the Right to Challenge. Here, ‘community groups and social 
enterprises can bid to run governmental care services where they believe they can do 
so differently and better than the currently provided services’ (P14, p 4). The role of 
governments in the framing is to remove possible obstacles for self-organization and 
facilitate the further activation of citizens (P14, p 4). In order to foster the connective 
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capacity of governments to societal initiatives, the national government started an 
experiment programme to explore how requirements can be made more in line with 
societal initiatives and how municipal procurement procedures can be made more 
open to those initiatives (P12, p 7; P29, p 5). How government positions the role of 
professionals towards these competitors remains unclear though. Being only 
marginally addressed, this narrative on self-organization gets less attention than the 
co-production narratives in which the activation of citizens takes place within the 
control of regular service providers.  
 
Client narrative  
The most dominant narrative in the policy documents is the client narrative. This 
narrative is present in 68 per cent of the policy documents, of which in 51 per cent it 
is the dominant narrative (19 of 37). Thus, in more than half of the analysed 
documents the responsibility for care provision is clearly attributed to professionals, 
healthcare institutions and local governments. In this narrative, citizens are framed 
as clients or patients. In contrast to the other narratives, future proof and high-quality 
care is framed to be the responsibility of board members of care institutions and/ or 
professionals (P32, p 2). For example, when it comes to future proof care in nursing 
homes: ‘The fundamental change is in the relationship between clients and 
professionals’ (P30, p 4). There is little consideration of the ways in which either 
service users themselves might co-produce their own care improvements with 
professionals (for example, by using tele care facilities or by participating in health 
improvement or through behaviour change programmes) or the ways in which 
volunteers might help to improve outcomes of existing public care programmes (for 
example, through peer support activities). Since these have both become major 
components of care programmes across OECD countries in the past decade, this 
ﬁnding is interesting. In contrast to the previous narratives citizens are addressed as 
(passive) clients. Within the client narrative other citizens are addressed beyond the 
supportive, partnership and competitive narratives. In this narrative, governments 
focus on citizens who are not self-reliant, while in the other narratives their families 
and volunteers are addressed. 
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Table 3. Overview narratives  
Narratives Results: 
percentage 
and amount of 
documents 
containing the 
code 
Results: 
percentage and 
amount of 
documents 
where code was 
dominant¹ 
Description  
Activation narrative 68% (25/37)  5% (2/37) Citizens are activated 
to become co-
producers, providers as 
coordinators. 
Supportive narrative 86% (32/37)  38% (14/37) Citizens are framed as 
co-producers, providers 
as facilitators and 
supporters. 
Partnership narrative 81% (30/37) 5% (2/37) Citizens are framed as 
co-producing partners, 
providers as back-up 
care providers. 
Competing narrative 11% (4/37) 0% (0/37) Citizens take 
responsibility and 
ownership of care 
process.  
Client narrative 68% (25/37) 51% (19/37) Citizens are framed as 
clients. Providers are 
regulating and 
producing care 
services. 
Note: The narrative that covers the highest number of sentences, is considered to be dominant 
within a document. Therefore, there can only be one dominant narrative per document  
 
Time trend?  
When we divide the 37 documents into four piles (of around nine documents per 
pile) to take the timing of narratives into account, we can observe corresponding 
supportive and client narratives. Although it should be noted that the time scope of 
the sample is quite small for discovering any meaningful time trends, we do observe 
some differences between the four quarters (see Table 4). While in the beginning of 
the reform the supportive narrative dominated, the client narrative convincingly took 
over in the middle of the reform (second and third quarter). The last documents 
showed a converging of the two narratives: both are strongly present and either one 
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of them being the dominant one. It seems government has found a balance between 
both narratives in the end of the examined reform period.  
 
Table 4. Time trend  
Documents 
divided in 4 
quarters 
Activation 
narrative 
Supportive 
narrative 
Partnership 
narrative 
Competitive 
narrative 
Client 
narrative 
First-quarter 
(2012-2013) 
1 5 1  2 
Second-quarter 
(2013-2014) 
 3 1  5 
Third-quarter 
(2014-2015) 
 2   7 
Fourth-quarter 
(2015) 
1 4   5 
 
 
Discussion  
Although our analysis shows that although the client narrative is dominant in half of 
the analysed policy documents, the overall picture shows a strong focus on 
activating, supporting and partnering with citizens. These narratives on citizens as 
active service producers are used in more documents than the narrative on citizens 
as passive client: 95 per cent against 68 per cent. Citizens are framed as active 
services producers which are and should be part of the general system of care service 
delivery. We could not ﬁnd clear patterns in the joint occurences of narratives; the 
national government uses multiple narratives frequently and freely throughout the 
policy documents. This expansion and diversiﬁcation of accompanying roles for 
regular providers seems to be, at least in this particular policy area, a signiﬁcant 
change from previous providercentric inspired frames. As noticed, the framing of 
citizens as active service producers in care service provision comes to the fore in 
different narratives. In the activation narrative, governments cast citizens as 
(informal) carers and try to incorporate them in the formal system by indicating that 
they count upon their commitment. By making use of this narrative, the national 
government calls for the activation of citizens in the care sector. In this process of 
becoming active co-producers of care, local governments and professionals are there 
to support citizens. This is key within the supportive narrative, where informal carers 
are again portrayed as being the main provider of home care. Interestingly, instead 
of facilitating collective forms of citizen activation, the focus is rather on individual 
citizens as informal carers and, in this role, as implementers of care services. The 
authority in the co-production relationship explicitly remains at the governmental 
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side in the narratives. The form in which citizens organise their own care in a civic 
collective outside the direct realm of government, is only marginally addressed: in 
11 per cent of the documents. Additionally, we did not ﬁnd, for example, a 
facilitative frame in which government seeks to stimulate and facilitate citizen 
groups in organising care for their community, giving them more democratic control 
and ownership, as suggested by scholars and government scientiﬁc advisory boards 
oriented at democratic innovation (for example, Wagenaar and Van der Heijden, 
2015; ROB, 2012). In line with the literature on co-production, it seems that the 
activation of citizens is predominantly seen as a means to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public governance, and not so much to enhance citizens’ democratic 
inﬂuence (compare Voorberg et al, 2015). In the partnership narrative, professionals 
and informal carers are portrayed as partners, who should cooperate and adapt their 
efforts in providing care for individuals. However, how the actual interaction takes 
shape and how long-term relationships are built remains unclear. Indeed, in this 
process of cooperation and adaptation, regular providers are framed as being the 
‘back-up’ service providers. Namely, if the production efforts of citizens fail, local 
governments are obliged to intervene as maintaining a good level of care remains a 
government responsibility. Therefore, the question is whether this process of 
‘partnering’ implies a process of co-producing public care services and what kind of 
co-production. As far as it concerns interaction between citizens and professionals 
in the design and production of public services, this interaction seems to take place 
in a quite vertical manner rather than a horizontal one. Government explicitly states 
that it decides where responsibility should shift towards citizens and where not. This 
ﬁnding supports claims of authors suggesting that governments are co-opting citizen 
action in their policy agendas and thereby trying to reshape those with whom they 
collaborate (for example, Brandsen et al, 2014; Newman, 2007). As becomes clear, 
these narratives are strongly connected and complement one another. They are aimed 
at giving shape to a shared delivery of care services by trying to incorporating the 
efforts of informal carers in the formal system by activation, supporting and 
cooperating with citizens. In this way, the national governments place the efforts of 
citizens under a shadow of hierarchy. 
 
2.6   Conclusion 
 
In this article, we empirically examined the framing of the relationship between 
citizens and regular service providers in recent care reforms in the Netherlands, 
contributing to wider understanding of changing relationships in care provision. This 
responds to recent calls to make the research into co-production methodically more 
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diverse and to pay more attention to studying the role of regular service providers 
(Brandsen and Honingh, 2016). Based on a content analysis of policy documents on 
the provision of care services in the period 2012–15, this study shows that the Dutch 
national government seeks to activate individual citizens (and their families) in the 
implementation of care services. By making use of activation, supportive, 
partnership and competing narratives, the government reshapes traditional roles. 
These ﬁndings provide empirical back-up for the claim that co-production and self-
organization in the public sector is becoming an increasingly important theme (for 
example, Voorberg et al, 2015; Edelenbos and Van Meerkerk, 2016), at least when 
it concerns the governmental discourse about care reforms: a policy sector that is 
traditionally characterised by strong levels of government responsibility and activity. 
However, these newer roles (citizen-as-coproducers) do not substitute traditional 
roles (citizen-as-clients), but constitute a new, additional layer resulting in an 
expansion and diversiﬁcation of roles for regular providers. With regards to the wider 
understanding of changing care provision this study demonstrates that the national 
government is calling for a new public service ethos of professionals. In recent care 
reforms, the central role of professionals is portrayed to encompass the mobilisation, 
support and coordination of the co-production capabilities of the social network of 
service users. The described diversiﬁcation of roles in co-producing care services 
with informal carers implies a versatile role for regular service providers. Next to 
their more traditional role as service provider (client narrative), professionals now 
have to activate the social network of people in need (activation narrative), support 
these informal carers in providing care (supportive narrative) while taking part in a 
collaborative process with them (parthership narrative). The aim of this reform 
essentially comes down to cutback expenditures to ensure the affordability and 
accesssiblity of the care-system by reducing the overall activities and role of 
professionals. This indicates a fundamental transformation in the relations of care 
service provision. In this respect, Endo and Lim (2017, 294) argue that the current 
transformation of the welfare state seeks to privatise the delivery of services to the 
third sector while the state maintains public responsibility for citizen’s social rights. 
It is important to put our conclusions into perspective. Although we have been able 
to elucidate how national governments frame the new co-production roles of citizens 
and professionals, this knowledge is based upon national policy letters in one country 
from a relatively small period in time. An interesting aspect for follow-up research 
concerns comparison of governmental framing across different timeframes (within 
countries) and/or comparing the framing of governments across different countries. 
A comparative country study could elucidate whether the same frames are found in 
countries with similar and with different governance traditions (compare Pollit and 
Bouckaert, 2011). Furthermore, it is good to keep in mind that the consequences of 
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the identiﬁed narratives for actual service delivery have to be established. Do citizens 
recognise themselves in the governmental framing of their role as self-organising 
partners of government? And does this framing affect their perception and their 
interpretation of their role? Do professionals take up their role as activator, partner 
and supporter? These are important questions for future research. Focusing on citizen 
production of care services fundamentally changes the roles not only of citizens, but 
also of professionals, as government requires care professionals to take up multiple 
roles simultaneously. Whereas in discursive practices all types of narratives can 
peacefully coexist, it might well be that, in policy practice, various conﬂicts and 
tensions arise as a result of incompatible roles. The practical implications of this 
hybridisation of roles thus have to be established. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1.  Policy documents 
Department Title of policy document in Dutch [and 
English] 
Year P (ID) 
Ministerie van VWS Policy letter family care 2012 1 
Ministerie van VWS Loneliness 2012 2 
Ministerie van VWS Implementation action plan ‘elderly in safe 
hands’ 
2012 3 
Ministerie van VWS Progress report autumn 2012 ‘violence in 
dependency relationships’ 
2012 4 
Ministerie van VWS Vision on the care and welfare labour market  2013 5 
Ministerie van VWS Progress ‘Strengthening, facilitating and 
linking’ 
2013 6 
Ministerie van VWS Investing in palliative care 2013 7 
Ministerie van VWS Strengthening, facilitating and linking 2013 8 
Ministerie van SZW Results meeting work and care of November 18 2013 9 
Ministerie van VWS Shared agenda VWS ‘From systems to people’ 2013 10 
Ministerie van VWS Consideration Social Support Act 2015 2014 11 
Ministerie van EZ Autumn report on regulatory burdens 2014 12 
Ministerie van VWS Intensifying and institutionalizing the approach 
to loneliness 
2014 13 
Ministerie van BZK Reaction to the motion put forward by Mr Slob 
regarding the participation society 
2014 14  
Ministerie van BZK Targeting restrictive rules for volunteers and 
citizen participation 
2014 15 
Ministerie van VWS Short-term primary residence 2014 16 
Ministerie van VWS Short-term residential care in AWBZ, Wmo 
2015, Zvw, Youth Act and Wlz 
2014 17 
Ministerie van BZK Transition Agenda for living independently for 
a longer time 
2014 18 
Ministerie van VWS Coherence in care and welfare 2014 19 
Ministerie van VWS Transition reforming long-term care 2014 20 
Ministerie van VWS The Wmo in motion; Evaluating the Social 
Support Act 2010-2012 
2014 21 
Ministerie van VWS Outcomes budgetary conciliations long-term 
care reforms 
2014 22 
Ministerie van VWS Waiting lists care and nursing homes 2014 23 
Ministerie van VWS Progress letter on informal care 2014 24 
Ministerie van VWS Progress transition Wmo 2015 2014 25 
Ministerie van VWS Progress report HLZ 2014 26 
Ministerie van VWS Commission letter of the Second Chamber in 
response to  NOS.nl dated 13 April 2015 ‘Older 
people get too little care at home’ 
2015 27 
Ministerie van VWS Request from the Regulation of work to 
respond to the SCP research ‘Competition 
2015 28 
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between informal care and paid work’ in 
response to the message ‘Participation society 
takes its toll in the workplace’ (Volkskrant, 24 
March 2015) 
Ministerie van BZK Transformation in the social domain 2015 29 
Ministerie van VWS Elaboration of the quality letter of elderly care: 
‘Dignity and pride. Loving care for our elderly’ 
2015 30 
Ministerie van BZK Progress report Transition agenda living 
independently for a longer time 
2015 31 
Ministerie van VWS Dignity and pride 2015 32 
Ministerie van VWS Living with dementia 2015 33 
Ministerie van VWS Intention expiration WTZi-requirement for 
respite care in Wlz 
2015 34 
Ministerie van VWS Progress report Informal Care 2015 35 
Ministerie van VWS Progress report transition HLZ 2015 36 
isterie van VWS Renewal letter care and welfare close to home 2015 37 
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Chapter 3 
The Governance of Self-Organization: which 
governance strategy do policy officials and 
citizens prefer? 
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Abstract 
This article compares views of policy officials and members of community-based 
collectives on the ideal role of government in processes of community self-
organization. By using Q methodology, we presented statements on four different 
governance perspectives: traditional public administration, New Public 
Management, network governance, and self- governance. Perceptions differ about 
how government should respond to the trend of community self-organization and, in 
particular, about the primacy of the relationship. Whereas some public servants and 
collectives favor hands-off involvement of policy officials, others show a preference 
for a more direct and interactive relation between government and community-based 
collectives. In general, neither of the two groups have much appreciation for policy 
instruments based on performance indicators, connected to the New Public 
Management perspective or strong involvement of politicians, connected the 
traditional public administration perspective. This article contributes to the 
discussion of how prac- titioners see and combine governance perspectives and serve 
to enable dialogs between practitioners.  
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Civic engagement around public issues is changing, leading to new forms of 
community organizing, also referred to as ‘self-organization’ in the literature 
(Eriksson 2012; Edelenbos et al. 2018). As a correction mechanism to the perceived 
failure of centralized and impersonal service provision by government and private 
parties, communities develop small-scale community-based services in which 
people have a say (Gofen 2015; Healey 2015; De Moor 2015). As part of a larger 
cultural and political development, many diverse collectives, such as community 
enterprises and cooperatives, have emerged to complement or even substitute 
professional services (see, for example, Peredo and Chrisman 2006; Kleinhans 
2017). These self-organizations are new in the sense that they are an attempt to break 
away from community organizing as either participating in government actions, or 
opposed to government initiatives, but as unrelated to government.1 In this article, 
we use the term community-based collectives to refer to groups of citizens that 
initiate, own, and exploit specific collective community-based services. 2  As 
community-based collectives establish themselves as independent players in an 
already crowded and institutionalized public field, entering into some kind of 
relationship with government is almost a prerequisite (Edelenbos et al. 2009; 
Bekkers et al. 2014).  
 
This article: assessing governance preferences of citizens and policy o cials  
Although we see a growing number of these community-based collectives and, 
accordingly, see a growing attention given in the literature to how they organize 
themselves (Nederhand et al. 2016; Edelenbos et al. 2018), there is very little 
research on what form of governance is actually preferred by policy officials and 
collectives. As a first step in researching the (causal) question of the effects of such 
relationship, this study systematically examines the perceptions on relevant 
governance orientations among both local policy officials and key members of 
collectives. The central question of this article is: How do policy officials and key 
 
 
1 Of course, from a historical point of view, these community-based collectives are anything but new 
since early examples of self-organization historically preceded the development of the state-controlled 
services of the twentieth century, and have been present ever since (De Moor 2015; Denters 2016). 
Contrary to the more historical instances of community-based collectives, these ‘new’ collectives 
establish themselves as independent players in an already crowded and institutionalized public field. 
2 We do not refer to entire communities that are self-organized, but specific organizational entities, 
‘collectives’ organized around a specific function – which also implies that these community-based 
collectives operate within the bounds of regular society, with all the normal rules and regulation.  
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members of community-based collectives perceive the (ideal) governance 
relationship between government and collectives? Our main contribution is twofold. 
First, this article contributes to the theoretical debate about what governance modes 
various actors prefer, but also how various governance perspectives, and 
accompanying policy mechanisms, are combined (See Levi-Faur 2012; Lægreid 
2016). In this research, we identify four governance modes, which involve different 
preferences for policy instruments, that are expected to attain the general aim of 
government (Salamon 1981; Considine 2001; Howlett 2009). Promotion of 
dichotomous sets of governance strategies like ‘market versus state’ or ‘hierarchical 
versus collaborative’ led to blunt thinking about instruments and their modalities 
which is not helpful for furthering understanding of policy design (Howlett 2014). 
That is to say, administrative practice usually involves the use of multiple tools in 
policy instrument mixes. However, the nature of these mixes and how behavioral 
aspects of policymakers lead them to favor one design over another remains 
understudied (Bressers and O’Toole 2005; Eliadis et al. 2005; Howlett 2018). Our 
contribution is a modest, but essential first step in developing a more ambitious 
research agenda on how mixes of normative expectations affect results of 
community-based collectives. Second, this article provides a firm basis for 
facilitating dialogs between practitioners about these views by providing a theo- 
retically grounded exploration on diverging views of governance steering between 
these two groups. A mismatch in normative expectations and attitudes on how the 
relationship between policy officials and community-based collectives should be 
organized and governed might have important consequences for the chances of 
success of collectives (for example Edelenbos et al. 2009; Nederhand et al. 2016). 
Hence, the issues of steering and intervention are key attributes of effective policy 
making (Hajer 2003).  
 
To gain insight into the differing perspectives on governance relationships, we use 
Q methodology (Brown 1980), a methodology especially suitable for identifying and 
systematically and scientifically mapping underlying inter-subjectivity on a topic. 
We first distinguish and discuss four theoretical perspectives on governance 
(“Perspectives on governance” section). We then explain the research method (Q 
methodology), how we used it, and how we constructed the statements for the sort 
process, for which we used the literature on governance perspectives (“Research 
design: Q sort statements and respondents’ selection” section). Next, we analyze the 
distinction in governance perspectives between the two groups of respondents 
(“Results” section). In the final section, we address important conclusions and 
limitations and consider avenues for future research.  
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3.2 Perspectives on governance 
 
There is a massive literature on the relationship between government and society and 
on governance as the way policy is formed and implemented to influence that 
relationship and achieve public goals. Within this literature, it is possible to 
distinguish coherent clusters that share a specific focus on certain elements or values 
of governance; these elements are not coherent theories, but rather joint perspectives 
on what is important in governance (e.g., Bourgon 2011). Such perspectives can be 
useful for studying the exchange relationship of government and community-based 
collectives. For the purpose of this study, we have discerned four perspectives on 
governance that reflect clusters in the literature and have proven to be recognizable 
and relevant in the view of practitioners. We discern the following four perspectives: 
traditional public administration, New Public Management, network governance, 
and self-governance. 3  We will discuss each perspective briefly and present the 
consequences of each perspective for the relation between government and 
community-based collectives. We do not strive toward a definitive clustering of the 
govern- ance literature, but for a lens that can be used to study the perceptions of the 
mutual interaction between policy officials and active citizens. We also acknowledge 
that the fourth perspective (self-governance) is the least well known and least well 
developed. The perspectives can help us to generate statements for the empirical 
analysis of the perceptions of respondents on governance. At the end of this section, 
we compare the four governance perspectives and highlight similarities and 
differences.  
 
Traditional Public Administration: safeguarding public values  
The first theoretical perspective examined is that of traditional public administration 
(TPA). This perspective focuses on governance as ensuring legal(istic) values, 
achieving political goals, and safeguarding public values, especially equal treatment, 
legality, and democracy (Wilson 1989). Governmental organizations are 
characterized as impersonal rational sys- tems that prescribe neutral behavior for 
 
 
3 We want to emphasize that we present governance perspectives here, so more or less coherent ideas 
on how to govern state-society relations and to form and implement policy. That is not exactly the 
same as coordination mechanism as is sometimes presented in more economic literature (see Ostrom, 
2010) or organizational literature (Powel, 1990) like market, hierarchies and networks although the 
two are related. But in governance perspectives much more other aspects are emphasized than in the 
literature about coordination mechanism (for instance, in the governance network perspective, as we 
distinguish it, much emphasizes is laid on network management as governance strategy, while this 
does not receive much attention in the literature on networks as coordination mechanism (see Powel, 
1990)). 
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policy officials (Weber 1978). Political goals of officeholders are favored, and so 
political decisions guide what policy officials should do. Moreover, this perspective 
emphasizes the rule of law and legalistic values. The presence of impersonal and 
stable rules shields citizens from arbitrariness, power abuse, and personal whims 
(Bartels 2013). With regard to collectives, this implies that the interaction should 
take place along the lines of clear regulations. The explicit standardization of func- 
tions, processes, and rules makes interaction with the bureaucratic organization 
perfectly predictable (Dror 1968). Hence, public values, such as impartiality and 
impersonality, which guarantee that values of equality, transparency and democracy 
are not violated, are key. From a TPA perspective, safeguarding these public values 
is especially important now that collectives are becoming increasingly prominent in 
public service provision. Therefore, to compensate for failures within civil society, 
government should use policy instru- ments that regularize collectives that provide 
services to citizens to ensure that they meet those public values of equality and 
democracy.  
 
New Public Management: governing through performance indicators  
The second perspective is that of New Public Management (NPM). It is difficult to 
provide a definitive image of NPM (Pollitt et al. 2007; see Hood 1991; Lane 2000). 
However, the main features of NPM focus on improving the efficiency and 
effectiveness of public service delivery through the use of policy instruments that 
focus on the management of processes and systems. In the NPM view, governments 
decide what they want, specify outputs, and then decide which organizations—
public but autonomous, nonprofit, or private—can best deliver the service (Osborne 
and Gaebler 1992). Moreover, the use of business instruments (strategic and 
performance management techniques and performance indicators) are cru- cial to 
any conceptualization of NPM (See Hood 1991). For this idea to work, two very 
important conditions have to be met: goal specification and monitoring capability. 
Thus, public actors have to be able to define goals and translate these into 
performance indicators and actually be able to monitor the implementation of the 
actors’ activities. In this perspective, governments thus occupy a superordinate 
position in relation to collectives that provide services (e.g., principal–agent 
relation). Once performance indicators have been set, policy officials can take a more 
hands-off approach to their monitoring role.  
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Network Governance: managing performance through joint interaction  
The third perspective is that of network governance. Here, government relates to 
collectives in a more horizontal way, resulting in more intense interactions. 
Governing takes place through the usage of procedural policy tools (Howlett 2000). 
Procedural tools, like process design rules, or arranging interactions, can be seen as 
techniques of network management (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Klijn and 
Koppenjan 2016). They are aimed at altering and improving policy interaction, but 
they do so indirectly by structuring interactions with- out determining their outcome 
(Howlett 2018). The governance perspective emphasizes the importance of inter-
organizational coordination and quality of decision making (Klijn and Koppenjan 
2016). In this perspective, public goals and policies are defined and imple- mented 
through a process of interaction and negotiation; policy and service delivery are 
achieved in networks of mutually dependent actors. Managerial efforts of policy 
officials focus on activating actors, organizing joint-research meetings (joint fact 
finding), and com- posing a set of mutually agreed upon rules of behavior. Whereas 
the relationship between government and collectives under NPM is more strongly 
contractual and performance based, in network governance it is a more 
interdependent horizontal relationship, with emphasis on joint action and facilitating 
cooperation to deliver societal outcomes.  
 
Self-Governance: fostering autonomy of community-based collectives 
Recently, the perspective of self-governance has been re-emerging (Bourgon 2011; 
Sørensen and Torfing 2007). Naturally, the idea that (small) groups of people can 
organize collective goods without market mechanism or hierarchy has been 
emphasized by others, not the least Elinor Ostrom. Sometimes, this is presented as 
‘clubs’ (see Ostrom 2010): groups of individuals that create private associations to 
provide themselves with non-rival but small-scale goods and services, but also 
exclude non-members.  
As a governance perspective, thus how it is used in this article, the idea of self-
govern- ance has a long history (for instance, in the nineteenth century, when various 
collectives were established to solve social problems). The key point of this 
perspective is that the dynamics that produce public value start within society and, 
as such, government relates to that (De Moor 2015). For example, government can 
relate to these initiatives of society by letting go, by blocking, by facilitating, or by 
attempting to ‘organize’ more self-organization (Nederhand et al. 2016; van der 
Steen et al. 2016). Thus, governments tend to follow and improve self-organization 
of citizen and society initiatives rather than initiate and organize them. Self-
governance is not equivalent to a laissez-faire approach to government (see also 
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Rhodes 1997), nor does it imply that self-organization is disconnected from 
government action. Almost all self-organizing activities take place within the bounds 
of government jurisdiction and in regulated spaces and involve interests of other 
stakeholders—either in or outside the self-organized community. The essence of this 
governance perspective is that because societal actors take action themselves, 
government actors need to relate to these often-uninvited actions (see Sørensen and 
Torfing 2007). The policy instruments appropriate for the self-governance 
perspective would thus be more restrained. They would include things like removing 
barriers for collectives to function, supporting them by providing fast access to 
public decision making, and maybe encouraging collectives by small subsidies. But 
essentially governments would stay away from steering strongly on the content 
(which is been done in the network perspective). Although the self-governance mode 
of governance contains elements of the network governance perspective in the sense 
that both emphasize a more horizontal type of relationship between the public and 
societal sphere, we observe several significant differences which makes it logical to 
identify them as separate perspectives. In the network governance perspective, the 
government does have a very active role in linking, collaborating, and co-producing 
services with the collective by intense network management strategies. In the self-
governance per- spective, goals of collectives are emphasized more and government 
is not very active in managing the relation and the output of the service. Thus, in a 
self-governance perspective, governments are not really co-producing services with 
collectives but are at larger distance only facilitating and reducing obstacles.  
 
The four perspectives compared  
The governance relationship between government and community-based collectives 
can therefore be perceived in very distinct ways. When the theoretical perspectives 
are applied to different aspects of this relationship, each mode has a different view 
(See Table 1). Based on the well-established practice of NPM and network 
governance, in particular, we would expect policy officials to embrace these two 
perspectives. For collectives, on the other hand, we expect a preference for the self-
governance perspective.  
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Table 1. Four dominant perspectives on governing self-organization  
 Traditional 
Public 
Administration 
New Public 
Management 
Network 
Governance 
Self-
Governance 
Focus Achieving 
political goals 
and safeguarding 
public values 
(like as equality, 
democracy) 
Improving 
efficiency and 
effectives of 
service 
delivery  
Improving 
inter-
organizational 
coordination 
and quality of 
decision 
making 
Improving 
self-
governance of 
non-
governmental 
actors 
Roles of 
public 
officials 
Neutral 
bureaucrat  
Monitoring 
entrepreneur 
Active 
Network 
Manager 
Distant 
facilitator 
Relation with 
government 
Interaction with 
collectives takes 
place along the 
lines of clear 
regulations 
Interaction 
with 
collectives 
takes place 
along the lines 
of clear policy 
goals and 
performance 
indicators 
Interactions 
with collectives 
is intense. 
Public officials 
as prominent 
network 
managers 
Interactions 
between public 
actors and 
collectives 
limited. Public 
officials 
following 
rather than 
leading 
Policy 
instruments 
Using rules and 
regulations to 
improve service 
delivery of 
collectives 
Using business 
instruments 
(modern 
management 
techniques, 
performance 
indicators) to 
improve 
service 
delivery of 
collectives 
Using network 
management: 
activating 
actors, 
organizing 
research 
gatherings 
(joint fact 
finding), 
process rules, 
etc. to improve 
services by 
collectives 
Use facilitating 
instruments 
(removing 
obstacles, 
providing 
access and 
encouraging by 
small subsidies 
that do not 
damage 
identities of 
collectives) 
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3.3 Research design: Q statements and respondents’ 
selection 
 
Q methodology is increasingly applied by public administration scholars in the 
systematic study of perceptions (Durose et al. 2015). In brief, Q methodology 
presents a series of statements representative of the debate on an issue to the 
respondents, who are asked to sort the statements into a distribution of preference (a 
Q sort). From this distribution, statistically significant factors are derived and 
interpreted (Watts and Stenner 2012). By using Q methodology, it is possible to 
develop a set of statements based on the four perspectives identified in Sect. 2 and 
administer these statements in random order to policy officials and community-based 
collectives to explore whether and how these perspectives operate in practice. Hence, 
respondents are not presented the perspectives, but only the individual statements 
derived from them. By measuring perceptions rather than actual behavior, the Q sort 
concerns the studying of subjectivity. The usage of a statistical tool in combination 
with a well-developed stepwise approach makes the method explicit and replicable 
(Watts and Stenner 2012; McKeown and Thomas 2013). We will now explain the 
three- step approach that we followed.  
 
Q methodology first requires researchers to comprehensively capture the diversity 
of the debate. There are several ways to establishing the breath of the debate around 
a particular issue (see Jeffares and Skelcher 2011; Watts and Stenner 2012), by using 
interviews, focus groups, policy and/or media discourses, and academic discourses. 
In this article, we take the academic discourse as a starting point (see Durning and 
Osuna 1994; Klijn et al. 2016). This allows researchers to relate the profiles that 
result from the empirical analysis more strongly to existing theoretical debates. We, 
therefore, started to develop sample statements by extracting a long list of statements 
from our reading of the literature around the four perspectives outlined in Sect. 3.2. 
By systematically sorting the statements in a 3×2 grid (see Table 2), we reduced the 
number of statements while simultaneously safeguarding the diversity of the debate. 
Our approach follows the statement-sampling method developed by Dryzek and 
Berejikian (1993). Across the horizontal axis, the grid considers three types of 
statements that are relevant for examining the relationship between government and 
collectives: relationships between entities, degrees of agency and governance 
profession. In addition, across the vertical axis, the grid considers two types of 
statements: definitions and prescriptions following, for instance, those of Jeffares 
and Skelcher (2011) and Klijn et al. (2016). To ensure a balanced sample, we 
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retained four statements in each cell. Each statement is inspired by one of the four 
perspectives, resulting in a total of 24 statements (See Table 2 below).  
To ensure the compatibility of the statements with the practitioners’ experiences, we 
conducted a pilot study. Before activating the study online, the preliminary Q-set 
was tested ‘offline’ in a face-to-face setting. We instructed two participants from the 
side of collectives (one initiator and one expert working for an umbrella organization 
specializing in community-based collectives) and two policy officials to sort the 
statements and to list the statements that they failed to understand, found similar in 
meaning, or considered irrel- evant. We also asked whether they had additional 
remarks about missing crucial dimen- sions. Their feedback resulted in several 
adjustments and refinements of the Q-set.  
 
The second step is to present the study to participants: in this case, policy officials 
and collectives. Most Q studies find samples of between 25 and 40 respondents 
sufficient to establish the number of shared subjective viewpoints operant around a 
topic (Brown 1980; Watts and Stenner 2012). Our P set is composed of 40 policy 
officials and 40 collectives. The participants are working in the field of care and 
welfare in the Netherlands. We find this domain specifically important to study as 
this policy area is traditionally character- ized by a strong government presence. 
Given the demographic of our P set, we decided to administer our study online using 
an application called POETQ. 4  We asked the participants in a corresponding email 
to let us know when they had difficulties with the Q sorting procedure so that we 
could offer additional instructions.  
We emailed a link to the online Q sort to 80 policy officials working in Dutch local 
gov- ernments. The policy officials whom we approached are involved in 
policymaking func- tions in departments of medium-to-large-sized municipalities 
that focus upon designing care and welfare policies. We strived to select policy 
officials who have direct contact with collectives. Around 35% of the participants 
consisted of professional contacts from our network in this sector, while the other 
65% were selected by top officials, who send out the invitation to the welfare policy 
department in their organization. A total of 40 people completed the Q sort (50% 
response rate). Despite our efforts to only select officials who are experienced in 
working with community-based collectives, a small minority of policy officials 
indicated that they did not have much contact with collectives. As the differences 
 
 
4 https://stephenjeffares.wordpress.com/poetq/ 
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with their colleagues who had direct contact were small, we chose to keep these 
policy officials included in our analysis. Furthermore, we emailed a link to the online 
Q sort to 95 initiators of care and welfare collectives in the Netherlands. We only 
selected collectives that are community-based organizational entities initiated, 
owned, and controlled by citizens and are organized around a specific welfare/care 
function. They are thus distinct from government (and cannot be attributed as co-
productions). With regard to the collectives, we also selected participants in two 
different ways to counteract a potential bias. We made use of two online databases: 
MAEX and Vilans. In the case of the MAEX database, collec- tives need to register 
themselves. Via the database that is linked to a website (https://www. 
maex.nl/initiatieven/), collectives make their societal value transparent and can get 
better connected to funds and possible partners or volunteers. This implies a certain 
amount of digital skills on the side of the collectives. The Vilas database consists of 
170 care and welfare collectives. These collectives were actively spotted and 
included by the organiza- tion Vilans itself. For the collectives, this implies that they 
need to be visible to the profes- sionals of Vilans to be added to the database. In 
conclusion, a potential bias exists in favor of those collectives with good digital and 
networking skills. In selecting the collectives, we also took the phase of the initiative 
into account as this can influence perceptions regard- ing governance issues. We 
only approached collectives that were well established and had thus transited the 
initiating phase. A total of 40 people completed the Q sort (42% response rate).  
 
The third step concerns the process of Q sorting. Our participants sorted the 24 state- 
ments into seven piles representing the seven degrees of agreement, ranging from 
‘most agree’ (+3) to ‘least agree’ (−3) (See “Appendix 1”). Subsequently, the 
respondents had to choose between statements, as they were restricted in how many 
statements they could place in each pile. Respondents are not presented with the 
perspectives but only with the individual statements (in random order). With regard 
to the reliability of findings, there is a double-check in the POETQ program, namely 
(1) by showing the pyramid/sort and ask- ing whether the participant confirms the 
order and (2) by explicitly showing the statements the participant agreed and 
disagreed with most and asking for clarification and reflection on the reasons why 
they did so. By these means, the respondents were given the opportu- nity to reflect 
on their choice of statements with which they agreed and disagreed with the 
strongest. Almost all participants used these options for reflection: 40/40 policy 
officials and 37/40 collectives. This double-check method enhances the reliability of 
our findings since respondents have to check and confirm their choices. For a more 
elaborate explana- tion of the POETQ procedure, see, for instance, Watts and Stenner 
(2012).  
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Table 2. Statement sampling grid 
Ideal type/basic 
mechanism 
Entity/relationship Agency Governance profession 
Definition: In the 
collaboration 
process between 
public officials 
and collectives, it 
is important to … 
s1… secure public 
values such as equality, 
democracy and 
transparency (P1) 
s5… let politicians 
play a key role in 
defining the direction 
(P1) 
 
s9… acknowledge that 
impartiality and the 
public interest come 
first (P1) 
 
s2… reward collectives 
when they contribute to 
achieving policy 
objectives (P2) 
s6… determine clear 
performance criteria 
to hold collectives 
accountable (P2) 
s10…  characterize the 
collaboration process 
by a business-like 
relationship (P2) 
s3… arrange 
consultations between 
public officials, 
collectives and other 
relevant stakeholders 
(P3) 
s7… let politicians 
and public officials 
determine, together 
with collectives and 
their potential partner 
organizations, how to 
support collectives 
(P3) 
s11…  compose a set of 
mutually agreed rules of 
behaviour, so that 
parties know where 
they stand (P3) 
 
s4… remain at a 
distance to let 
collectives make their 
own decisions (P4) 
s8… let collectives 
define their preferred 
direction themselves 
and learn from one 
another (possibly 
supported by public 
officials) (P4) 
s12…  let collectives 
determine the rules of 
play, and public officials 
help where needed (P4) 
Prescription: 
Public officials 
should 
predominantly … 
s13... prevent the 
emergence of 
collectives from leading 
to undesirable situations 
(such as exclusion, 
arbitrariness, etc) (P1) 
s17… keep a good 
view and control on 
what happens within 
collectives (P1) 
s21… check that 
nothing is done that 
conflicts with municipal 
frameworks (P1) 
s14… gain insight into 
the final performance 
and impact of 
collectives (P2) 
s18… encourage 
collectives to be 
transparent about their 
performance (P2) 
s22… stimulate 
collectives by 
formulating smart 
performance 
agreements (P2)  
 
s15… connect relevant 
parties to one another 
and facilitate the 
collaboration process 
where needed (P3) 
s19… encourage 
collectives to open up 
to collaboration 
possibilities (P3 
s23… work together 
with collectives and 
their partners to realize 
public goals (P3) 
s16… not hinder or take 
over collectives, they are 
self-steering (P4) 
s20… remove 
obstacles and barriers 
that hinder collectives 
(P4) 
s24… take care that 
collectives are given the 
freedom to develop in 
the direction they desire 
(P4) 
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3.4 Analysis 
 
We used the software package PQ method to perform two seperate factor analysis 
(Schmolck and Atkinson 2013). Conducting a centroid factor analysis, we extracted 
four factors: two for policy officials and two for collectives. These four factors all 
satisfy the standard conditions explicated by Watts and Stenner (2012), namely that 
their eigenvalues exceed one and that two or more people load significantly on each 
factor (See Appendix 2). Each profile is informed by the loading of between 9 and 
21 Q sorts. The degree to which participants are associated with each factor is 
indicated by the magnitude of factor loadings. The significance of a loading is 
calculated on the basis of the number of statements in the Q sample (Brown 1980). 
With 24 statements, the significant loading on the sort is calculated to be 0.53 at p < 
.01. To maximize the number of unique factor loadings, partici- pants with a loading 
of 0.53 and above were flagged for a varimax rotation (See Appendix 3). Of the 80 
participants, 60 had a loading on one of the four factors. This is in line with what can 
be expected in a Q study (Jeffares and Skelcher 2011).  
 
3.5 Results 
 
From our data, we constructed four factor profiles: two for policy officials and two 
for col- lectives. As our Q study is theoretically driven, we interpret the factors in 
relation to the four governance perspectives set out in Sect. 2 (See also Appendix 3).  
 
Facilitators (21 policy officials significantly associated)  
The first profile identifies policy officials as Facilitators. For these policy officials, 
the role of government is in the background: they strongly support the self-
governance perspective. They believe that non-interference is key to maintain 
collectives’ feeling of ownership. This profile is reflected by the characterizing 
statement ‘collectives define their preferred direction themselves and learn from one 
another (possibly supported by policy officials)’ (s8). To facilitate this process of 
learning, Facilitators stress the connective role of policy officials (s15), thereby 
embracing some aspects of the network governance perspective. Although 
Facilitators broadly support the idea of self-governance and not controlling or 
hindering collectives (s16), they give less priority to the idea of policy officials 
actively removing obstacles and barriers that hinder collectives (s20) and explicitly 
taking care that collectives are given the freedom to develop in the direction they 
desire (s24). The same goes for the network governance statements regarding 
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actively encouraging collectives to open up to collaboration possibilities (s19) and 
playing a role in composing a set of behav- ioral rules to let parties know where they 
stand (s11). Facilitators stress that policy officials should remain at a distance to 
allow collectives to make their own decisions and determine the rules of play (s4, 
s12). Consequently, they strongly disagree with the view, as stressed by the NPM 
perspective, that governments should relate to community-based collectives in a 
traditional or a business-like manner. Participant 25 explained: ‘Then you take out 
the energy.’ Facilitators believe that it is not their job to keep control on what 
happens within collectives (s17) by, for example, formulating smart performance 
agreements to hold collectives accountable (s22, s6).  
 
Networking Servants (9 policy offcials significantly associated)  
The second profile identifies policy officials as Networking Servants. Networking 
Servants feel that their main task is to secure such public values as equality, 
democracy, and transparency in the collaboration process with collectives, as 
stressed by the TPA perspective. Participant 21 explains: ‘It is important to always 
keep these three values in mind in order to remain trusted by residents and 
authorities. People expect this from us. If we let these values go, we become 
unreliable as a government.’ On the one hand, Networking Servants agree upon 
safeguarding public values (s1) and preventing the emergence of collectives from 
leading to undesirable solutions, such as exclusion and arbitrariness (s13)—state- 
ments that resemble the TPA perspective—they strongly disagree with statements 
from the same perspective that policy officials should act upon this in a top-down 
manner, with politicians playing a key role in defining the course of events (s17, s5, 
s21). As such, the Networking Servants’ statement preferences reveal two 
dimensions within the theoretical perspective of TPA: a public values dimension and 
a top-down governance dimension.  
Networking Servants furthermore support statements that come from the network 
governance perspective about involving other relevant parties in the network around 
collectives (s3, s15). Or as participant 15 explains: ‘As a municipality, you have a 
reasonably good overview of what is happening in the city and who are active. By 
encouraging cooperation and bringing the right people into contact with one 
another, you strengthen initiatives.’  
Overall, the orientation of Networking Servants leans more toward the idea of safe- 
guarding public values (TPA) and networking (network governance) than toward 
facilitating the direction that collectives have chosen (see Facilitators). They, for 
instance, give less priority to self-governance statements such as keeping at an 
appropriate distance (s4) and not taking over collectives (s16), than the other three 
Chapter 3 | The Governance of Self-Organization  
63 
profiles. They thus find an active stance more appropriate than their Facilitating 
colleagues. They share, however, the strong opposition to NPM control and 
performance criteria (s6). According to Networking Servants, this attitude of 
government harms (and possibly destroys) collectives’ self-organizing capacity.  
 
Independents (16 collectives significantly associated)  
We labeled the first profile of the collectives as Independents. Independents 
emphasize that policy officials predominantly should take care that collectives are 
given the freedom to develop in the direction they desire (s24). In their perception, 
this strongly contrasts with top-down and managerial government involvement. As 
collectives are dependent upon passion and energy, it is crucial to give them the 
freedom to set their own rules and steps (s8, s12). They strongly identify with the 
self-governance perspective, and in line with this, Independents show a clear dislike 
of political interference, as stressed by the TPA per- spective (s5). Respondent 35 
explains: ‘Political interference can lead to demoralization; by involving the 
alderman, the process gets drawn into the political arena and this often results in a 
very laborious process.’ Other respondents stress the need for collectives to remain 
free of political opinions to maintain openness. Independents are further charac- 
terized by a strong dislike of most NPM statements, such as their idea of a business-
like relationship between collectives and local governments (s22, s6, s10). They feel 
that the achievement-oriented society is preposterous. Instead, respondents indicate 
that collectives are often characterized by a focus on outcomes that are difficult to 
measure. Respondent 26 explains: ‘Taking the work that we do into account, the 
words business and performance are two extremes that don’t match. Performance 
and results are too often crucial in society, unfortunately. What we try to do is to 
break free and provide people with a sense of self- esteem, utility and welfare. These 
values are difficult to measure.’  
In combining statements from the network governance and the self-governance 
perspectives, the Independents correspond highly with the policy officials’ group, 
the Facilitators. Like the Facilitators, Independents take the view that the role of 
government should be to connect relevant parties and facilitate the process if needed 
(s15). Both groups also particularly dislike statements from the TPA and NPM 
perspectives. All in all, Independents want to be left alone as much as possible.  
 
Entrepreneurs (13 collectives significantly associated)  
We labeled the second profile of the collectives as Entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs 
acknowledge the potential of an active and diverse involvement of policy officials, 
as long as collectives can define their preferred direction themselves (s8). This 
profile is characterized by the statement (from the NPM perspective) that it is 
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important to reward collectives when they contribute to achieving policy objectives 
(s2). Distinguishing between initiatives that are performing well and badly can help 
to further improve the quality of services. As exemplar, key participant 3 explains: 
‘It happens too often that initiatives that are already performing well are “taken for 
granted”, whereas huge amounts of time and money are spent on new initiatives or 
badly performing ones.’ This also has advantages for govern- ments themselves. Key 
participants indicate that collectives that are performing well save the government 
money by eliminating and preventing certain problems. This second state- ment is 
the only statement from this perspective that is highly supported. For the rest, the 
NPM statements, in general, are rejected or prioritized less by both policy officials 
and collectives. Indeed, Entrepreneurs emphasize that they are not an executive 
agency of gov- ernment policies.  
Entrepreneurs endorse the statement from the self-governance perspective that 
policy officials should remove obstacles and barriers that hinder collectives (s20), as 
well as the TPA statement on securing values such as equality, democracy and 
transparency (s1). They believe that policy officials should be unbiased in 
collaborating with collectives. It should be about more than who you know and who 
has a good marketing campaign; rather, it should be about genuine impact and 
content. This profile highlights again the two dimen- sions within the traditional 
perspective (the top-down dimension and the securing values and equity dimension). 
Entrepreneurs do not like traditional top-down TPA statements, such as checking 
municipal frameworks (s21), political involvement (s5), and keeping con- trol of 
collectives (s17). Respondent 24 explains: ‘A collective often arises from a sense of 
dissatisfaction with the current situation. Therefore, it is not desirable that the “cur- 
rent power” acts as judge or jury’ (R24). Moreover, Entrepreneurs disagree with the 
NPM statement on smart performance agreements for collectives (s22). They think 
that it is not only impossible to measure performance such as social cohesion, well-
being, and preven- tion, but also that it is inappropriate.  
Entrepreneurs combine statements from the Traditional, NPM (but only one!) and 
self- governance perspective. In contrast to other profiles, Entrepreneurs find 
network govern- ance less important in their relationship with policy officials. Being 
rather confident and active, they do not need government assistance for building and 
maintaining networks. Namely, maintaining and exploring contacts and networks is 
one of the defining character- istics of Entrepreneurs.  
 
Table 3 provides an overview of the main characteristics of the four profiles and their 
connection to the theoretical perspectives.  
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Table 3. Four profiles of the governance relationship between government and collectives 
 Theoretical 
perspective 
View of relationship Prescription for public 
officials 
Public officials    
   Facilitators Self-Governance, 
but also Network 
Governance 
Governance as 
facilitation  
Collectives define their 
own direction and rules-
of-play. Role of 
government is about 
connecting relevant 
parties 
 
Don’t hinder or take over, 
only provide support  
Let collectives govern 
themselves. Be externally 
oriented in connecting 
collectives to relevant 
parties and facilitate the 
collaboration process 
   Networking   
Servants 
TPA and 
Network 
Governance 
Governance as securing 
public values 
Values such as equality, 
democracy and 
transparency are key in 
the governance approach 
 
Prevent undesirable 
situations and take an 
inclusive approach  
Make sure the emergence 
of collectives does not 
lead to exclusion and/or 
arbitrariness. Stimulate 
collectives at the same 
time in their efforts to 
consult and connect to 
other parties  
Collectives    
   Independents  Self-Governance, 
but also Network 
Governance 
Governance as enabling 
Collectives define their 
own direction and rules-
of-play. Government’s 
role is more in the 
background and about 
connecting relevant 
parties 
Pave the way to freedom 
and connectivity 
Take care that collectives 
are given the freedom to 
develop in the direction 
they desire and 
simultaneously provide 
opportunities to connect 
relevant parties  
   Entrepreneurs Self-Governance, 
NPM and TPA  
Governance as active 
and mixed practice 
The direction of 
development is outlined 
by collectives 
themselves. Government 
secures public values, on 
the one hand, and 
stimulates collectives 
with its reward system 
and by eliminating 
barriers, on the other 
hand 
Remove obstacles and 
reward good collectives 
Remove obstacles and 
barriers and reward 
collectives when they 
achieve policy objectives 
 
 
The Governance of Self-Organization | Chapter 3 
 
66 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Our purpose was to explore the views of policy officials and community-based 
collectives on governance and examine the ways in which they differ. This 
exploration is very relevant in the light of the widespread political discourses 
advocating that communities care of their own local problems and public services, 
as well as the growth in the number of community-based collectives (see Nederhand 
and Van Meerkerk 2017; Edelenbos and Van Meerkerk 2016). The question then is 
how we should respond to this trend; that is, which form of governance is appropriate 
for—and desired by—the actors involved? To explore this question, we used Q 
methodology in which we presented respondents with constructed statements on 
governance based on four governance perspectives: traditional public admin- 
istration, New Public Management, network governance, and self-governance.  
 
Our study shows that there are roughly two types of governance profiles. The first 
type perceives the ‘ideal’ governance relationship as one of ‘pure’ and somewhat 
radical self- governance. According to this profile, policy officials should not have 
direct involvement in collectives and keep their distance; the role of government 
should be to create favora- ble conditions for collectives. This type of governance is 
advocated by Facilitators and Independents, and we have found this to be a prevalent 
profile among both policy officials and citizens.  
 
The second type aims for the co-creation of public value and pursues a more direct 
and interactive relationship between government and community-based collectives. 
This type sees an important role for community-based collectives within the broader 
bounds of government policy. It is the role of government to ensure that the self-
organizations remain aligned to a broader public interest; therefore, a more hands-
on collaboration is preferred here. Government is seen as a partner or platform to 
help realize the societal ambitions of collectives. Although Entrepreneurs and 
Networking Servants advocate this type of gov- ernance, their precise focus differs. 
Entrepreneurs believe that their impact on the creation of public values may and, in 
fact, should be rewarded, whereas Networking Servants see their involvement more 
in connecting and taking a collaborative approach. Table 3 shows the main 
characteristics of these profiles.  
 
Limitations of the study  
The study does have several limitations. We derived the q sort statements from 
literature on governance. This has clear advantages and strengths (like the possibility 
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to connect the resulting factors to the source of the statements, the governance 
perspectives), but it also has limitations. By using theoretical perspectives as our 
starting point, we run the risk of missing additional dimensions of the perceptions of 
our respondents on the issue. To partly obviate this effect and to ensure the 
compatibility of the statements with practitioners’ experience, we conducted a pilot 
study. Another limitation has to do with the study of perceptions. Although the 
advantage of applying Q methodology is that it gains insight into practitioners’ 
perceptions, it does not necessarily provide knowledge about how govern- ance 
actually takes place in practice. It would, therefore, be good to follow up with com- 
parative case studies, in which the different governance perspectives and their 
applications can be studied more in-depth and also in relation to different settings. 
Another limitation has to do with the context. This study was conducted among 
practitioners working on wel- fare policies and in collectives with a focus on welfare. 
Follow-up research could compare the governance perceptions in this ‘soft’ sector 
to a ‘harder’ sector, such as the energy sector, where talking about performance 
measurement may be more natural.  
 
Reflections  
Despites these limitations, we think we have highlighted an interesting and 
understudied topic in the governance and policy design literature. What becomes 
clear is that percep- tions of both policy officials and community-based collectives 
differ about how govern- ment should respond to this new trend of self-organization, 
and in particular, about the primacy of the relationship. Whereas Facilitators and 
Independents favor the relatively light governance perspective of self-governance, 
with community-based collectives finding their own way, Networking Servants and 
Entrepreneurs show a preference for a closer relationship in which ideas and policy 
instruments of all governance modes are mixed. While this research highlights 
interesting differences in the governance approach that policy officials and 
collectives prefer the most, this research simultaneously shows that when it comes 
to the governance approach that is preferred the least, the profiles show some striking 
similarities. That is all profiles strongly reject the applicability of performance 
measurement and strong political involvement. It is clear that despite the more or 
less ‘distant’ way of governing the managerial idea of performance criteria does not 
resonate at all with both initiators of community-based collectives and with the pol- 
icy officials. This should probably encourage thinking about policy instrument mixes 
to arrange the relation between governments and community-based collectives. 
Mixes that combine the management of objectives with mutual learning processes 
rather than the more ‘associations of punishment’ that are connected to the NPM 
toolkit (see Noorde- graaf and Abma 2003; Stoker 2006). When we are rethinking 
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policy instrument mixes we then should also pay attention to perceptions of most 
respondents in relation to the traditional public administration perspective. Although 
participants seem to strongly support the underlying (public) values and principles 
such as preventing exclusion of groups, they are much more critical about the form 
in which these are sometimes pursued: statements regarding the dominant role of 
politicians and top-down steering were rejected. Collectives, for instance, feared the 
laborious process when something ‘becomes political.’ This resonates with the 
observation of some authors that strong political interference regarding content 
seems to be difficult to combine with new governance forms (see, for instance, Klijn 
and Skelcher 2007). The rejection of political interference could point toward 
another role for politicians that matches the emphasis placed by respondents on the 
more traditional guarantee of fundamental democratic values (equal access, equal 
treatment, and so forth) rather than managerial interference. Thus, politicians would 
be more concerned with achieving a level playing field, ensuring that self-
organizations do not lead to undesired side-effects and exclusion.  
 
By unraveling governance preferences, this research provides a first step to inform 
and improve the process of policy design in contemporary states (Howlett 2009, 
2018). This research suggests that the governance of community-based collectives 
calls for a design perspective that mixes the instruments and values of the more 
facilitating self-governance perspective with elements of the more traditional, 
managerial, and network perspectives.  
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Appendix A  
 
Table A1.  Shape of the response grid 
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Appendix B  
 
Table B1.  Factor loadings for Q sorts (40 public officials and 40 collectives) 
 
 Public officials Collectives 
 
 Facilitators Networking 
Servants 
Independents 
 
Entrepreneurs 
1 -0.0300 0.4772 0.6148 0.6518 
2 0.7244X 0.1059 0.1394 0.5459X 
3 0.8930X 0.0513 0.0367 0.8848X 
4 0.5036 0.2795 0.1684 0.5650X 
5 0.7195X 0.3525 0.3121 0.5991X 
6 0.3742 0.5321X 0.7499X 0.3258 
7 0.4031 0.5871X 0.1958 0.6416X 
8 0.2258 0.4359 0.0310 0.7892X 
9 0.6946X 0.3451 0.3485 0.1913 
10 0.7625X 0.1799 0.3917 0.7485X 
11 0.5642X 0.5161 0.2630 0.6046X 
12 0.7371X 0.1947 0.4999 0.5773X 
13 0.6646X 0.2258 0.4789 -0.0361 
14 0.3273 0.4699 0.4976 0.2913 
15 0.7362X 0.2314 0.5409X 0.5058 
16 0.5738 0.5388 0.1717 0.6731X 
17 0.3135 0.8259X 0.5349X 0.5118 
18 0.4666 0.6510X 0.1755 0.2545 
19 0.6785X 0.1164 0.7498X 0.1984 
20 0.5971X 0.5041 0.6066X 0.4961 
21 0.2932 0.7034X 0.5641X 0.1933 
22 0.5375X 0.2318 0.7463X 0.2187 
23 -0.2831 0.4095 0.6236X 0.4487 
24 0.3016 0.1680 0.3167 0.7373X 
25 0.8166X 0.1117 0.6384X 0.4832 
26 0.7144X -0.2896 0.5587X 0.1078 
27 0.4068 0.4961 0.0793 0.4975 
28 0.2342 0.6546X 0.5048 0.2828 
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29 0.6883X 0.1398 0.3781 0.5982X 
30 0.4096 0.5585X 0.3197 0.6249X 
31 -0.0246 0.5081 0.7619X 0.4604 
32 0.6152X 0.4565 0.5511X -0.1542 
33 0.0204 0.5261X 0.5311X 0.5060 
34 0.6814X 0.1745 0.5136X 0.2811 
35 0.6656X 0.4720 0.6924X 0.2492 
36 0.6822X 0.2499 0.5000 0.3162 
37 0.5649X 0.0158 0.3289 0.3131 
38 0.8853X 0.1933 0.0431 0.5235 
39 0.0117 0.5463X 0.2649 0.0277 
40 0.5066 0.4459 0.7421X 0.2842 
Explained 
variance % 
32 18 23 23 
Eigenvalue 16.15 3.63 15.70 2.91 
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Appendix C  
 
Table C1.  Factor arrays for Q sample of statements 
 
Statement Factor score 
 Public officials Collectives 
 Facilitators Networking 
Servants 
Independents 
 
Entrepreneurs 
In the collaboration 
process between public 
officials and collectives, it 
is important to … 
    
   1 … secure public values 
such as equality, 
democracy and 
transparency (P1) 
0 3 1 2 
   2 … reward collectives 
when they contribute to 
achieving policy 
objectives (P2) 
0 -1 0 3 
   3 … arrange 
consultations between 
public officials, collectives 
and other relevant 
stakeholders (P3) 
1 2 0 1 
   4 … remain at a distance 
to let collectives make 
their own decisions (P4) 
1 -1 1 0 
   5 … let politicians play a 
key role in defining the 
direction (P1) 
-2 -2 -3 -2 
   6 … determine clear 
performance criteria to 
hold collectives 
accountable (P2) 
-2 -2 -2 -1 
   7 … let politicians and 
public officials determine, 
together with collectives 
and their potential partner 
organizations, how to 
support collectives (P3) 
0 1 0 1 
   8 … let collectives 
define their preferred 
direction themselves and 
learn from one another 
(possibly supported by 
public officials) (P4) 
3 1 2 2 
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   9 …  acknowledge that 
impartiality and the public 
interest come first (P1) 
1 1 0 1 
  10 …  characterize the 
collaboration process by a 
business-like relationship 
(P2) 
-1 -1 -2 -1 
  11 …  compose a set of 
mutually agreed rules of 
behaviour, so that parties 
know where they stand 
(P3) 
0 0 0 -1 
  12 …  let collectives 
determine the rules of 
play, and public officials 
help where needed (P4) 
 
2 0 2 0 
Public officials should 
predominantly … 
    
   13 ... prevent the 
emergence of collectives 
from leading to 
undesirable situations 
(such as exclusion, 
arbitrariness, etc.) (P1) 
-1 2 0 0 
   14 … gain insight into 
the final performance and 
impact of collectives (P2) 
-1 -1 -1 1 
   15 … connect relevant 
parties to one another and 
facilitate the collaboration 
process where needed (P3) 
2 2 2 0 
   16 … not hinder or take 
over collectives, they are 
self-steering (P4) 
2 0 1 1 
   17 … keep a good view 
and control on what 
happens within collectives 
(P1) 
-3 -3 -1 -3 
   18 … encourage 
collectives to be 
transparent about their 
performance (P2) 
-1 0 -1 0 
   19 … encourage 
collectives to open up to 
collaboration possibilities 
(P3) 
0 1 1 -1 
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   20 … remove obstacles 
and barriers that hinder 
collectives (P4) 
1 0 1 2 
   21 … check that nothing 
is done that conflicts with 
municipal frameworks 
(P1) 
-1 -2 -1 -2 
  22 … stimulate 
collectives by formulating 
smart performance 
agreements (P2) 
-2 -1 -2 -2 
   23 … work together with 
collectives and their 
partners to realize public 
goals (P3) 
0 1 -1 -1 
   24 … take care that 
collectives are given the 
freedom to develop in the 
direction they desire (P4) 
1 0 3 0 
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Chapter 4 
Self-Organization and the Role of Government: 
How and Why does Self-Organization Evolve in 
the Shadow of Hierarchy?  
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Shadow of Hierarchy. Public Management Review, 18(7): 1063-1084. 
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Abstract 
 
Self-organization is a concept that is often used to legitimize a government’s retreat 
from sectors in which it has traditionally played a vital role. In this article, we analyse 
how the emergence of new welfare services is mutually shaped by factors that 
stimulate self- organization among citizens and by meta-gov- erning interventions 
by local governments. Self-organization seems to takes place in the shadow of a 
government hierarchy: either a fear-based one or a benevolent one. Boundary 
spanners play an important role in establish- ing these new arrangements, thereby 
making use of, and developing, trustworthy relationships between citizen groups and 
government.  
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Communities are increasingly being considered as an alternative location for govern- 
ments to deliver welfare services. In the concept of a so-called ‘Big Society’, these 
new services are realized by making use of the self-organizing capacities of citizens. 
In doing so, government is further retreating, although this process did not start with 
‘Big Society’. It has a longer history that started in the 1980s (Rhodes 1997). 
However, empirical understanding of self-organization in the public sector is scarce 
(Boonstra and Boelens 2011). Self-organization can be defined as a process of shared 
understanding that results in the emergence of ordered structures (Bušev 1994; 
Comfort 1994). Some authors argue that self-organization implies the absence of 
government control (Cilliers 1998; Goldstein 1999; Heylighen 2001). However, how 
realistic is this in policy sectors where government, although retreating, has 
traditionally played a substantial role (Taylor 2007)? Although they might be 
retreating, governments are still able to control vital resources, and this enables them 
to use more complex and subtle governance strategies. These go beyond coercive 
control, creating what has been labelled as ‘a shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1994; 
Milward and Provan 2000; Taylor 2007). This raises questions about the relationship 
between self-organization and the role of government.  
 
The changes that have taken place in the Dutch local welfare regime during the past 
five years potentially provide a scenario that could help clarify what happens. On the 
one hand, autonomous, non-profit, local welfare organizations have been free to 
develop neighbourhood services, but, on the other hand, they depend on funds 
provided by local government. In order to gain funding, these services have to align 
with the goals of all kinds of local welfare policies formulated by the municipality 
council. However, increasing budget austerity and questions about the quality of the 
services provided have led to a retreat by both local welfare organizations and 
governments. These trends have offered neighbourhood communities the 
opportunity to take over neighbourhood centres and to set up their own, self-
supporting, services. As a result, apparently self-organizing community enterprises 
have emerged – but does the government still play a role behind, or even in front of, 
the scenes?  
 
To understand self-organization processes in the public sector, it is important to 
empirically unravel them. Our goal is to understand how and why the interplay 
between self-organizing communities of citizens and governments shapes the 
emergence of new public services, and in particular welfare services. In so doing, we 
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want to gain a better empirical and theoretical understanding of the complex nature 
of self-organization processes in the public sector. To achieve this, we link three 
bodies of literature (in Sections 2 and 3). Here, we link the concept of self-
governance, and the factors that account for it, with theories concerning meta-
governance and networking in the shadow of hierarchies. Section 4 describes our 
comparative case study research strategy. Our case analysis, outlined in Section 5, 
involves two Dutch community enterprises: one in Amersfoort and one in 
Amsterdam. Finally, conclusions are then presented in Section 6.  
 
4.2 Self-Organization 
 
Self-organization as a concept was used in physics to explain the emergence of order 
in seemingly chaotic physical processes such as the formation of galaxies (Prigogine 
and Stengers 1984; Kauffmann 1993; de Wolf and Holvoet 2005). In public 
administration, the term refers to non-governmental actors adapting their behaviour 
and to the emergence of collective action without governmental interference (Pierre 
and Peters 2000). Boonstra and Boelens (2011, 12) define self-organization in the 
context of spatial planning as ‘initiatives that originate in civil society from 
autonomous community-based networks of citizens, who are part of the urban 
system but independent of government procedures. Self-organization can also be 
defined as a process of shared understanding – in terms of collective interaction and 
communication – that results in the emergence of a structure based on a goal shared 
by members of a given system (Comfort 1994; Bušev 1994). In essence, out of a 
rather complex system of different (non-linear, somewhat spontaneous, co-
evolutionary and local) interactions among various actors – with different interests, 
resources and interdependencies – a governance structure somehow emerges to deal 
with a collective challenge: one that is not imposed by a single actor and that is able 
to maintain itself (Jantsch 1980; Cilliers 1998; Goldstein 1999; Heylighen 2001; van 
Meerkerk, Boonstra, and Edelenbos 2012). The self-organization literature suggests 
that several factors seem to shape the content, course and outcomes of these self-
organization processes.  
 
First, self-organization requires a trigger to generate interaction. van Meerkerk, 
Boonstra, and Edelenbos (2012) show how events may have disruptive effects on 
people. For instance, the demolition of buildings may change the meaning of an 
urban area in terms of in-place attachment and/or sense of community (Manzo and 
Perkins 2006). These events stimulate the exploration of new ideas and seeking 
support for them (Bootsma and Lechner 2002).  
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Second, successful self-organization presupposes the presence of trustworthy rela- 
tionships among actors and these refer to the social capital in a neighbourhood (van 
Meerkerk, Boonstra, and Edelenbos 2012; Ostrom 1999). Communities are able to 
overcome barriers to collective action when they have a large stockpile of existing 
networks, groups and contacts as well as a shared history of past collaboration 
(Putnam 2000; Stone, 2011). As a result, people know and trust each other; they 
share a sense of belonging that encourages them to participate in a collective effort 
(Pierre and Peters 2000; Nicholls 2009; Huygen, van Marissing, and Boutellier 
2012). In places where social capital is strong and people attach a strong meaning to 
a specific place, societal problems can catalyse community action because residents 
can focus on those assets they share as neighbours (Manzo and Perkins 2006).  
 
The third factor refers to the necessary interplay of ideas, information and experi- 
ences, and the focus that is needed to exchange them. The development of a shared 
and clear goal that structures the evolving interactions seems to stimulate self-
organization (Bootsma and Lechner 2002; Comfort 1994; Ostrom 1999; Huygen, 
van Marissing, and Boutellier 2012). Comfort (1994), Kauffmann (1993) and Uzzi 
and Spiro (2005) showed that a limited number of actors with recurrent opportunities 
for interaction makes it easier to mutually adjust their behaviour in order to develop 
a shared goal.  
 
The fourth factor refers to the physical and virtual locus of the self-organization 
process. If the information that is available in the community is located at various 
sites and organizations, there is a danger that it will not be shared (Comfort 1994). 
Comfort (1994) argues that, in order to take better informed and more comprehensive 
decisions, it is important that a shared and evolving knowledge base, open 
communication channels and clear feedback mechanisms all emerge, possibly 
facilitated by information and communication technologies (Bekkers 2004).  
 
Boundary-spanning activities by key individuals who connect the internal realm of 
an organization with its external environment constitute the fifth factor. These 
activities refer to the mutual exchange of information between the focal organization 
and other actors in this environment. It also involves the provision of a 
communication channel, commitment, support and protection, and the assurance of 
legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; van Buuren and Loorbach 2009). This 
requires linking forms of leader- ship that facilitate the free flow of ideas, people and 
resources (van Meerkerk, Boonstra, and Edelenbos 2012; Bekkers, Edelenbos, and 
Steijn 2011).  
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The sixth factor concerns the mutual adaptation of existing practices such as roles, 
procedures, systems and routines as well as legal norms (Kauffmann 1993; Comfort 
1994; Johnson 2001; van Meerkerk, Boonstra, and Edelenbos 2012). The actors 
involved need sufficient autonomy and flexibility to adjust their behaviours 
(Comfort 1994; Ostrom 1999).  
 
Our basic assumption is that retreating governments can still play a role and that self-
organization does not take place in a vacuum. What theories might help us 
understand this role?  
 
4.3 Self-Organization in the Context of Meta-Governance 
 
Meta-governance is concerned with how political authorities promote and guide the 
self-organization of governance systems through rules, organizational knowledge, 
insti- tutional tactics and other political strategies (Jessop 1997). The idea is that 
forms of power beyond the state can often sustain a government more effectively 
than its own institutions, and that coercive forms of control are replaced by a 
complex arrangement of subtle strategies, techniques and forms of knowledge 
(Taylor 2007). The literature on meta-governance discerns six strategies (Kooiman 
1994; Sørensen 2006).  
 
The first is to develop strategic frameworks that operate as administrative checks to 
which self-organizing communities have to comply. This can be considered as ‘self- 
regulation in the context of regulation’ (Whitehead 2003). The second strategy is to 
develop procedures to monitor the self-organization process and to assess its outputs 
and outcomes using performance and benchmark systems (Whitehead 2003). The 
third option is for governments to use (persuasive) framing and storytelling to create 
a shared discursive context that helps align the sensemaking of individual actors so 
that a shared belief and discourse emerges (Sørensen 2006; Hajer and Laws 2006; 
Taylor 2007). The fourth is to offer support and assistance by providing relevant 
information, legal assistance, a meeting place and/or financial support (Sørensen 
2006). In so doing, access to vital resources is being given (Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978). The fifth strategy is that governments try to participate in a more direct way 
by designing the institutional setting in which self-organization takes place (Goodin 
1998; Sørensen 2006). Here, government intervention focuses on the allocation of 
positions to relevant actors, the relationships between them (stipulating 
interdependency) and formulating relevant rules-of-play (Taylor 2007). The final, 
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sixth option is to discipline the self-organizing process by playing with ‘fear’ (often 
linked to storytelling). In so doing, governments try to ‘scare’ the involved actors so 
that they move in a certain direction, for instance by threatening to use financial 
claw-back procedures or project appraisals, to stop funding or to impose binding 
rules (Whitehead 2003; Boons 2008; Scharpf 1994; Börzel and Risse 2010). This 
idea of playing with fear (which can be subtle and implicit or very explicit) has been 
given the theoretical label ‘networked governance in the shadow of hierarchy’ 
(Scharpf 1994). The idea is that governments continue to use their state power albeit 
differently. Even in networked, non-hierarchical structures in which government is 
but one of the many actors, it can still use specific resources (authority, money, 
information, knowledge) to intervene in a hierarchical way because of the resource 
dependency of other actors. This possibility creates a ‘shadow of hierarchy’ that 
influences the content and the outcomes of self-organizing processes. This shadow 
can become more threatening if, for example, governments control the external 
funding to non-state actors (Milward and Provan 2003). The greater the 
government’s capacity to control access to or distribution of vital resources, the 
stronger this shadow will be, increasing the inclination of non-state actors to 
cooperate (Börzel and Risse 2010; Bang 2004; Durant and Warber 2001).  
 
4.4 Research strategy 
 
In the previous sections, we explored the theoretical concepts underpinning this 
research. We expect successful processes of self-organization (i.e. the emergence of 
sustainable order) to depend on the interplay between the factors introduced in 
Sections 2 and 3. InFigure 1, we visualize the relationships we expect based on 
deductions from relevant literature. Although Figure 1 somewhat simplifies reality, 
we believe it can still function as a heuristic tool with which to understand the 
complex interplay between some of the factors that are relevant in a specific context 
in which specific government and community actors are engaged in self-organization 
(Mahoney 2012). 
 
Given the limited empirical knowledge about self-organization in the public sector, 
a case study seems the best way to analyse and understand this complex issue since 
this approach can improve empirical exploratory understanding, in this instance of 
selforganization processes. Selecting two contrasting cases should achieve a better 
analytical understanding of the interplay between relevant factors and mechanisms 
(Yin 2003). Both cases are selected on the difference in experience with self-
organization and participatory processes between two municipalities. In one 
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municipality (Amsterdam) such a tradition existed, which created a rather 
trustworthy relationship between the involved parties. In the other cases 
(Amersfoort) such a tradition did not exist.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Heuristic theoretical framework to understand process and results of self-
organization 
 
By selecting two contrasting cases, which co-vary on one independent factor 
(Haverland 2010), we aim to improve our analytical understanding of the interplay 
between the factors that stimulate self-organization on the one hand and the meta-
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governing role of government on the other. The external validity of our findings is 
limited, because we only considered one sector in one country. At the same time we 
believe that our study can help understand self-organization processes in a more 
analytical way, in terms of understanding the complex interplay between different 
actors, mechanisms and factors. Hence, we aim to provide an analytical instead of a 
statistical generalization of our findings. Our generalization is based on the provision 
of an exploratory, but plausible and coherent, line of reasoning, based on theory-
driven comparative empirical case study research (Yin 2003). The development of 
this line of reason may be used to develop further research.  
 
Therefore, based on an in-depth analysis of the relevant actors, their motives and 
interests, their resources and their actions, as well as relevant outputs, we aim to 
identify striking similarities and differences that can lead to conclusions in the form 
of plausible generalizations that can help in understanding self-organization 
processes.  
 
The unit of analysis is the emergence of a Dutch community enterprise. Therefore, 
we analysed and compared two cases in different contexts with different triggers. In 
Amsterdam, the local government has for some time actively promoted self-
organization, and could therefore build upon a tradition of community participation. 
In Amersfoort, such a tradition was absent, and the local government’s attitude 
towards self-organization was sceptical. In each municipality, one community 
enterprise was selected that was already firmly established and carrying out concrete 
activities: ‘De Meevaart’ in Amsterdam and ‘Het Klokhuis’ in Amersfoort.  
 
We have translated the concepts in this model into questions that can function as 
indicators in order to steer our empirical work in a consistent way, thereby ensuring 
internal validity (see Table A1 in Appendix 1). In the final months of 2013 and in 
2014 we conducted thirty-one semi-structured interviews in the Dutch municipalities 
of Amsterdam (eighteen) and Amersfoort (thirteen) with different types of 
stakeholders involved in the development and exploitation of two community 
centres. We conducted fifteen interviews with citizens (initiators and volunteers), 
twelve interviews with civil servants and politicians (policymakers and managers) 
and four with professional workers. Subsequently, we again used the framework to 
conduct a content analysis of relevant policy documents (both internal and external) 
as well as relevant media coverage. These techniques formed part of our comparative 
case study strategy. 
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4.5 Results 
 
This section follows the structure of the analytical model as presented in Figure 1 
and Appendix 1. 
 
New service arrangements 
In Amersfoort, ‘Het Klokhuis’ is generally seen as a success story (Volkskrant 
2013). Since its start in April 2012, when it was legally established, about 300–400 
inhabitants visit the centre each day and they are served by 40–50 volunteers 
(Municipality of Amersfoort 2012b, 2; Dichtbij 2013). The building is rented from 
a third party (SRO) to which the municipality has outsourced the exploitation of their 
buildings (Het Klokhuis 2012, 14). Commercial activities such as renting spaces to 
other parties (such as for childcare) financially compensate for the social activities 
that are carried out to foster social cohesion. Furthermore, ‘Het Klokhuis’ provides 
internships in cooperation with the UWV (the Dutch unemployment agency), Wi-Fi 
hotspots, a small library, sports and hobby lessons, buddy projects for migrants 
and/or unemployed people and a low-threshold location to facilitate meetings, for 
instance with the police (Het Klokhuis 2012, 4). 
 
In Amsterdam, in August 2010, inhabitants from ‘De Indische Buurt’ developed a 
plan to take over the ‘De Meevaart’ community centre. With more than twenty 
volunteers, it can be open seven days a week (de Meevaart 2013). A foundation, 
known as the ‘Meevaart Development Board’, owns the community enterprise. The 
intention is that De Meevaart offers a place for all kinds of local groups and 
initiatives so that they can meet and develop activities both in and beyond De 
Meevaart. By creating this overarching meeting place, the instigators aim to improve 
the social cohesion in the neighbourhood (such as by encouraging cooking and 
gardening activities). De Meevaart is considered a success due to the energy and 
dynamics that the process has unleashed among inhabitants (Municipality of 
Amsterdam 2012b, 12; de Meevaart 2012b). A national newspaper reported: ’What 
happens in [De Meevaart] is so innovative that visitors from Amstelveen and as far 
away as France and China are visiting the neighbourhood’ (Het Parool 2012). 
 
 Both cases show that the efforts of the citizens involved have led to the creation of 
legal and financially sustainable organizations that deliver a broad range of services. 
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Trigger 
The top-down closure of the former community centre by the Amersfoort 
municipality and the consideration being given to establishing an addiction clinic 
mobilized a small group of active inhabitants who were willing to take over the 
centre. This was an important trigger: ‘We took a lot of actions and attended all the 
public hearing sessions in order to prevent an addiction care centre being located in 
the previous centre’ (interviewed initiators). The initiators organized a lobby to 
convince local politicians to consider alternatives. ‘We forced the alderman to talk 
to us about us taking over the centre. If necessary, we would even have occupied the 
building’ (interviewed initiators). The increased political pressure convinced the 
town council to adopt a resolution that forced the alderman responsible to organize 
a public tendering procedure for the centre.  
 
No single disruptive triggering event was found in Amsterdam. The self-
organization process had started back in 2004, involving two inhabitants (supported 
by some politicians) who were unhappy with the poor state of their neighbourhood. 
They organized, in collaboration with the municipality, activities to improve 
neighbourhood cohesion. After renovating the centre in 2010, the municipality 
wanted to put the building on the property market. This plan triggered the inhabitants 
to approach the municipality’s eastern district branch with a plan to take over the 
building as they were looking for a location for their activities (de Meevaart 2012a, 
10 –14; Groot Oost TV 2012). Furthermore, the establishment of an experimentation 
zone that allowed communities to experiment with new activities beyond existing 
legal and financial practices made possible by the Ministry of the Interior also 
boosted its development (Municipality of Amsterdam 2012a, 2; Municipality of 
Amersfoort 2012b, 4).  
 
The triggers differ in the two cases. In Amersfoort, there was a single disruptive 
triggering event that fuelled the self-organization process, which can be viewed as a 
NIMBY-like response (not in my back yard) that changed the meaning that the 
inhabitants gave to the location. It emphasized their community belonging. In 
Amsterdam, the neighbourhood enterprise idea was embedded in a tradition of 
citizen participation that was refuelled when the municipality threatened to sell the 
building. 
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Trustworthy relationships 
In Amersfoort, the initiators and the community manager 1  shared a history of 
community activities. The initiators knew each other (establishing social capital), 
and had experience with how local politics worked in terms of political/institutional 
capital, which helped set the wheels in motion. However, scepticism continued: ‘We 
really had to build the level of trust with the municipality itself’ (interviewed 
initiators). The recurring interactions between initiators and key municipal people – 
civil servants and the responsible alderman – gradually helped the initiators feel 
positive about their plans and helped create a shared vision. The openness and 
frequency of these meetings led to the involved citizens feeling recognized. The 
alderman involved stated: ‘Contacts were frequent and also cordial. When the 
initiators asked me for time and attention, they always got it’. Eventually, the Board 
of Aldermen approved the citizens taking over the centre (Municipality of 
Amersfoort 2012a, 2). Furthermore, the initial scepticism stimulated the initiators to 
stick together and feel motivated: ‘Our confidence has grown rather than declined as 
the result of the critical attitude of the municipality’ (interviewed initiators).  
 
In Amsterdam, the establishment of the enterprise was embedded in an environment 
in which citizen participation, and thus collaboration with the municipality, had 
flourished for many years (Municipality of Amsterdam 2012b,3 –4). The initiators 
and civil servants had known each other for years and they valued each other’s work. 
As one of the participation brokers involved put it: ‘The positive attitudes of the 
municipality certainly had a positive effect on the initiators’ (interviewed civil 
servant). However, the municipality was internally divided and, as one initiator 
indicated, not all civil servants were constructive: ‘Some traditionally minded civil 
servants think that they know better and lock out citizens: they act like they are from 
the “participation police” and tell us whether we are doing it correctly’ (interviewed 
initiators).  
 
Hence, in both cases, the initiators knew each other because they shared a 
background in citizen engagement. A shared common history between civil servants 
(community managers, participation brokers) and citizens results in close and 
longlasting relationships that generate social capital within the municipality that 
 
 
1 The community manager is a civil servant who acts as an interface between the local 
community and the municipality when dealing with issues that touch upon the quality of the 
neighbourhood.  
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helps support the citizens’ initiatives. Nevertheless, in Amersfoort, some scepticism 
initially prevailed, which stimulated the initiators to push on. 
 
Focus and locus in the interaction 
In Amersfoort, we observed that the interactions between initiators and the 
municipality were strongly structured with a clear set of time, legal and financial 
guidelines that were formulated by the municipality and then ‘forced upon’ the 
initiators (Municipality of Amersfoort 2013). Although the initiators were not 
always happy with the imposed rules: ‘Initially, our hands and feet were tied’ 
(interviewed initiators), this focus still enabled them to set priorities. As an 
interviewed civil servant observed, the focus was not completely fixed: ‘We [the 
municipality] were willing to adjust the guidelines when they proved not to be 
useful’.  
 
In Amsterdam, the initiators wrestled to find a focus, although this was not 
considered problematic (de Meevaart 2012a, 18). The energetic and free flow of 
ideas, knowledge and experiences led to numerous ideas and partnerships on how to 
develop the enterprise, which was also a goal of the municipality: ‘We want to make 
things possible and build on partnerships: we try to connect many parties in order to 
facilitate mutual learning’(interviewed civil servant). As a result, the initiators and 
neighbourhood inhabitants were still working on establishing a shared vision in order 
to elaborate the centre’s mission. This was proving hard to define since there were 
so many interests to be met: ‘Our targets are not set. Along the way, we are exploring 
what is the right way to go. Tensions are bringing people closer together’ 
(Municipality of Amsterdam 2012a, 2).  
 
The cases show an interesting difference in focus. In Amersfoort, the focus was 
forced upon the initiators by the municipality, and this helped the initiators develop 
their plan. In Amsterdam, such a focus was absent and this slowed down the creation 
of a mission. However, this lack of focus was not seen as problematic by the 
Amsterdam municipality since, in their opinion, multiple goals enabled them to 
connect various parties. Although the role of a focus differs, both cases show that 
the role the focus plays is determined by the interplay between the initiators and the 
government.  
 
In terms of a physical locus, we saw that, in Amersfoort, the community centre was 
where the inhabitants used to gather to discuss and support the initiator’s plans. In 
Amsterdam, the in-house debating centre ‘Pakhuis de Zwijger’ served as an 
important platform where debates between many actors – the (district) municipality, 
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the Ministry of the Interior and sometimes over 300 inhabitants – took place. In 
neither case did the internet or social media play a significant role as a virtual 
meeting place. In the Amersfoort situation, social media were used to mobilize 
inhabitants, whereas, in the Amsterdam case, the most important function was 
providing information. 
 
Boundary-spanning activities 
In the Amersfoort case, the community manager and the alderman responsible 
conducted significant boundary-spanning activities, thereby fostering trust. The 
alderman ensured political support and protected the initiative, making it easier for 
the community manager to overcome resistance within the municipality. One 
initiator observed: ‘The role of the community manager was a tough one since she 
experienced a lot of resistance’. The alderman commented: ‘I think my close 
involvement was one of the key factors for success’. This was important because 
‘the municipality is a seven-headed monster, and some heads trust the initiators but 
other heads do not’ (interviewed civil servant). The ability and willingness to change 
the guidelines (in terms of exchanging knowledge and learning) can be explained by 
the fact that the community manager was able to link people and ideas resulting in 
improved trust between the initiators and the municipality parties, protected by the 
aldermen.  
 
In Amsterdam, district-level participation brokers 2  were able to bring people 
together in the enterprise. The programme manager and one of her policy officers on 
the central municipality level were actively linking people, ideas and resources. This 
helped overcome and avoid deadlocks. A civil servant said: ‘When I know that a 
district is struggling with a topic, I make sure that they contact a district that is very 
developed in that area so that they can help each other’. Furthermore, the 
municipality organized meetings and facilitated contacts with relevant parties to find 
alternative funding (Municipality of Amsterdam 2012b, 13). In addition, the 
responsible aldermen frequently met with the initiators. By showing their support, 
they made the involved people feel recognized.  
 
 
 
2 A participation broker is a civil servant who connects the administration, neighbourhood-
citizens and all sorts of citizen initiatives. 
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What we see here is that boundary spanners had an important leadership role in 
mobilizing social capital by being part of both worlds: the neighbourhood and the 
municipality. Both cases show that frontline civil servants (those working at the 
interface of the community and the municipality) are especially important in granting 
access to vital resources (people), in sharing information and knowledge as well as 
in acting as ambassadors for the initiators. This is important for two reasons. First, 
they helped the initiators deal with the multi-headed nature of the involved 
municipalities and, second, they helped link the initiatives to the political realm of 
the aldermen responsible. In both cases, aldermen were important in backing the 
initiatives in terms of rendering protection, mobilizing political support and opening 
up all kinds of new knowledge and expertise channels. In both cases, boundary-
spanning activities contributed to the creation of trust in the initiators and in their 
plans. In so doing, they helped facilitate the creation of a shared understanding that 
also helped adjust existing roles, positions and regulations. 
 
Adaption of existing roles and practices 
In Amersfoort, the initiators originally encountered resistance because they were 
forced to develop a (financial) plan, and this constrained their space to manoeuvre. 
Again, the involvement of an alderman and the community manager helped the civil 
servants become more willing to change their roles and to adapt existing rules. ‘The 
conditions that restricted us were loosened by the municipality so that we could act 
in a more business-like manner’ (interviewed initiators).  
 
The existing roles and rules also changed in Amsterdam. The location of De 
Meevaart in an experimentation zone enabled the municipality to be more flexible 
than would otherwise have been possible. A civil servant said: ‘You try to make 
things possible, after that you look at the rules. That is one of our commitments in 
this experiment – to facilitate them [the community enterprises] in their work’. As a 
result, the municipality and the Ministry of the Interior actively explored the 
redrafting of rules and regulations that hindered change, such as allowing volunteers 
to receive compensation: ‘The upcoming period will be used to transform and apply 
rules that ease the start of community enterprises’ (Municipality of Amsterdam 
2012b, 13). However, the municipality ’s planning and control cycles, and the 
apparently sluggish way of working, sometimes frustrated the development process. 
One initiator commented ‘If we wanted to do something in spring, we had to wait 
nine months before the money was available’, adding that,‘If the municipality had 
been more flexible that would have been helpful’. This sentiment was also put 
forward in the Amersfoort case.  
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Looking at the importance of adapting existing roles and rules, both cases showed 
that the willingness of municipal actors to change their roles and some of their 
regulations in order to prevent deadlocks was vital, and that this could be helped by 
the involved aldermen. 
 
Meta-governance 
Our next step is to analyse how and why different meta-governing strategies played 
a role. Given that different combinations of the possible strategies were used in each 
case, we first provide separate descriptions for each case before discussing them in 
combination. In advance, benchmarking did not play a role in both cases as relevant 
strategy. 
 
Meta-governance: Strategic frameworks 
The first meta-governance strategy is to develop strategic frameworks and various 
forms of guidance that function as administrative checks to which self-organizing 
communities have to comply. In the Amersfoort case, we see a strong hierarchical 
involvement of the municipality through the definition and enforcement of key 
parameters, rules-of-play and all kinds of requirements to be fulfilled. ‘When we 
were finished with one list of demands, another was already waiting for us’ 
(interviewed initiator). These requirements sometimes made it difficult for the 
initiators to be taken seriously: ‘Given the financial requirements, we were 
dependent on certain parties that rented rooms in our building, and that gave them a 
lot of freedom and power to enforce certain things’ (interviewed initiators). 
Conversely, in Amsterdam, the district and central branches of the municipality tried 
to support and facilitate the process by providing all kinds of resources rather than 
influencing directly by imposing norms and guidelines. 
 
Meta-governance: Framing and storytelling 
The municipality of Amersfoort explicitly decided not to stimulate citizens to 
establish community enterprises. The community manager indicated: ‘When there 
are citizens who want to take over the buildings that is fine, but we are not going to 
stimulate this’. The neighbourhood manager underlined this by saying: ‘There was 
no plan in the beginning. I think it is good that such a plan did not exist’. This 
explains why the municipality did not embrace self-organization as a relevant frame 
with which to justify the possible takeover of roles by citizens. In Amsterdam, self-
organization was embraced as an inspirational story to trigger societal entrepreneurs 
and citizens into becoming active: ‘It all started with incentives: you try to make 
things attractive by inspiring stories and offering subsidies’ (interviewed civil 
servant). Furthermore, platforms were organized to share the experiences of similar 
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initiatives. A civil servant indicated: ‘If the communications lead to bottlenecks, or 
if I know that one district has very good ideas and another is still searching, I ensure 
that they learn from each other’. 
 
Meta-governance: Supportive actions 
In Amersfoort, the municipality used supportive actions through providing initiators 
with contacts, expert knowledge, useful information and the building lease. When it 
became clear that the initiators wanted to take over the centre, the municipality 
appointed independent experts to help them draft exploitation plans. The community 
manager also dedicated much of her time to discussing the pros and cons and to 
sharing information and contacts. The creation of an experimentation zone in 
Amsterdam provided the new community enterprises with financial opportunities: 
‘We got a further subsidy for furnishing the building and, after that, a second amount 
to ensure the main floor looked good at the opening of the building’ (de Meevaart 
2013). The municipality also helped groups of inhabitants to acquire additional 
funding by helping them with applications and by providing necessary contacts and 
knowledge. Supportive actions also included setting up the earlier mentioned 
platforms because it was considered important ‘to organize meetings to strengthen 
and broaden the network of community enterprises in order to exchange knowledge 
and experiences’ (Municipality of Amsterdam 2012b, 13). This was also necessary 
because the development of a community enterprise requires the involvement of 
multiple administrative layers within the municipality that have specific knowledge. 
 
Meta-governance: Formulation of rules-of-play 
Both municipalities redefined the rules of the game. They made it possible for 
citizens to take over buildings that were public property, rather than immediately 
placing them on the real estate market. In both cases, the initiators had to pay rents 
that were below commercial levels. This assistance was recognized: ‘without the 
help and goodwill of the municipality we would probably not have acquired a 
building’ (interviewed initiator, Amersfoort). Furthermore, the Amersfoort 
municipality also formulated a number of rules-of-play that structured the 
interactions, an example being: ‘Make sure there is a strict separation of functions 
between the community and the board of the association. Review the business case 
with an independent third party (...)’ (Municipality of Amersfoort 2012a, 1). In 
Amsterdam, the experimentation zone changed the rules of the game, providing 
greater freedom to the initiators to act: ‘...itwillbeusedtobendandapplyrules to ease 
the starting up process of neighbourhood enterprises’ (Municipality of Amsterdam 
2012b, 13). Furthermore, the new enterprise was in a strong position relative to the 
existing professional welfare organizations in the district because ‘usage of 
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professional welfare has shifted towards civil society’ (Municipality of Amsterdam 
– District East 2011, 5). 
 
Meta-governance: Playing with fear 
In the Amersfoort case, the municipality relied heavily upon administrative checks 
and regulations: ‘When we were finished with one list of demands, another was 
already waiting for us’ (interviewed initiators). There was a constant threat that the 
municipality, framed by the initiators and citizens as ‘the opposition party’, would 
intervene in a top-down way and sell the building on the open market if the citizen 
group’s plan was not sufficiently strong or if they did not meet the requirements. 
This threat kept the initiators on their toes by creating a sense of urgency and also 
increased support from other inhabitants that convinced the initiators to keep going: 
‘It was going to happen either way, good or bad’ (interviewed initiators). In 
Amsterdam, the regulation-free experimentation zone created a benevolent 
atmosphere rather than a threatening shadow over the initiative. In contrast to 
Amersfoort, fear-based incentives were absent in Amsterdam. From the beginning, 
the government attitude was supportive. 
 
Meta-governance: Summary 
This analysis shows the following. First, we can see that the combinations of 
strategies employed really influenced the outcomes of the self-organization process. 
In Amersfoort, the combination of working with all kinds of frameworks and 
regulations with playing with fear led to a well-defined organization. In Amsterdam, 
both these elements were largely absent, which could explain why a more loosely 
coupled enterprise evolved. In Amsterdam, a ‘softer’ approach was visible, one that 
made use of supportive actions (providing resources), storytelling and helpful 
changes to the rules of the game (setting up the experimentation zone). Second, in 
both cases we can observe that local governments still played a role. In Amersfoort, 
we see a somewhat fear-inducing, hierarchical and administration-oriented shadow 
of hierarchy, whereas, in Amsterdam, a more bottom-up, supportive shadow could 
be seen. A third observation is that, in Amersfoort, a change could be seen during 
the process towards a more benevolent shadow, one that also involved supportive 
actions (providing resources) and changing the rules of the game (giving citizens a 
privileged position). Fourth, our case analysis shows that self-organization and meta-
governance are co-evolving and interacting mechanisms, and that the contents of this 
co-evolutionary process can differ. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
 
Self-organization is used to legitimize a retreat by government from policy sectors 
(such as welfare) in which they previously held a strong position. Empirical 
understanding of self-organization in the public sector is scarce, especially with 
regard to the role of government. One reason is that the absence of governmental 
control is seen as an inherent characteristic of self-organization. We, however, argue 
that if we really want to understand self-organization processes in the public sector, 
we have to address the way in which governments continue to influence these 
processes. Hence, the goal of this research has been to understand how and why the 
interplay between self-organizing communities and meta-governing local 
governments shape the emergence of new public service arrangements, thereby 
unravelling the mechanisms behind this interplay by taking into account the actions, 
interests and motives of the involved stakeholders. Our comparative case study of 
two community enterprises analyses how this interplay substantially shapes the 
course and outcomes of the self-organizing processes behind the establishment of 
two robust community enterprises. Their success can be explained by the fact that 
the actions taken by the initiators were closely interwoven with the actions of civil 
servants – policymakers and frontline workers – and politicians. Governments, even 
though they were formally retreating, played a substantial role. They used a complex 
set of meta-governing techniques, which go beyond coercive control, to influence 
the shaping and the outcome of self-organization processes. In doing so, they created 
shadows of hierarchy that, in both cases, partly explain the emergence of new local 
service-arrangements. Our research identifies two versions of this shadow. In the 
Amersfoort situation, a fear-based shadow of hierarchy structured the self-
organization process, which in turn influenced its shaping. The ‘shadow’ provided 
focus and structured the interactions between the initiators and the municipality 
through the imposition of various guidelines and requirements. One could argue that 
the citizens were invited to take the initiative to produce these services, but within a 
framework created by government. The second type, seen in the Amsterdam case, 
was a more benevolent shadow of hierarchy, involving the creation of a level playing 
field and the provision of access to relevant resources. As in the Amersfoort example, 
this again partially explains the shaping of the self-organization process. In this type 
of shadow, the group of citizens was perceived by government as a co-creator that 
together with local government would initiate new service arrangements. A more 
benevolent shadow also became visible in the Amersfoort situation once the initial 
distrust and scepticism were replaced by a more positive attitude. This suggests that 
a benevolent shadow is related to trust. In Amsterdam, in contrast to Amersfoort, 
selforganization could be linked to a tradition of civil engagement which had already 
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generated trust and social capital. We therefore conclude that the type of shadow cast 
by governments seems to correlate with the trust present: distrust leads to a fear-
based shadow, whereas trust leads to a more benevolent form. Furthermore, the role 
of boundary spanners, as connectors of people, ideas, interests and resources as well 
as protectors of the initiative (and also in terms of leadership), is evident when it 
comes to shaping the self-organization process since they can help create trust. In 
particular, boundary-spanning frontline workers are important since they are often 
part of two social infrastructures: the local community and the municipality. The 
aldermen responsible for the relevant area of services can also be important boundary 
spanners by providing political support and allowing access to vital resources. This 
role was also visible in the way these municipalities intervened: by creating new 
playing rules and developing supportive actions and positive framing.  
 
Another conclusion relates to triggers for self-organization and the role that 
disruptive events play. In Amersfoort, we saw that the closing of the community 
centre and the NIMBY reaction to a threatened addiction clinic acted as a disruptive 
event that mobilized citizens to take over the community centre. This changed the 
meaning of the location and created a sense of belonging. In Amsterdam, in 
comparison, we saw that the takeover of the community centre was the outcome of 
a gradual process that built upon a tradition of civic participation as an inspirational 
idea. Here, setting up a selforganizing neighbourhood centre can be seen as an 
evolutionary next step. This adds a contextual factor to the significance of disruptive 
events. The fact that the takeover of the community centre in Amsterdam was 
embedded in this tradition and built on existing practices of collaboration also 
explains why, in Amsterdam, the shadow of hierarchy was a benevolent one. In 
Amersfoort, the plan that was developed by the local community can be regarded as 
a process of mobilization against the municipality that had provoked them. This 
emerging tension can explain why the Amersfoort municipality chose to create a 
fear-based shadow of hierarchy. While accepting this alternative solution, the 
municipality wanted to control the centre’s development. Again over time, these 
tensions were eased by boundary-spanning activities that generated trust.  
 
These conclusions have some theoretical consequences. We had expected successful 
self-organization to depend on the way governments would support the initiatives of 
self-organizing neighbourhood communities. In the two studied cases, government 
involvement differed, but in both successful community enterprises emerged. 
Although there is always a risk of case study selection bias, this conclusion fits with 
the ideas of those scholars who advocate a more ecological approach to studying 
selforganization (Goldstein 1999). Here, self-organization is viewed as a 
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predominantly local and, therefore, contingent process of co-evolutionary 
interactions. Hence, as we found in our two cases, context should matter. 
Notwithstanding this agreement, further comparative case study research is needed 
to back up our initial conclusion. As others have suggested, self-organization in the 
public sector does seem to take place within a shadow of hierarchy. What we have 
shown is that there are different sorts of shadows, shaped by tradition, existing 
powers and resource-dependency relationships. This also implies that there are 
different forms of self-organization and, besides pure forms, there also seem to be 
somewhat hybrid forms of self-organization. The nature of this hybridity seems to 
be influenced by the role governments want to play. Moreover, the various forms of 
self-organization seem to have different triggers. It appears that self-organization can 
be an emerging process based on tradition or that it can be caused by a disruptive 
NIMBY-type situation that creates a policy window in which self-organization is 
advanced as a possible approach to an appropriate solution. A logical next step in 
studying self-organizing practices in public administration would be to attempt to 
develop a contingency-based framework of relevant factors that can then be 
elaborated and tested.  
 
It is important to put our conclusions into perspective. While we have been able to 
gain a better understanding of how self-organization processes are shaped, this 
knowledge is based on only two case studies that are located in one sector and in one 
country. Hence, we should be reluctant to generalize our findings. Given the 
importance that is nowadays attached to self-organization in public service delivery 
and the limited empirical findings that are provided by our own study, further 
empirical research is vital. A question that needs to be addressed is how the local 
context matters. In order to examine this, one could set up a field experiment in 
different settings, thereby varying the type of shadow. What, for example, would 
happen when a fear-based shadow is cast over a context in which there is a tradition 
of civic engagement? Another aspect is that the Netherlands has a long tradition of 
community participation, in which each societal pillar (Catholics, Protestants, 
Socialists and Liberals) organized specific services for their own group. It would be 
interesting to see whether the relationship between the type of self-organization and 
the role of government that we found also occurs in other countries with different 
governance traditions, for instance by examining the link in countries with a strong 
centralistic state tradition (such as France). Another research possibility would be to 
explore, within a single country, the link between self-organization and the weak 
and/or strong governance tradition in different policy sectors. We see this study as 
an early step in addressing this challenge. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1. Analytical model 
Relevant factors regarding the 
process of self-organization 
Indicators 
Output of self-organization: new 
service arrangements 
Has an order been established in terms 
of the creation of an organization that 
has a legal status, a budget and staff to 
carry out activities? 
Presence of a trigger Did a disruptive event stimulate self-
organization? Has this led to the 
generation of specific ideas? Why? 
Trustworthy relationships Did a sense of belonging and 
reciprocity stimulate or frustrate self-
organization? Why? 
Ability to focus on the exchange of 
and interplay between ideas, 
information, knowledge and 
experience 
Did a clear and shared focus that 
structured the interactions either 
stimulate or frustrate self-
organization? Why? 
Presence of a physical and/or virtual 
locus of interaction 
Did the use of a physical or virtual 
location with recurrent interactions 
stimulate or frustrate self-
organization? Why? 
Presence of boundary-spanning 
activities 
Did the presence of key individuals 
that were able to link people, ideas and 
resources and that were able to protect 
the interaction between the involved 
actors stimulate or frustrate self-
organization? Why? 
Flexibility of the involved actors to 
adapt existing roles and other 
practices, including relevant legal 
frameworks 
Did the willingness and ability to 
change existing roles, positions and 
regulations stimulate or frustrate 
selforganization? Why? 
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Factors related to meta-governance 
 
 
Application of meta-governance 
strategies 
Government acted as a meta-governor, 
thereby deploying the following 
strategies: 
A. Presence of strategic frameworks Did the use of all kinds of 
administrative checks, based on 
strategic frameworks and guidance 
notes, stimulate or frustrate self-
organization? Why? 
B. Presence of monitoring activities Did the use of benchmarking to 
monitor self-organization frustrate or 
stimulate self-organization and why? 
C. Presence of framing and storytelling 
activities 
Did storytelling by the meta-governor 
stimulate or frustrate self-
organization? Why? 
D. Presence of supportive actions Did provision of and access to vital 
resources, such as information, 
knowledge, finance, buildings and 
contacts by the meta-governor, 
stimulate or frustrate selforganization? 
Why? 
E. Formulating playing rules Did the structuring of positions and 
relationships between the involved 
actors as well as the formulation of 
rules-of-play by the meta-governor 
stimulate or frustrate selforganization? 
Why? 
F. Playing with fear Did threats by the meta-governor to 
impose top- down 
regulations/interventions stimulate or 
frustrate selforganization? Why? 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1. Documents and websites 
 
 
Source Document  
Dichtbij. 2013  “Het geheim van het klokhuis.” 
http://www.dichtbij.nl/eemland/ 
ondernemersnieuws/artikel/2837754/het-geheim-van-t-
klokhuis.aspx  
Groot Oost TV. 2012 “De Meevaart is open!.”  
http://www.youtube.com/watch? v=BWY4Dgno8go  
Het Klokhuis. 2012 
 
Wijkvereniging Het Klokhuis. Bedrijfsplan 2012. 
Amersfoort: Het  
Klokhuis.  
Meevaart. 2012a “Meevaart of tegenstroom.” http://meevaart.nl/  
Meevaart. 2012b “De Meevaart: op weg naar een wijkonderneming.” 
http:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=6zDPapxaXqE  
Meevaart. 2012 “Meevaart Ontwikkel Groep, wat is dat?” 
http://meevaart.nl/  
Municipality of Amersfoort. 
2013 
“Maatschappelijke overname wijkcentra.” http:// 
www.amersfoort.nl/4/ontmoetingindewijk/Maatschappel
ijke-overname-wijkcentra.html 
Municipality of Amersfoort. 
2012a 
Brief van College van Burgemeester en Wethouders. 
Maatschappelijke overname wijkcentrum het Klokhuis. 
MO/VW/4140528. June 26, 2012. 
Municipality of Amersfoort. 
2012b 
Collegebesluit. MO/VW/4141616. June 27, 2012.  
 
Municipality of Amsterdam. 
2012a 
Bewonersinitiatief. De Meevaart in handen van 
bewoners: een wijkonderneming in ontwikkeling.  
Municipality of Amsterdam. 
2012b 
Actieplan: Vertrouwen in de stad. Doorontwikkeling 
bewonersgestuurde wijkontwikkelingen en 
wijkondernemingen.  
Municipality of Amsterdam 
– District East. 2011 
Kadernota versterking sociaal domein.  
 
Parool. 2012 In de Meevaart spelt niemand de baas. June 22, 2012.  
Volkskrant. 2013 Buurt moet het voortaan zelf doen. February 21, 2013. 
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Chapter 5 
Boundary-spanning strategies for aligning 
institutional logics: a typology  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is published as: 
Nederhand, M.J., Van der Steen, M. and Van Twist, M. (2019). Boundary-spanning  
strategies for aligning institutional logics: a typology. Local Government Studies, 
45(2): 219-240.  
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Abstract 
This article critically examines strategies used by boundary spanners to align the 
institutional logics of bureaucracy, management and networks in citizenstate 
interactions. In-depth interviews conducted within the Dutch municipality of 
Rotterdam reveal that boundary spanners use entrepreneurial, mediation, and 
hierarchical strategies to align institutional logics. By providing insight into the 
strategic toolbox of boundary spanners and the perceived eﬀectiveness of these tools, 
this article enhances empirical understanding of how the interplay between older and 
newer institutional logics within public organisations takes shape and how boundary 
spanners make strategic use of hierarchy to overcome institutional barriers. 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
The complex nature of today’s problems has led governments to rethink their 
approach to the design and implementation of policies and services. An impressive 
growth of scholarly attention for post-NPM literature, such as network management 
and collaborative governance, support the idea that governance networks and 
collaborative governance have become the next ‘big thing’ in public sector 
management (Agranoﬀ 2006; Ansell and Gash 2008; Klijn and Koppenjan2015). 
The New Public Governance (NPG) paradigm is put forward as a viable 
alternative—a new and dominant logic—to the dominant Traditional Public 
Administration (TPA) and New Public Management (NPM) paradigms (Osborne 
2007; Pesto ﬀ 2012; Torﬁng et al. 2012). Rooted in the literature on networks and 
co-production, the NPG paradigm’s central assumption is that citizens are no longer 
to be treated as passive voters or consumers, but as active co-producers that 
participate in policy-making networks and contribute to the delivery of public 
services (Osborne 2007; Fledderus, Brandsen, and Honingh 2014). Although we see 
a sharp increase of scholarly and political attention on networks and co-production, 
empirical research falls short in exploring how the interplay between the logic of 
hierarchy (TPA), market (NPM) and networks (NPG) within public organisations 
takes shape (see Olsen 2010; Laegreid 2016). While many politicians and policy 
oﬃcials certainly ‘talk the walk’ along the lines of the popular scholarly refrain about 
the importance of collaboration and the rise of the network society (Buser 2013; 
Nederhand and Van Meerkerk2018), the question is whether policy oﬃcials also 
‘walk the talk’ in day-to-day encounters with citizens (see Van Dorp 2018). 
 
This article: the art of boundary spanning in aligning institutional logics  
To see how the addition of the newer NPG logic combines and aligns with the older 
institutional logics of TPA and NPM, it is important to take the work of boundary 
spanners into account. Due to their strategic positioning in-between policy oﬃcials 
and local communities (Van Meerkerk 2014), boundary spanners are able to play a 
key role in enabling a productive interplay between ‘’incompatible prescriptions’’ of 
diﬀerent institutional logics (Williams 2002; Meyer and Hammerschmid 2006). By 
linking organisations with their environments, boundary spanners are engaged in 
building and maintaining sustainable networks (Tushman and Scanlan 1981). As 
building networks of sustainable relations is very important to the collaborative 
nature of the NPG paradigm (Osborne 2007, 2010), boundary spanning is the key 
focus of managerial action within the NPG paradigm (Van Meerkerk and Edelenbos 
2018; Osborne 2010). By using their agency, boundary spanners actively foster and 
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shape citizen-government encounters. Although the need to mobilise and activate 
one’s own organisation to make these encounters work has been discussed frequently 
(see Streeck and Thelen 2005; Klijn and Koppenjan 2015; Nederhand, Bekkers, and 
Voorberg 2016), the current literature on boundary spanning lacks a clear typology 
of boundary-spanning strategies that are used to align clashing institutional logics 
within public organisations. This article therefore answers the following research 
question: what strategies do boundary spanners deploy to organisationally align the 
diﬀerent institutional logics (hierarchy, market, networks) in citizen-state 
interactions and do they succeed in their eﬀorts? By providing insight into the 
strategic toolbox of boundary spanners and the perceived eﬀectiveness of these tools, 
this article contributes not only to increasing our empirical understanding of how the 
interplay between older and newer institutional logics within public organisations 
takes shape (do they peacefully coexist or clash), but also to the eﬀectiveness of 
boundary spanners in aligning clashing logics by preventing or overcoming barriers. 
 
To achieve this, we build on diﬀerent bodies of the literature. Section 2 describes the 
literature on institutional logics and boundary spanners. Section 3 and 4 describe our 
case study approach that focuses on the exemplary case of the municipality of 
Rotterdam. The results of our analysis are presented in Sections 5 and 6. In the ﬁnal 
section, we address important conclusions and limitations and consider avenues for 
future research. 
 
5.2 Institutional logics: TPA, NPM and NPG 
 
The notion of institutional logics is used to provide a bridge between the macro-
structural paradigms within organisations and the study of individual behaviour of 
boundary spanners and policy oﬃcials on the micro level (Thornton and Ocasio 
2008). Institutional logics are a set of intra-organisational rules, routines and 
sanctions that individuals in particular contexts create and recreate in such a way that 
their behaviour is to some extent regularised and predictable (Jackall 1988). This 
implies the behaviour of policy oﬃcials to be structured along the lines of 
historically grown and accepted rule-based practices. These practices, which are 
based on dominant organisational paradigms or institutional logics, function as a 
common meaning system that adds to the durability and predictability of individual 
interactions (Scott 1995). Institutional logics are thus the sources of legitimacy that 
provide policy oﬃcials with a sense of order (Seo and Creed 2002). This sense of 
order in modern public organisations has traditionally been provided by the 
bureaucratic and the managerial logic (Christensen & Lægreid, 2007; Pollitt, 2003). 
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The behavioural repertoire of the more recently introduced NPG is not necessarily 
congruent with the repertoires represented by the bureaucratic (TPA) and/or the 
managerial (NPM) logic. We can identify four characteristics of the bureaucratic and 
managerial logics that can act as institutional barriers that boundary spanners face in 
their collaborative eﬀorts. These tensions with the NPG network logic will be 
speciﬁed after a short account of what the bureaucratic and managerial logics entails. 
 
Bureaucratic logic and potential barriers to network logic  
The bureaucratic logic is grounded in classical public administration theories in 
which government organisations are characterised as impersonal rational systems 
that prescribe neutral behaviour for policy oﬃcials (Weber 1978). From this logic, 
the function of policy oﬃcials should be standardised and executed along the lines 
of predictable processes and rules. The explicit standardisation of functions makes 
interaction with the bureaucratic organisation perfectly predictable. This 
predictability is also safeguarded by the presence of impersonal and stable rules 
(Dror 1968; Wilson 1989). These rules shield citizens from arbitrariness, power 
abuse and personal whims of policy oﬃcials (Bartels 2013). In this respect, it is also 
important that the allocation of resources should take place along the lines of clear 
regulations. Policy oﬃcials rely on rigid administrative guidelines, which perfectly 
ﬁt public values, such as impartiality and equality. As a consequence, policy oﬃcials 
are intentionally internally oriented. Political goals of oﬃceholders are favoured, and 
so political decisions guide what policy oﬃcials should do.  
 
The primary characteristic of this logic that can act as a barrier to the NPG logic of 
networks is standardisation. Whereas NPG entails the development and negotiation 
of goals and policies during interaction with citizens and other stakeholders (Osborne 
2010; Klijn and Koppenjan 2012), the bureaucratic logic would like policy oﬃcials 
to reason from existing regulations and politically authorised policy programmes. 
This beneﬁts the predictability and equality of public service provisions; however, 
tailor-made solutions that are more appropriate to the context at hand become more 
diﬃcult. The second major characteristic that potentially impedes network-working 
is the internal orientation of policy oﬃcials. The emphasis on both administrative 
procedures and serving the political oﬃceholders makes policy oﬃcials internally 
oriented. Hence, political decisions guide the actions of policy oﬃcials. This internal 
orientation on policy programmes and rules also enables policy oﬃcials to treat each 
citizen alike. In contrast, the logic of networks requires an openness and external 
focus from policy oﬃcials (Torﬁng et al. 2012; Klijn and Koppenjan 2015). 
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Managerial logic and potential barriers to network logic  
The managerial logic is grounded in the neoliberal approach of NPM. While it is 
diﬃcult to provide a deﬁnitive image of NPM (Pollitt, van Thiel, and Homburg 2007; 
see Hood 1991; Lane 2000), most scholars agree on the main features. These main 
features are the focus on improving the eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of public service 
delivery through management of processes and systems. The use of business 
instruments (strategic and performance management techniques, performance 
indicators) is crucial to the conceptualisation of NPM (Hood 1991). After politicians 
have deﬁned and set the main policy goals for the bureaucratic organisation, public 
managers are expected to manage the delivery of these policy goals within this 
budget (Du Gay 2008). Consequently, problems are translated into managerial 
targets that reﬂect the internal organisation. Financial resources are subsequently 
disaggregated into speciﬁc organisational units that should realise these targets and 
results. Results measured in terms of outputs and outcomes are important for 
purposes of accountability and eﬃciency (Hood 1991; Haque 2007). Therefore, 
setting speciﬁc performance indicators for each department enables managers and 
politicians to critically monitor and evaluate their performance.  
 
The primary characteristic of this logic that potentially serves as a barrier to the 
network logic is functional specialisation. Due to the focus on performance 
information and monitoring, policy ambitions are broken down into a large set of 
measurable smaller tasks that are allocated among departments and responsible 
policy oﬃcials. As a result, decision-making power and ﬁnancial resources are 
distributed within the organisation. This potentially impedes NPG as local needs of 
citizens usually cut across the responsibilities of individual policy oﬃcials and 
departments (Bartels 2016). The second major characteristic and barrier is the result-
orientation of policy oﬃcials. Achieving managerial targets within budget is key for 
policy oﬃcials as that is what they are held accountable for. This potentially leaves 
little room and time for policy oﬃcials to take-up extra tasks that come up during 
interactions with citizens, and therefore fall outside their performance indicators (see 
Bartels 2016; Michels and De Graaf 2010). 
 
Aligning institutional logics: the art of boundary spanning  
As institutional logics—with contradictory rules and routines—are conﬁrmed or 
changed during interactions (Edelenbos 2005), we will take a closer look at the role 
and agency of boundary spanners in aligning the institutional logics. The boundary-
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spanning literature depicts boundary spanners as connectors of people and processes: 
they facilitate contacts between internal and external parties. Diﬀerent ideas exist in 
the literature about when a person qualiﬁes as being a boundary spanner. Some 
scholars focus on holding a structural position within the organisational structure 
(Fernandez and Gould 1994; Tushman and Scanlan 1981), while others deﬁne 
boundary spanning as an activity that is not bound to a particular organisational 
position (Levina and Vaast 2005; Quick and Feldman 2014). In this article, we focus 
on boundary spanners that hold strategic brokerage positions. As a result of the 
central positioning of the boundary spanners inbetween their organisation and its 
environment, boundary spanners are able to shape perceptions by controlling 
information and access to various parts of the network (Williams 2002; Levina and 
Vaast 2005). Hence, boundary spanning is commonly thought of as the management 
of the interface between organisations and their environments (Sullivan and Skelcher 
2002; Williams 2002). To accomplish a better ﬁt between organisation and 
environment, boundary spanners (1) connect diﬀerent people and processes across 
organisational boundaries, (2) select relevant information on both sides of the 
boundary and (3) translate this information to the other side of the boundary (Van 
Meerkerk 2014). They are thus involved in a two-step informational ﬂow, collecting 
and transferring information from one side of the boundary to the other. However, 
boundary spanning is more than a simple matter of translation between diﬀerent 
‘worlds’ (e.g., internal and external, professional and amateur). Key to managing and 
coordinating the interface is not only the ability to connect, but also the ability to 
align organisations and actors of diﬀerent backgrounds (Lodge and Wegrich 2014). 
The central positioning of boundary spanners enables them to strategically shape 
perceptions through controlling information and to access various parts of the 
network. The rapidly expanding scholarship on boundary spanning has recently put 
more emphasis on the innovative component of boundary spanning: to transform 
particular institutional arrangements (Van Meerkerk and Edelenbos 2018; Baker, 
2008). Boundary spanners are considered to be entrepreneurs and innovators in the 
sense that they try to link diﬀerent policy issues and policy streams across 
boundaries. They highlight contradictions in institutional rule-sets to make a case for 
changing existing routines, or they attempt to recognise and exploit policy windows 
to create turns in the ‘paths’ of internal routines (Kingdon 1984). These kinds of 
strategies have received far less attention within the public administration literature 
on boundary spanning. Consequently, insight into the strategies that boundary 
spanners employ to prevent or overcome institutional barriers within public 
organisations is limited. Therefore, in this article, we will identify and construct a 
typology of boundary-spanning strategies that play a role within public 
organisations. 
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5.3 Research site 
 
This research is conducted within the Dutch municipality of Rotterdam. This 
municipality is internationally known for its experience with partnership working 
due to its involvement with the Rotterdam Harbour. Moreover, Rotterdam was 
following a political programme highlighting the importance of NPG by stressing 
citizen activation and participation (Municipality of Rotterdam 2014). In order to 
diminish the legitimacy gap between local government and citizens, the municipality 
of Rotterdam introduced the socalled GGW-approach in 2006 (Gebiedsgericht 
Werken). The GGW approach gives primacy to local experiences as opposed to the 
institutionalised understandings and routines of policy oﬃcials (see Bartels 2016). 
In 2010, a large reorganisation completed the shift of the administrative organisation 
to ﬁt this new governance philosophy of putting the local needs of districts and 
citizens ﬁrst. Hence, the municipality has moved from a ‘policy-centred’ 
organisation towards a ‘citizen-centred’ organisation (Rekenkamer Rotterdam 
2011). Policy oﬃcials of the municipality or Rotterdam thus build on years of 
experience with collaborative working (Van Steenbergen et al. 2017). This is not 
only mirrored in the current political programme of the municipality, but also in the 
institutional structure built around the GGW-approach. Therefore, the municipality 
of Rotterdam is exemplary in studying how diﬀerent institutional logics (hierarchy, 
market, networks) in citizen-state interactions take shape.  
 
This study focuses on public oﬃcials working in the municipality of Rotterdam as 
district managers. District managers are explicitly employed to function as the link 
between the perspectives and interests of a speciﬁc district (environment) and the 
perspectives and interests of the policydepartments of the city (organisation). They 
are responsible for collecting information on the local needs of citizens and 
transferring this information to policy oﬃcials and vice versa. The work of district 
managers is thus characterised not only by representing the local needs of citizens to 
policy oﬃcials, but also by representing the policies of these oﬃcials to citizens 
living in the relevant districts. As such, they connect two diﬀerent worlds. District 
managers thus not only hold a structural brokerage position within the organisational 
structure (Fleming, Mingo, and Chen 2007), their job description also implies a 
process of constantly interacting back and forth in-between various actors: the very 
activity of boundary spanning (Quick and Feldman 2014). District managers play a 
key role in the GGW approach. This approach divides the urban area of Rotterdam 
into 14 districts. Each of the 14 districts is represented within the municipal 
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organisation by a separate district-department in which district managers are 
employed. Besides spanning boundaries between policy oﬃcials and communities, 
district managers collaborate with a district-committee that consists of elected 
citizens living in the speciﬁc district and who communicate the local needs that they 
want the policy oﬃcials to take up. These needs are in turn taken up by district 
managers who are responsible to ﬁnd a solution for these local problems intheir 
district through informing and calling into action policy oﬃcials and, if necessary, 
the political head of the municipality. The district managers have no formal power 
and budget; thus, they rely solely on the commitment of policy oﬃcials of the 
policydepartments. Consequently, for the GGW-approach to work, the district 
managers have to align the interests of policy oﬃcials and districts. 
 
5.4 Methods 
 
In this study, we interviewed 16 district managers. Respondents were selected on 
theoretical grounds: respondents are all working as boundary spanners who have 
encounters with both citizens from their district and with policy oﬃcials working in 
the policy-departments. This selection made it possible to study the barriers that 
boundary spanners experience in their encounters with policy oﬃcials and to 
examine how they strategised upon these barriers. Within this selection frame, this 
study aimed for a sample consisting of district managers who are spread over the 
diﬀerent city districts to be able to grasp a variety of experiences. We succeeded in 
interviewing district managers from 12 of the 14 district-departments in the 
municipality of Rotterdam. Although Hoek van Holland and Charlois were not 
included, they were indirectly represented by the 12 district managers, who were also 
familiar with these districts. In four interviews the district manager brought along a 
colleague (district IJsselmonde, Prins Alexander, Feijenoord and Overschie). The 
respondents were introduced to the study by either the director of their own district 
or the director of another district and were then requested to participate as part of a 
broader evaluation of the GGW-approach within the municipality.  
 
This study focused on the experience of boundary spanners. Thus, to study these 
experiences, we focused on detailed examples and stories about encounters with 
policy oﬃcials. Stories present highly textured depictions of practices in which the 
norms, beliefs, and decision rules that guide actions and choices become clear 
(Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). This method allows respondents to illustrate 
what particular situations call for certain routines and how the speciﬁcs of a case ﬁt 
or do not ﬁt standard practices (see Bartels2013; Raaphorst2018). Within an 
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interview setting, respondents were asked to tell stories about struggles they had 
experienced. Additionally, we asked respondents to come up with examples and 
stories on how they strategised facing these struggles. To make valid and replicable 
inferences, we analysed the transcribed interviews by making use of the step-by-step 
approach of the constant comparative method to identify boundary-spanning 
strategies (Boeije 2002). We ﬁrst segmented our data into relevant categories by 
making use of an open coding process. Open coding is the process of breaking down, 
examining, comparing, conceptualising and categorising data (Strauss and Corbin 
1990). The fragments were then compared among each other, grouped into 
categories dealing with the same subject, and labelled with a code. The list of codes 
was then grouped in categories by means of axial coding and reassembled into the 
ﬁndings that are presented in this article. We used ATLAS.ti software for qualitative 
data analysis. The full coding scheme is presented in Appendix A. We now turn to 
the discussion of the main patterns and most exemplary stories. See Appendix B for 
additional supporting quotes. 
 
5.5 Clashing institutional logics 
 
The public management practice is characterised by the coexistence of multiple 
institutional logics. How does the logic of the more recently introduced NPG 
paradigm combine with the older institutional logics of the TPA and NPM paradigm? 
This section explores the four barriers that we theoretically expect boundary 
spanners to encounter as the result of clashing logics. We ﬁrst turn to the 
standardisation barrier. 
 
Standardisation barrier (experienced by 12 respondents)  
It often happens that boundary spanners clash with policy oﬃcials who are 
‘guarding’ current standards in terms of rules and policies. In the experience of 
boundary spanners, policy oﬃcials do not reason from the perspective of the problem 
but from the perspective of existing rules and policies. Consequently, many solutions 
do not quite ﬁt the needs of citizens from the districts. This is a two-fold problem: a 
strict interpretation of standards, and also a controlling approach of policy oﬃcials 
‘guarding’ these standards. According to boundary spanners, guarding these 
standards seems more important for policy oﬃcials then deviating from them 
because of an external need or initiative. As long as requests and ideas of citizens 
can be arranged within existing rules and standards, they are realised easily. 
However, when a request or initiative falls outside this framework, “it gets very 
tough’’. The following story is exemplary for this case.  
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‘’When citizen initiatives deviate from existing standards and rules, it gets very 
tough. For example, a group of citizens had the idea of installing new bicycle parking 
facilities in their neighborhood. This is of course really nice. They say to me: we will 
hire an artist to design these parking facilities. However, this is incredible diﬃcult 
for policy oﬃcials, as they want to adhere to the standard way of designing bicycle 
facilities in Rotterdam. […] The same goes for the design of paving stones. Policy 
oﬃcials don’t want these to include wood for a whole range of reasons… It doesn’t 
ﬁt the pre-deﬁned standard. Well, and so on.’’ (Respondent 14)  
The respondents who experienced this barrier indicated, like the above story aptly 
shows, that it often seems easier for policy oﬃcials to point at reasons why 
something is not possible, than to adapt the standard solution. Hence, citizens are 
often urged to adapt their idea or initiative so that it ﬁts policy standards. 
 
Internal-orientation barrier (experienced by 11 respondents)  
The following story shows that nearly three quarters of the boundary spanners also 
feel hindered because the primary point of reference for public servants from the 
policy departments is the inner bureaucracy and political process. Boundary spanners 
argue that policy oﬃcials are so busy with making sure the internal machinery runs 
well that they often lose sight of the more personal story of initiatives and requests 
from citizens.  
‘’The alderman promised the district committee that he would send them a letter. 
Well, that letter was important, also for other citizens from the district. The letter 
would enable the district committee to show what they had arranged with the 
alderman. It took a very long time for the letter to arrive. Each time, there was 
someone who felt that something else had to be included in the letter. While I was 
thinking like, this letter has to get through otherwise there will be a quarrel in the 
district, and with … So that is… This is where you really notice that the logic of the 
community and the municipality are very diﬀerent. Policy oﬃcials say, ‘’yes, yes, 
but if this is not part of the letter, then the alderman… [gets in trouble]. That political 
party will deﬁnitely ask questions.’’ All the time I am waiting and saying like: hurry 
up, this letter needs to become public. We have to get started. So that… And 
eventually the alderman would proﬁt. But OK, this is my experience, and I also get 
that the ‘other world’ looks diﬀerent.’’ (Respondent 9)  
Boundary spanners describe policy oﬃcials as being mainly oriented towards their 
organisation and the proper answering of internal questions. It comes more natural 
for policy oﬃcials to take a formal perspective on matters than to take a more 
personal approach and look at initiatives proposed by citizens as actions taken by 
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‘real people’. However, this barrier is hardly experienced as an issue of principle 
regarding equal treatment of citizens, but more as a pragmatic working-attitude. 
 
Functional speciﬁcation barrier (experienced by 9 respondents)  
Functional speciﬁcation is experienced as being a barrier for more than half of the 
boundary spanners. Because functions and tasks of policy oﬃcials are clearly 
demarcated, power and resources are spread over diﬀerent units. Hence, a lot of 
interdependencies exist within the organisation. The following story shows that it is 
hard to reconnect the resources and responsibilities in line with priorities of citizens 
within the districts. Such issues can linger very long simply because it is diﬃcult to 
combine the various resources from diﬀerent units, and, moreover, there is no real 
mechanism for doing that.  
‘’It is diﬃcult to get a hold on the cash ﬂow that enables you to say: Ok, I can 
promise on this table that this issue will be handled next week. You can only promise 
that to citizens if you possess the money. These days, there are a lot of dependencies 
and a major distance between the policy oﬃcials ‘on the tables’ and policy oﬃcials 
guarding the cash ﬂow. (…) [These] policy oﬃcials work in one of the big towers, 
you know, somewhere in the new building. Their systems show that somewhere in 
another district a street is in a much worse condition, so they won’t provide a budget 
for our street. (…) Often my contact person within the policy department doesn’t 
even know who this asset manager is. How are we supposed to contact this person? 
How can we arrange that not the street in district A, but the street in district B… [is 
ﬁxed]? Well, that is all at a distance.’’ (Respondent 1)  
Interestingly, more than one third of the boundary spanners didn’t perceive the 
functional speciﬁcation barrier to be problematic at all. They perceived the spread of 
functions and resources as a structural feature of organisations that not inherently 
impedes collaborative working. In fact, this feature could be made productive by 
public oﬃcials—if it wasn’t for their, for-instance, result-oriented or inward-
oriented behaviour or attitude. These boundary spanners thus perceived other more 
behavioural barriers to cause problems for collaborative working. 
 
Result-orientation barrier (experienced by 12 respondents)  
Policy oﬃcials and managers are judged on realising their programme; however, 
seeking cooperation with citizens and entrepreneurs is something ‘extra’ and, 
therefore, not always part of their performance agreements. Because it is not ‘in the 
programme’, three quarters of the boundary spanners feel that when a collaborative 
activity does not add to a performance target of policy oﬃcials, few internal 
managers feel responsible for it; for them, it literally does not count. The following 
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story shows that processes of co-production could easily go wrong when they are not 
anchored in the performance agreements of policy oﬃcials.  
‘’Take for example the redesign of a street. We did that in co-production with 
citizens. (…) Let ’s say you work for the policy department Urban Development, and 
you have drafted this plan together with citizens while also taking into account safety 
and social development arguments. This could imply that, for instance, the parking 
spots are not entirely optimal placed, and the spots are 10 cm shorter than the norm. 
Then a senior [policy oﬃcials who works as] urban planner sees the plan and 
dismisses it immediately, with all its citizen ideas, regardless of whether the citizens 
thought it was the best plan possible, given all their other interests. This person is 
not held accountable for integral working [in co-production with citizens], this was 
not speciﬁed in his performance indicators. You should not give this one person the 
power to destroy the integral plan just with one point-of-view.’’ (Respondent 12)  
Furthermore, part of the orientation on results is the allocation of budgets to speciﬁc 
managerial targets. This makes the municipal budget quite inﬂexible; there is little 
space for re-allocating money to purposes outside a pre-deﬁned programme. 
Boundary spanners indicate that because of the labelling of money, there is not 
always space for new issues that pop-up. This is also part of the result-orientation 
barrier that they experience. 
 
Four institutional barriers to NPG  
Our ﬁndings show that traditional logics produce signiﬁcant barriers to the work of 
boundary spanners. We found little evidence of major objections to the requests of 
boundary spanners. Most initiatives were not far-fetched and ﬁtted within existing 
policy goals. That shows how traditional institutional logics provide an ever-present 
but also implicit barrier for aligning actions of policy oﬃcials with demands of local 
citizens. Of course, not all encounters with policy oﬃcials are cumbersome. Some 
boundary spanners explicitly stress the good-intentions of many of the policy 
oﬃcials. Nevertheless, that does not take away from the tensions experienced almost 
on a daily basis. We will now examine the strategies that boundary spanners use to 
align the clashing institutional logics by preventing and/or overcoming the barriers 
that they experience. 
 
5.6 Boundary-spanning strategies 
 
Within our case, we can identify three types of strategies that boundary spanners use 
to avoid or overcome the barriers they experience: an entrepreneurial strategy, a 
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mediating strategy, and a hierarchical strategy. In the next section, these strategies 
are described, including their eﬀectiveness as perceived by the boundary spanners.1 
 
Entrepreneurial strategy (used by 7 respondents)  
This strategy involves taking a creative approach to rules and routines, but also to 
contacts. Boundary spanners who employ this strategy strategically think about the 
best starting point for the request or initiative from citizens. They think carefully 
about whom to go to and what battles they would pick. When a policy oﬃcial fails 
to properly react to the request, boundary spanners try another way into the system 
by approaching oﬃcials at diﬀerent positions. The following story shows an example 
of this entrepreneurial approach:  
‘’Take for example the MOE-landers, that formed a problem in our district. (…) It 
takes a lot of time before the policy o ﬃcials working to get their policies moving. 
Rules and all sorts of frameworks should be followed. That is quite diﬃcult 
sometimes. Simultaneously, like I said before, I try to work at the boundaries of what 
is appropriate, I am inventive and creative. You are going to look at… take the 
consultation hour that we set-up for the MOE-landers. They [policy oﬃcials] then 
say like, the aldermen don’t want to facilitate special target groups. I think, OK, so 
be it. Policy makers will not deviate. I think OK, but it has also something to do with 
integration and there may be room within the policy framework of integration for 
something like this. So you have to be very creative and open-minded, but also show 
courage.’’ (Respondent 16)  
This story shows that this particular boundary spanner detected a policy window and 
acted upon that opportunity. Boundary spanners thus attempt to recognise and 
exploit policy windows to act upon resource opportunities and couple solutions to 
existing problems. This strategy is used before actual barriers are experienced (e.g., 
approaching the right policy oﬃcials) as well as after barriers have occurred (e.g., 
approaching other policy oﬃcials). Hence, experience about previous barriers is 
used to inform future behaviour, for example, not to approach certain policy oﬃcials 
again. By seeking another way in (as the above story shows), boundary spanners try 
to avoid all four types of existing barriers. While all boundary spanners who use this 
strategy agree with its eﬀectiveness to avoid and get around barriers, two boundary 
spanners were more pessimistic than the others by stressing that it takes considerable 
time to get in contact with the right person. The other—more positive—respondents 
indicated that if this strategy is to work, the formulation of the request is very 
important. Issues should be framed and split up into smaller parts to match the 
interests of the receiver. 
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Mediating strategy (used by 14 respondents)  
The mediation strategy is used by boundary spanners to ﬁnd common ground for the 
development of a solution. The mediating strategy can be applied in two ways. The 
ﬁrst way involves the usage of an argumentative approach to persuade oﬃcials. 
Boundary spanners use terms like engaging in the battle or starting the ﬁght to 
describe these encounters. They try to make the policy oﬃcials see the importance 
of bending existing rules and policies. The second way involves trust-building and 
facilitating compromises by listening and showing respect to the interests of policy 
oﬃcials. The following story shows the importance of keeping in mind the interests 
of their colleagues. On the basis of this knowledge, boundary spanners try to 
facilitate a shared understanding on which they themselves and the policy oﬃcials 
can build. Facilitating a shared understanding becomes easier if the relationship 
between the policy oﬃcials and boundary spanners is good. Therefore, investing in 
relationships beforehand is part of the strategy boundary spanners use to avoid future 
barriers (see Appendix for supporting quotes). Boundary spanners then have a better 
basis to start the negotiation and mediation process. This strategy is also used to 
overcome barriers by exploring common ground and entering in a negotiation 
process as the following story shows.  
‘’The art is to get as many things done as possible. In all fairness, aye. Knowing 
each other’s world on the basis of arguments is very important. Contacts and 
relations are key. They [policy oﬃcials] have to get that there is a problem in the 
neighbourhood, and simultaneously I have to get that there are certain policy 
assignments at stake. In the organization, there should also be scored. (…) You have 
to get that policy oﬃcials take a lot of [internal] interests into consideration. If you 
get that, you have created room for a good conversation. In this case, you don’t work 
against the currents, but you can adjust the main current a little.’’ (Respondent 3)  
This strategy is used in combination with all barriers, but mostly with the 
standardisation, and result-orientation barrier. However, the boundary spanners 
disagree on whether this strategy is eﬀective or not. Of the 14 boundary spanners 
that use the strategy, 3 boundary spanners ﬁnd mediating eﬀective (although some 
of them do complain about the eﬀort it costs and the delay accompanying it), and 2 
boundary spanners ﬁnd the mediating strategy eﬀective only when they combine it 
with the entrepreneurial strategy of picking the right colleagues. Seven boundary 
spanners stress that the eﬀectiveness of the mediating strategy depends, for instance, 
on the competences and willingness of colleagues to see (and act upon) the added 
value. Lastly, 2 boundary spanners are entirely negative about the potentials of the 
mediating strategy and indicate that the traditional logics are too dominant to be 
aligned with the logic of networks. They thus plea for institutional reform. 
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Hierarchical strategy (used by 9 respondents)  
Sometimes policy oﬃcials need a little help in breaking through red tape and 
engaging in processes of collaboration and co-production. Boundary spanners 
indicate that when requests and communication get stuck (often for a long time), it 
may be necessary to involve managers. This more confrontational approach to 
overcome barriers is sometimes unavoidable to getting the collaboration moving. In 
order for this strategy to be successful, it is important for boundary spanners to 
clearly formulate what they expect from these managers and why it is of crucial 
importance to change existing rules or policies and/or mobilise extra manpower 
within the policy-departments. The preparation needs to be excellent and to-thepoint. 
This strategy is usually applied after experiencing some kind of barrier (‘’as a last 
resort’’) rather than preventing barriers from happening in the ﬁrst place, as is the 
case with the other two strategies. The following fragment underlines this strategy. 
‘’Yes, but something goes wrong here. Then we need to escalate, like ok, you consign 
the choice or dilemma, what you see as unfair, to [the managers on] the table who 
possesses the power to solve the issue. They then might say: ‘’Yes you are right, this 
is indeed undesirable.’’ Subsequently, you hope, of course, that the manager [of the 
policy department] who seems most appropriate to take the lead, then says: You are 
right, I will instruct several policy oﬃcials to help you.’’ (Respondent 1)  
This strategy is used in combination with all barriers, but mostly with the 
standardisation and internal orientation barrier. All the boundary spanners, but one, 
agree on the eﬀectiveness of this strategy. It is important though to be very speciﬁc 
to the management what exactly is needed so that they know what to do. While 
threatening with the hierarchical strategy may sometimes be enough to get policy 
oﬃcials moving, at other times, the strategy is developed together with policy 
oﬃcials as managerial or political involvement may help the policy oﬃcials to 
resolve the issue by getting more resources or leeway. Although eﬀective, the 
boundary spanners indicate that they use this strategy not very often, and almost only 
when the other two strategies have failed. One respondent is negative about the 
eﬀectiveness. He indicates: ‘’If my mangers talks to their manager and arrange that 
someone gets assigned to this task, you and I both know that that this person lacks 
the intrinsic motivation to give his or her best.’’ 
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Typology of boundary-spanning strategies  
Boundary work thus involves continuously avoiding and overcoming various 
institutional barriers; it can be seen as the core feature of NPG. About half of the 
boundary spanners use multiple strategies, while the other half has a strong 
preference for only one strategy (mostly the mediating strategy). Table 1 depicts the 
three strategies that boundary spanners use to avoid and overcome institutional 
barriers that are based on traditional institutional logics. 
 
5.7 Conclusion and discussion 
 
This study aims to empirically examine the interplay between traditional hierarchical 
and more horizontal institutional logics within the Dutch municipality of Rotterdam 
by connecting the literature of institutional logics (structure) to the literature of 
boundary spanning (agency). The central aim of this article was to examine what 
strategies boundary spanners deploy to organisationally align the diﬀerent 
institutional logics (hierarchy, market, networks) in citizen-state interactions and 
examine if boundary spanners succeed in their eﬀorts.  
 
To align clashing institutional logics, boundary spanners make use of three 
strategies: entrepreneurial, mediating, and hierarchical. The entrepreneurial 
strategyis used to recognize and exploit policy windows, to act upon resource 
opportunities, and to couple solutions to existing problems. Boundary spanners not 
only act entrepreneurial when it comes to policy-opportunities, but also when it 
comes to approaching ‘the right’ people. Past encounters inform the strategic 
behaviour, for example, not to approach certain inﬂexible policy oﬃcials again. To 
make this strategy work, boundary spanners have to do their homework to ﬁnd the 
perfect policy-person ﬁt for the speciﬁc collaborative issue and frame the issue 
accordingly. This strategy is, if applied well, eﬀective in aligning logics by avoiding 
problematic clashes. The mediating strategy is used to facilitate a shared 
understanding and to negotiate the conditions of a potential solution. While 
mediating is the most-applied boundary-spanning strategy in this study, boundary 
spanners have mixed feelings when it comes to assessing its eﬀectiveness. While 
some boundary spanners ﬁnd this strategy very helpful in aligning logics (e.g., 
aligning logics requires good communication), other boundaryspanners ﬁndthis 
strategya waste of time (e.g., aligning logics requires institutional change). Most 
boundary spanners however ﬁnd this strategy to be occasionally eﬀective, depending 
on the ﬂexibility and goodwill of the policy oﬃcials concerned. The hierarchical 
strategy is employed mostly as a reaction to barriers that stem from the traditional 
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hierarchical bureaucratic logic, such as standardisation and internal orientation. 
While hierarchy poses problems for boundary spanners, using hierarchy 
simultaneously also provides the solution to align clashing institutional processes 
and make collaboration work. Although this strategy is very eﬀective, boundary 
spanners are careful in applying it.  
 
Table 1. Boundary-spanning strategies 
 
This study makes two major contributions to the literature on NPG and boundary 
spanning. First, this study underlines that the real challenge of working 
collaboratively does not lie across the borders of the public administration, but lies 
deeply rooted within it. Although the need to mobilise or activate one’s own 
organisation has been discussed frequently in the governance literature (see Klijn 
 Entrepreneurial 
strategy 
Mediating strategy  Hierarchical 
strategy 
Goal Avoid barriers Avoid and overcome 
barriers 
Overcome barriers 
Focus Working around rules 
and contacts  
Search for shared 
meanings to facilitate 
compromises 
Using the power of 
managers to pave 
the way  
Activities Framing issues to  
match interests of 
receiver, splitting up 
issues in smaller parts, 
using political 
knowledge to pick right 
policy agendas, seeking 
opportunities, avoiding 
inflexible colleagues 
Talking with colleagues 
to find common ground 
and a solution, using 
charms and/or 
arguments to change 
viewpoints 
Taking the issue to a 
higher managerial 
level by involving 
public managers 
and/or politicians. 
Competences 
and skills 
Creativity, courage, 
political sensitivity, 
proactivity 
Listening, openness, 
negotiation, persuading 
Prioritizing, 
perseverance, 
delegating, result-
orientedness 
Mechanism Policy windows  Communication and 
personal relations  
Formal hierarchy 
Applied All barriers All barriers, but mostly 
standardization and 
result-orientation 
All barriers, but 
mostly 
standardization and 
internal-orientation 
Effectiveness Yes, if applied well Mixed results Yes, but 1 
respondent 
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and Koppenjan 2015; Bartels2016), this article connects this discussion to the 
literature on institutional logics.Consequently, this article responds to an important 
theoretical challenge to the study of hybrid governance structures by identifying 
important structural institutional incompatibilities in the assumptions and principles 
that underlie traditional paradigms and the NPG paradigm (Klijn and Koppenjan 
2012). Second, this study shows that boundary spanning not only uses strategies 
based on trust-building, communication and entrepreneurship (see Williams 2002), 
but also uses strategies that requires the mobilisation of the power of politicians and 
managers (e.g., hierarchy) to align institutional logics and handle conﬂicts. This 
point is an important addition to the current boundary-spanning literature. As 
boundary spanners extensively handle non-routine tasks, political and managerial 
supportto safeguard their maneuver room enables them to better handle conﬂicts 
inherent to their position (Chebat and Kollias 2000; Stamper and Johlke 2003). 
While boundary spanners often get portrayed as the ultimate ‘network champion’ 
and ‘postmodern non-hierarchical leader’ (Williams 2002; Guarneros-Meza and 
Martin 2016), aligning clashing institutional logics require not only ‘bending’ and 
‘renegotiating’ dominant traditional routines, but also strategically using these 
hierarchy-based routines to break through critical institutional barriers.  
 
Inevitably this study has limitations that we hope will inspire future research. This 
study was performed in a speciﬁc context—boundary spanning in a large-sized 
municipality in the Netherlands. While we believe our ﬁndings to hold in comparable 
contexts, more empirical research is needed to test the generalisability and to further 
develop the theory on intraorganisational boundary-spanning strategies. To this end, 
future research could compare strategies of boundary spanners within diﬀerent-sized 
municipalities both within one country and across countries to theoretically advance 
this ﬁeld of study. The ﬁndings indicate that more attention should be given to the 
role of hierarchy in boundary spanning. 
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Appendix A  
 
Table A1.  Coding Scheme 
Open coding Axial coding Final code 
Frame issues to match interest receiver Issue formulation Entrepreneurial 
strategy Splitting up issues in small parts 
Using political knowledge to pick right 
policy agendas  
Seeking collaborative and 
resource opportunities 
Avoid inflexible colleagues 
Collaborate with colleagues with 
decision-power 
Taking advantage of circumstances Opportunism  
Learning about each other’s culture Empathy Mediating 
strategy Listening 
Togetherness and trust 
Exploring common ground Collaboration 
Bringing people together 
Organizing commitment 
Influencing choices Persuasion 
Debating choices 
Arguing  
Change or force decision Decision power Hierarchical 
strategy Seeking power 
Power over resources 
Involve supervisors Higher managerial level 
Supervisors will deliberate 
Managers use hierarchy 
Involve executive politicians Higher political level 
Threatening with politics 
Collaborating with politicians 
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Appendix B  
 
Table B1.  Supporting quotes 
Category Quotes  
Standardization  ‘’All kinds of objections are raised. Whilst as you explain it the way I do, 
everyone is like: this is beneficial for all parties. The municipality 
reduces maintenance costs and citizens have more fun. But the rules say 
that the area has to adjacent your own property, and that is not the case 
here. So it is not possible.’’ (Respondent 6) 
‘’It is a hard and sluggish process. General solutions are employed, 
while you have specifically asked for custom solutions. They then come 
up with a policy measure that is not quite what we need in our district. 
This happens often.’’ (Respondent 8) 
Internal-orientation  ‘’This is, for example, making sure the organization is run smoothly and 
all questions are answered properly.’’ (Respondent 8) 
‘’[Policy officials say] We do not handle complaints in this way. You 
should tell [the citizens] that they should report it again. For us [district 
managers], this is a very sluggish, administrative, annoying way of 
working.’’ (Respondent 11) 
Functional specification  ‘’Somewhere in the organization an asset manager sees in his/her system 
that other streets should be handled first. So I hear that there is no 
money.’’ (Respondent 1) 
 ‘’I spent 1.5 years (!) negotiating with two governmental clusters, boys, 
we suffer from it and get reports of angry citizens, and rightly so, you 
have to renovate this field. Well, cluster 1 said the space was the 
responsibility of cluster 2, while cluster 2 said: no it’s theirs…’’ 
(Respondent 5) 
Result-orientation  ‘’For the civil servant working on urban development it makes no 
difference that we have a district plan, because he is judged on realizing 
his own program. So if he has to build 30 houses, and he built 30 houses, 
he did a good job. However, it could well be that the 30 houses were 
quite unnecessary for the area.’’  (respondent 5)  
‘’Yes, that [achieving the policy program] is of course not something 
[that they are judged upon], you know, that is not part of the result-
oriented way of working, which is required here.’’ (Respondent 7) 
Entrepreneurial strategy  ‘’At a certain point you know which colleagues to approach for a fruitful 
dialogue, and which ones to avoid.’’ (Respondent 3) 
‘’You can try different persons.’’ (Respondent 4) 
Mediating strategy  ‘’They have to get that there is a problem in the neighborhood, and 
simultaneously I have to get that there are certain policy assignments at 
stake. In the organization there should also be scored.’’ (Respondent 3) 
 ‘’I invest in relationships. Whether it is a colleague or inhabitant, I 
invest in them. I notice that these people… Well, of course I am not 
always nice, but in general these people are willing to do things for 
you.’’ (Respondent 11) 
Hierarchical strategy ‘’Present it to the managers, like, listen, it doesn’t work. Your employees 
repeatedly say: these are the rules. I want to have these rules adjusted.’’ 
(Respondent 6) 
‘’Cooperation is hardly possible. This [co-creation process] is so 
beyond all conventions. In this process I have direct contact with the 
mayor. Which of course is very weird if you take into account all the 
managers and advisors. They are non-existent here.’’ (Respondent 7)  
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Chapter 6 
The Politics of Collaboration: Assessing the 
Determinants of Performance in Community-
Based Nonprofits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is submitted as: 
Nederhand, M.J. (2019). The Politics of Collaboration: Assessing the Determinants 
of Performance in Community-Based Nonprofits.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Discussion 
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7.1 Introducing the conclusions 
 
This study aimed to gain a better understanding of the governance of community 
self-organization. This is an important goal as the role of community self-
organization is increasingly becoming pivotal for upholding modern welfare states. 
At the same time, governments are struggling with defining and implementing a 
governance strategy to react to and stimulate this trend of community self-
organization. With this study, we want to gain systematic insight into what 
governance strategies are actually preferred by involved stakeholders and how these 
strategies affect community-based collectives (as key examples of self-
organization). The main conclusions of the research are presented in this final 
chapter. This concluding chapter comprises four sections. In Section 7.2, we aim to 
answer the main research questions of this study.  Next, in Section 7.3 we present 
the main conclusions that can be drawn from this study and its contributions to the 
literature. In Section 7.4, we address the limitations of this study. Finally, in Sections 
7.5 and 7.6, recommendations for future research and practice are made. 
 
7.2 Answering the research questions 
 
The overall goal of this dissertation was to gain a better understanding of how 
municipalities should govern community-based collectives to safeguard their 
performance. In line with this aim, the main research question was formulated as 
follows:  
 
How should municipalities govern community-based collectives to safeguard their 
performance?  
 
The main research question was divided into three research sub-questions: 
1. How do key stakeholders perceive effective governance of community-
based collectives by municipalities?   
2. What strategies are used by municipalities to govern community-based 
collectives and to what effect?  
3. Under what conditions do community-based collectives perform well?  
 
The five empirical chapters of this dissertation all contributed to answering one or 
more of these questions. The next section presents the conclusions of each empirical 
chapter individually. Together, they will provide the answer to the main research 
question.  
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7.2.1 Talking the walk: perceptions on effective governance (RQ1)  
The first research question concerned how key stakeholders perceive effective 
governance of community-based collectives by municipalities.  In Chapter 2, we 
used a qualitative content analysis of policy letters of the Dutch national government 
to determine how the governance role of municipalities regarding community-based 
collectives is perceived (national level). Based on the analysis of 37 policy 
documents published between January 2012 and December 2015, our findings 
showed that the Dutch national government call for a new public service ethos of 
municipalities. Next to their more traditional role as service provider, national 
government wants municipalities to pick up a more activating, supporting and 
partnering role in order to mobilize and incorporate community resources as an 
inextricable part of the care system. Regular providers decide where responsibility 
should shift towards the community, and where not. As maintaining a good level of 
care remains a government responsibility, municipalities are obliged to intervene 
when the production efforts of the social network of citizens fail. This study thus 
shows that although the role of municipalities is changing (e.g. horizontal 
governance), their firm grip on care provision continues to exist (e.g. vertical 
governance). The question is whether this dominant political discourse is also 
present in the perception and interpretation of stakeholders at the municipal and 
community level. How do policy officials and community-based collectives perceive 
the ideal governance role of municipalities?  
 
In Chapter 3, we used Q-Methodology to determine how public officials (municipal 
level) and community-based collectives (community level) perceive the ideal role of 
government in processes of self-organization. The Q study shows that there are 
roughly two types of perceptions on effective governance. The first type perceived 
the ‘ideal’ governance relationship as one of ‘pure’ and somewhat radical self-
governance. According to this perception, policy officials should have no direct 
involvement in collectives and keep their distance. As collectives are dependent 
upon passion and energy, it is crucial to give them the freedom to set their own rules 
and steps to follow. Non-interference is key to maintain the collectives’ feeling of 
ownership. The role of policy officials is to create favorable conditions for 
community-based collectives by, for instance, connecting relevant parties. This type 
embraces elements from the relatively light governance modes of Self-Governance 
and Network Governance. Both public officials and community-based collectives 
adhere to this type. The second type aims for a more direct and interactive 
relationship between municipalities and community-based collectives. This type 
acknowledges the potential of an active involvement of policy officials for both 
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municipalities and community-based collectives. A close partnership can, on the one 
hand, help collectives in realizing their societal ambitions, while, on the other hand, 
help municipalities in realizing important policy objectives. Public officials and 
community-based collectives that adhere to this perception show a preference for a 
close and hands-on relationship in which public officials have an important role of 
safeguarding traditional public values, such as reliability, equality and transparency. 
However, how this more hands-on collaboration exactly takes shape differs among 
public officials and community-based collectives. Whereas public officials see their 
involvement in a more connective way, community-based collectives believe that 
municipalities may and, indeed, should reward their impact. They believe that in this 
process of rewarding, it should be about more than whom you know and who has a 
good marketing campaign; rather, it should be about genuine impact and content. 
This type sees effective governance as an active and hands-on practice in which it is 
important for governments to stay true to their traditional values.  
 
While the study highlights interesting differences in prevalent perceptions on 
effective governance, the findings simultaneously show striking similarities in 
perceptions on ineffective governance. That is, policy officials and community-
based collectives strongly disagree with the view that governments should relate to 
community-based collectives in a traditional, controlling or business-like manner. 
Collectives, for instance, indicate that they find it not only impossible to measure 
performance such as social cohesion, self-esteem and well-being, but find it also 
inappropriate. They conclude that although today’s society puts heavy emphasis on 
business, performance and results, this is not necessarily desirable. It is therefore 
questionable whether representatives of the ‘current power’, such as governments, 
should control collectives. Both groups of stakeholders find that a controlling and 
result-oriented attitude of government, harms (and possibly destroys) collectives’ 
self-organizing capacity. Additionally, both policy officials and community-based 
collectives feel that politicians should not play a key role in defining the course of 
events with regards to community-based collectives. They fear the laborious process 
when something ‘becomes political’ and the resulting demoralization on the side of 
collectives.  
 
To summarize, in this section, we answered the first research question on how 
effective governance is perceived by key stakeholders at the national, municipal, and 
community levels. Although stakeholders seem to agree on what ineffective 
governance consists of (e.g. controlling, performance-related steering), stakeholders 
seem to disagree to a certain extent on how effective governance should look like. 
Would community-based collectives profit more from a hands-on or from a hands-
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off governance approach, and what case-specific circumstances account for this? 
These findings highlight the need for more empirical research into how the interplay 
between municipalities and community-based collectives is organized in practice.  
 
7.2.2 Walking the talk: usage of governance strategies (RQ2) 
The second research question dives deeper into the strategies that are used by 
municipalities to govern community-based collectives. We explored these strategies 
and their effects in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, we conducted a comparative case 
study of two community-based collectives in Amersfoort and Amsterdam to 
determine the governance strategies of politicians and public officials that are used 
to govern community-based collectives and their effects. Based on the analysis of 31 
in-depth interviews, our findings showed that public officials and politicians use a 
complex set of governance strategies that create different shadows of hierarchy. The 
study identified two versions of this shadow: a fear-based one and a benevolent one, 
depending on tradition, existing powers, and resource-dependency relationships. The 
type of shadow cast influences the development of community-based collectives. In 
the Amersfoort case, we see a strong hierarchical involvement of the municipality 
through the definition and enforcement of key parameters, rules-of-play and all kinds 
of requirements. There was a constant threat that the municipality, framed by the 
initiators and citizens as ‘the opposition party’, would intervene in a top-down way 
and sell the building that the community-based collective wanted to acquire on the 
open market if the collective’s plan was not sufficiently strong or if they did not meet 
the requirements. The imposition of various guidelines and requirements led to a 
very focused organization. In the Amsterdam case, the community-based collective 
was included as part of a policy experimentation project, which enabled the 
municipality to adopt a more flexible attitude. In this case, public officials and 
politicians tried to create a level playing field in which they made use of supporting 
and connecting strategies, leading to a more loosely coupled community-based 
organization. The findings of this study show that although the usage of government 
strategies differed, in both cases successful community-based collectives emerged. 
Hence, multiple strategy-paths are associated with the establishment of successful 
collectives. In both cases, the findings show that boundary-spanning public officials 
and politicians are of crucial importance to align the different departments of the 
internal municipal organization with regards to working with community-based 
collectives.  
 
The study described in Chapter 5 examined boundary spanning strategies that public 
officials use within the municipal organization to align the heads of the seven-headed 
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administrative monster. The traditional vertical way of working produces significant 
barriers to the collaborative horizontal way of working that is required when working 
with outside stakeholders, such as community-based collectives. As removing 
barriers is an important element of governing community-based collectives 
according to the findings in Chapter 4, this study delves deeper into this topic. Based 
on 16 in-depth interviews with district managers in the municipality of Rotterdam, 
we found that boundary spanners use three strategies to enable a productive interplay 
between horizontal and vertical institutional logics (and to prevent and overcome 
barriers): entrepreneurial, mediation, and hierarchical strategies. The 
entrepreneurial strategy is used to recognize and exploit policy windows for 
approaching ‘the right’ people. To make this strategy work, boundary spanners have 
to find the perfect policy-person fit for the specific collaborative issue and frame the 
issue accordingly. This strategy is, if applied well, perceived to be effective in 
avoiding problematic clashes. The mediating strategy is used to facilitate a shared 
understanding and to negotiate the conditions of a potential solution. Most boundary 
spanners however find this strategy to be occasionally effective in avoiding and 
overcoming clashes, depending on the flexibility and goodwill of the policy officials 
concerned. The hierarchical strategy requires the mobilization of the power of 
politicians and managers. This more confrontational approach to overcoming 
barriers is sometimes unavoidable. While threatening with the hierarchical strategy 
may sometimes be enough to get policy officials moving, at other times, the strategy 
is developed together with policy officials as managerial or political involvement 
may help the policy officials to resolve the issue by getting more resources or leeway. 
Although effective, the boundary spanners indicate that they use this strategy not 
very often, and almost only when other strategies have failed. This study shows that 
municipal boundary spanners thus not only use strategies based on trust-building, 
communication and entrepreneurship (see Williams 2002), but also use strategies 
that requires the mobilization of the power of politicians and managers (e.g. 
hierarchy). Working with community-based collectives thus not only requires 
‘bending’ and ‘renegotiating’ dominant traditional routines, as is commonly argued, 
but also requires strategically using these hierarchy-based routines to break through 
critical vertical barriers.  
 
Considering the findings from Chapters 4 and 5, we can conclude that despite the 
subjective (Chapter 3) consensus that vertical strategies are not a good fit when it 
comes to governing community-based collectives, these findings show that 
involving politicians and using controlling and business-inspired governance 
strategies need not necessarily be ineffective governance strategies. While these 
strategies can certainly lead to the demoralization of community-based collectives, 
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as was suggested in Chapter 3, the strategies can simultaneously motivate initiators 
of community-based collectives by creating a sense of urgency and stimulating the 
mobilization against the municipality as their ‘common enemy’ (Chapter 4). 
Internally, the top-down involvement of politicians is very important for 
safeguarding the necessary resources and capacity that is needed to deal with 
community-based collectives. Boundary spanners play into this by using hierarchical 
strategies when their usual more horizontal strategies have failed (Chapter 4 and 5).  
 
7.2.3 Governance and performance: the pivotal role of politics (RQ3) 
The third research question considers under which conditions community-based 
collectives show outstanding and resilient performance. In Chapter 6, we used set-
theoretic configurational analysis to develop and test a contingency-based 
framework of relevant factors to determine the effect of governance on community-
based collectives under different contextual conditions. Based on 14 case studies in 
which we combined qualitative and quantitative data of 54 respondents, our findings 
showed that the effect of governance is contingent on the political and community 
network ties of community-based collectives. When community-based collectives 
have a hands-off collaborative relationship1 with government in combination with 
strong political network ties, their performance is outstanding. When community-
based collectives have a hands-off collaborative relationship with government in 
combination with strong political network ties and weak community network ties, 
their performance is resilient. Additionally, political network ties are necessary for 
community-based collectives to perform resilient. It is important to keep in mind, 
however, that collectives with strong political network ties not automatically achieve 
performance resilience.  
 
In sum, this study provides evidence that political network ties are a crucial 
component in explaining the performance of community-based collectives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Hands-on governance defined as the presence of collaborative activities between public 
officials and collectives such as frequent contact, shared policy making and a (financial) 
resource exchange relationship. Hands-off governance defined as the absence of hands-on 
governance.  
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7.3 Main conclusions 
 
The previous section summarized the answers to our three research sub-questions. 
Based on these, we will now reflect on our overall findings. The main research 
question of this study was as follows: How should municipalities govern community-
based collectives to safeguard their performance? The answer to how municipalities 
should govern community-based collectives is not that clear-cut. The empirical 
findings on some points almost seem somewhat like a paradox. We discern two 
central tensions or dilemmas that follow from our empirical studies and relate them 
to the literature.    
 
7.3.1 Tensions between perceptions and practice    
The potential of involving communities and other societal stakeholders in the 
production of services is a topic that increasingly attracts scholarly attention (see 
Sørensen & Triantafillou 2009; Alford 2009; Nederhand & Klijn 2016). Although 
the ability of communities to govern themselves is a longstanding concern of 
academic inquiry, Sørensen & Triantafillou (2009) argue that the framing of this 
concern as being directly related to the ability of government to draw upon and 
facilitate the potentials of self-organization is more recent. This dissertation (Chapter 
2) shows that involving communities is not only framed as inevitable for budgetary 
and continuity reasons, but also as being a response to a wider process of cultural 
change. This change implies a diversification of roles for municipalities, namely, not 
only their traditional role as service providers, but also that of partners, supporters, 
and activators of local communities. We see a new form of public governance where 
the state not only gives room, but also actively facilitates the self-governing 
capacities of communities (see Sørensen and Triantafillou 2009). What governance 
strategy fits this new context? The empirical findings in this dissertation show an 
interesting tension between the perceptions on and the practice of governing self-
organization.  
 
The dominant perception on governing self-organization is that soft governance 
strategies that focus on connecting, facilitating, and supporting community-based 
collectives are most effective and appropriate (Chapter 3). These ‘soft’ and 
‘processual’ strategies allow governments to stimulate the self-organizing capacity 
of collectives, while simultaneously keeping an appropriate distance. This distance 
allows collectives to maintain (their feeling of) managerial autonomy and ownership 
(Smith and Lipsky 1994). The viewpoint of practitioners resonates perfectly with 
post-NPM bodies of literature that focus on governing actors in the context of 
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networks (see Sørensen and Torfing 2007; Klijn and Koppenjan 2016). The 
argument is that, in this context, traditional and managerial governance strategies 
have lost their relevance (see Kickert et al. 1997; Osborne 2010), and are even able 
to destruct the self-organizing capacity of collectives (Korosec and Berman 2006; 
Brandsen et al. 2017). Similarly, our findings show that both public officials and 
community-based collectives are strongly convinced that traditional governance 
techniques based on political involvement, control, and performance measurement 
should be abandoned (Chapter 3). Practitioners are convinced that governments 
should interfere as little as possible in the internal business of community-based 
collectives in order to maintain the collectives’ motivation, passion, and energy.    
 
The dominant practice of governing self-organization is that hard governance 
strategies that focus on the rule of law, performance, and accountability are used by 
municipalities to govern community-based collectives (Chapter 4). Although public 
officials talk the talk of horizontal governance and networks, in practice they get 
entangled in all kind of barriers and revert to more familiar traditional strategies 
(Klijn and Teisman 2003; Termeer 2009). As a move towards self-organization 
presents a challenge to the norms of elections, transparency and bureaucratic 
procedure, one of the standard governmental responses is to monitor collectives on 
certain criteria in order for them to receive governmental support (Baker et al. 2009). 
Criteria, as for instance, the rule of law and safeguarding values such as equality, 
legality and fairness (Wilson 1989). To compensate for failures within civil society, 
municipalities should use policy instruments that regularize collectives that provide 
services to citizens. The more citizens rely on the service provision of community-
based collectives (for instance, when the collective is the sole service provider in a 
village) the more important it is to protect citizens against the arbitrary exercise of 
power, exclusion, and personal whims (Bartels 2013; Den Ouden et al. 2018). The 
same goes for criteria about performance and accountability. Supporting collectives 
with public resources, such as buildings or subsidies, calls for some sort of 
institutional accountability mechanisms (see Klijn and Skelcher 2007; Baker et al. 
2009). As such, the municipality can provide motivation to the city council on how 
the spending of public resources, or the bending of municipal rules and regulations 
could contribute to their policy targets (see Termeer 2009).  
 
In sum, despite the widespread rejection of controlling and performance-related 
governance strategies by public administration scholars and practitioners, these 
strategies are still ‘alive and kicking’ when it comes to the daily practice of governing 
community-based collectives.      
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7.3.2 Tensions between depoliticization and politicization  
The presence of conflicts, resource dependencies and strategic power-games are 
inherent features of the governance literature (see Klijn and Koppenjan 2016). At the 
same time, these features seem to be underrepresented in the literature in comparison 
to such concepts as dialogue, trust, and cooperation (O’Toole and Meier 2004; 
Huxham and Vangen 2005; Lewis 2010). These horizontal governance concepts are 
put forward as effective strategies to managing conflicts and differences. Sørensen 
and Torfing (2016) even go so far as to claim that the dominant scholarly literature 
on governance treats governance as a post-political managerial process by virtually 
ignoring the political power dimension to governance. The sharp division between 
the dominant perception of governance as management and the dominant practice of 
governance as politics shows the presence of an interesting tension in this area.    
 
The dominant perception of ‘governance as management’ is that politicians should 
play no key role in defining the course of events with regard to community-based 
collectives. Public officials and collectives find that political interference could harm 
the autonomy of community-based collectives (Chapter 3). As politicians are 
involved in a political competitive powerplay for votes, it is difficult to get them 
involved in a constructive way (see Edelenbos et al. 2017). By acting too much upon 
the daily worries of their electors, public officials find that political interventions and 
micro-management can be counterproductive. Moreover, as politicians act within a 
limited time of office, the continuity of their actions and policies is unpredictable 
(see Koppenjan et al. 2011; Termeer et al. 2013). The governance of self-
organization would therefore benefit from a more rational managerial approach that 
is characterized by the predictable and regulated allocation of public resources. With 
this approach, personal connections are subordinate to these more rational 
considerations.  
 
The dominant practice of ‘governance as politics’ is that politicians play pivotal 
roles in the governance of community-based collectives. Since self-governance 
challenges existing policies and institutions, it is crucial to have political leaders who 
do not only support self-governance themselves, but who also manage their networks 
(including public officials and other governmental levels) to fully share the new 
approach (Baker et al. 2009; Termeer et al. 2013). As demands of community-based 
collectives rarely touch upon the competency of only one policy area, public officials 
crucially need political support and backup to mobilize and redeploy public 
resources and administrative capacity within the municipal organization (Chapters 4 
and 5). Playing by the rules of politicized decision-making within public 
organizations is useful for public officials to get things done (Perry and Rainey 1988; 
  Conclusions and Discussion | Chapter 7 
 
 162 
Nielsen and Baekgaard 2015). The same goes for community-based collectives. For 
them, political connections are necessary to perform in a resilient manner (Chapter 
6). A strong political network allows collectives to go ‘over the heads’ of public 
officials to overcome or reverse decisions. In this way, the political network ties 
could increase the resistance of collectives against severe controlling and 
performance-related pressures of government. This in turn fosters a more equalized 
power balance between collectives and public officials, and, hence, a more careful 
and deliberate approach by public officials.  
 
In sum, although this dissertation empirically shows that involving politicians – the 
power dimension to governance – is important to safeguard the performance of 
community-based collectives, their involvement does not lack controversy among 
public officials and collectives.   
  
7.4 Limitations and directions for future research  
 
This section discusses three limitations that resulted from methodological choices 
and choices in the research design. Based on these reflections, we point out 
promising avenues for future research.  
 
7.4.1 Case selection and generalizability  
As this study is conducted in the social care domain in the Netherlands, we should 
be careful in generalizing these findings. While we have been able to gain a better 
understanding about the governance of self-organization, this knowledge is based on 
studies conducted in one sector and in one country. We purposefully selected the 
social care sector because the importance of community-based collectives in this 
sector is rapidly increasing. Although collectives are often established as a counter 
reaction to municipal care facilities, they simultaneously rely heavily on municipal 
help to survive the dense institutional field of social care provision. This relationship, 
seemingly incongruent but, nevertheless complementary provides an interesting case 
for studying the effects of municipal governance. It could, however, well be that 
specific characteristics of our research context influenced the findings. As the social 
care sector is a relatively soft sector, it may, for instance, be that the strong rejection 
of monitoring performance and results is context specific. Follow-up research could 
compare the governance perceptions in this ‘soft’ sector to a ‘harder’ sector, such as 
the energy sector, where talking about performance measurement may be more 
natural. Furthermore, the Netherlands is characterized by a governance tradition that 
tends to proceed according to the tradition of consensus and deliberation. It would 
Chapter 7 | Conclusions and Discussion 
 
163 
be interesting to see whether the findings also hold in countries with both similar and 
different governance traditions (compare Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Skelcher et al. 
2011). A comparative case study could examine the links in countries with, for 
instance, a strong centralistic state tradition, such as France, or a strong decentralized 
state tradition, such as Denmark. Future research should thus study whether the 
findings also hold for community-based collectives in other policy domains and 
countries. Furthermore, the results from the casestudies, as resported in Chapter 4 
and 5, are based upon research that is conducted in relatively large-sized 
municipalities. Hence, we should be careful to directly translate these findings to 
smaller municipalities, as large-sized municipalities typically have a more complex 
organizational structure than small-sized municipalities. We believe that it would be 
interesting for future research to examine if and how our findings hold in different 
sized municipalities.  
 
7.4.2 Measuring performance 
A second limitation concerns the measurement of performance. In this dissertation, 
we made use of subjective measures to determine the level of performance as we 
believe that measuring performance is a normative task (see Simon 1976; Kenis and 
Provan 2009). We combined two different kinds of subjective measures: self-
evaluations by collectives and external-evaluations by public officials. Combining 
these measures may help to overcome the limitations that are associated with each 
of these measures (see Meier and O’Toole 2013; Wang 2016). On average, 
collectives and public officials ranked the performance of collectives very much 
alike. However, with regards to the durability of the performance, collectives were 
slightly more confident than the public officials were. Although combining these 
measures is a promising step in improving the sophistication of performance 
measurement (Torfing et al. 2012), this strategy lacks the evaluation of the most 
important category of stakeholders: the end-users and target community of the care 
services. By including the evaluation of community members, an even more accurate 
picture could be drafted, especially when it comes to rating the question of how 
important the services are considered by the wider community. We would therefore 
recommend that future research includes the perception of end-users.  
 
7.4.3 Causal inference  
The third limitation concerns the lack of causal inference. In the design of this 
dissertation, we explicitly chose qualitative and mixed methods that reflect the 
complex and contextualized reality of governance, such as Content Analysis, Q-
Methodology, and Qualitative Comparative Analysis. For instance, the results 
stemming from set-theoretic methods, such as QCA, emphasize the existence of 
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causal complexity. This entails considering that different constellations can produce 
similar outcomes, and that the same condition can produce different outcomes in 
different contexts (see Rihoux and Ragin 2009). As a consequence, however, 
statistically generalizable statements on the effect of governance on performance 
were not obtained. Instead, this dissertation shows the importance of multiple 
perspectives on and empirical paths to the effective governance of self-organization. 
Although exploring classical causal relations as is achieved with using experimental 
approaches was not an aim of this dissertation, there are other methods to infer causal 
relations more suited for a context-informed approach that studying governance 
requires. We believe that a promising avenue for future research is to include a 
longitudinal approach to studying the governance of self-organization, such as by 
using process-tracing case studies or time-series QCA studies (George and Bennett 
2005; Schneider and Wagemann 2012). These studies would enhance our 
understanding to the effect of specific configurations of conditions during the 
collective’s lifecycle.  
 
7.5 Practical recommendations 
 
The findings from this dissertation provide several useful insights to inspire public 
managers, policy-makers, and other practitioners in better understanding of and 
acting upon the challenges that come with the governance of self-organization (see 
Table 1). We present our recommendations for practice below. The first two 
recommendations focus on ‘soft’ processual aspects to governing self-organization, 
while the last two recommendations focus on the ‘hard’ and more institutional 
aspects.   
 
7.5.1 Create awareness of differing governance preferences    
The first set of recommendations relate to the different perceptions that were found 
between involved practitioners. This dissertation showed that there are roughly two 
types of governance perceptions. Whereas the first type perceives the ‘ideal’ 
governance relationship as one of ‘pure’ and somewhat radical self- governance, the 
second type aims for the co-creation of public value and pursues a more direct and 
interactive relationship between government and community-based collectives. For 
practitioners, our findings imply that they will be confronted with public officials or 
collectives who hold different expectations about governance. A mismatch in 
normative expectations and attitudes on how the relationship between public 
officials and community-based collectives should be organized and governed might 
have important consequences for the chances of success of collectives. It is therefore 
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important that practitioners become aware of their own dominant governance 
perceptions – and the reasoning behind their preference – and that of others. This 
awareness contrinutes to prevent the ‘locking up’ of existing government frames, 
e.g. groups of practitioners with shared convictions that seal themselves off from 
those with opposing viewpoints (see Termeer 2009). Organizing meetings on 
existing governance stereotypes, such as that new ways of governing would be better 
than ‘old-fashioned’ ways or vice-versa, would help practitioners in reflecting on 
their own thinking and acting. Getting to know each other’s world is a first, but 
crucial, step in exploring and finding common ground to designing appropriate 
governance interventions. This tailor-made approach is especially important since 
this dissertation shows that, in line with the notion of equifinality, multiple 
‘governance paths’ lead to Rome (see Schneider and Wagemann 2012; Thomann et 
al. 2018). There is no clear, simple clear-cut road to safeguarding the performance 
of community-based collectives. The dynamics within specific collectives require 
different configurations of governance strategies, and these strategies might change 
during the collective’s lifecycle (see Gofen et al. 2014; Edelenbos et al. 2018). This 
implies that public officials and politicians need to be reflective in determining 
which path municipalities should choose and at what point in time. The Q-method 
could be an appropriate tool to facilitate this kind of personal and group reflexivity 
by mapping out differences and similarities between perceptions.  
 
7.5.2 Carefully embrace the political aspect of working collaboratively  
The second set of recommendations relates to the political aspect of governing 
community-based collectives. As discussed in the empirical chapters of this 
dissertation, we found that direct or indirect involvement of politicians seems crucial 
to safeguarding the performance of community-based collectives. Simultaneously, 
the involvement of politicians is perceived to be somewhat contentious by public 
officials and collectives. Specifically, public officials and collectives find the 
importance of personal connections and electoral consideration not always desirable 
for the governance of self-organization. With these legitimate concerns in mind, we 
think it is important to carefully embrace the political aspect of working with 
community-based collectives (see Koppenjan et al. 2009). This implies that we 
would recommend public officials and community-based collectives to generate 
political support for the collective by actively informing and involving politicians. If 
collectives are to be playing a pivotal role in local service provision, it is important 
to involve politicians in seeking custom-made solutions in which conflicts between 
values, such as between equality and responsiveness, are resolved. Politicians can – 
together with public officials and collectives – play pivotal roles in determining the 
appropriate conditions under which public resources such as buildings, financial 
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support, and administrative capacity are exchanged for some sort of administrative 
checks. By keeping politicians close, public officials and collectives reduce the 
chance of being confronted by disturbing interventions by politicians later on in the 
process claiming that they were not informed and/or did not have a say in the 
conditions under which public support was granted.  
 
7.5.3 Redesign traditional and performance related policy instruments  
The third recommendation relates to our finding that we could distinguish multiple 
dimensions within more traditional governance perspectives2: a value dimension and 
a policy instrument dimension. Although practitioners seem to strongly support the 
underlying (public) values and principles such as preventing exclusion of groups, 
they are much more critical about the form in which these are sometimes pursued: 
top-down and performance-based. In this regard, we would recommend developing 
a tailor-made governance approach that mixes values of the more traditional 
perspectives with instruments from the more novel and horizontal perspectives (see 
also Schulz 2017). This could be done, for instance, by jointly determining the form 
and content of performance indicators with collectives. In this way, the management 
of objectives is combined with mutual learning processes rather than with the more 
‘associations of punishment’ that are traditionally connected to performance 
measurement. Creating proper evaluative criteria for collectives to evaluate their 
performance can help to convince policy makers to provide room in existing policies 
(see Termeer 2009; Sørensen and Triantafillou 2009). Dichotomous notions of 
governance, such as ‘market versus state’ or ‘hierarchical versus collaborative’, 
should thus be replaced by a more flexible approach (see Howelett 2014). 
Furthermore, organizing room for self-organization within existing institutions also 
requires practitioners to use existing rules and routines to foster change. Therefore, 
in order to follow-up on this recommendation, it is important to not only redesign 
governance interventions and instruments towards collectives, but to also, at the 
more fundamental level, adjust internal instruments such as the internal incentive 
and appraise system for public officials. For instance, by allowing flexibility in the 
content and process of the performance targets of public officials, or by explicitly 
including targets on contact with citizens.  
 
 
 
 
 
2 TPA and NPM (see Chapter 3) 
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7.5.4 Appoint public officials as boundary spanners   
A final set of recommendations relates to the crucial role of municipal boundary 
spanners in managing the interaction process between community-based collectives 
and municipalities. More specifically, the findings from this dissertation highlight 
the importance of boundary spanners in preventing and overcoming deadlocks in the 
contact between public officials and collectives, and in building trustful 
relationships. This is extremely important as the municipality is a ‘seven-headed 
monster’ in which the various departments have different, sometimes conflicting, 
interests with regards to collectives. The fragmented structure of governments (each 
resource has its own organizations and regulations) makes it difficult for collectives, 
that typically address various resources, to dig trough the layers of existing systems 
(Ostrom 2005; Termeer et al. 2013). Based on our findings, we would recommend 
that municipalities invest in appointing boundary spanners who act as fixed contact 
persons within the administrative organization for collectives. These contact persons 
could make sure that collectives will not get lost within the administrative 
bureaucracy and could play a significant role in smoothening and monitoring the 
progress of the contact between collectives and public officials (see also Williams 
2002; Van Meerkerk and Edelenbos 2018).  
 
Table 1. Recommendations for practice 
Finding Significance for public 
organizations  
Practical examples on how 
to address this issue  
Different perceptions on 
how municipalities should 
govern community-based 
collectives: hands-off 
versus hands-on (Chapters 
2, 3) 
Awareness about 
governance preferences of 
public officials and 
collectives serve to enable 
the dialogue about 
expectations and necessities 
between practitioners 
• Reflect individually on 
dominant governance 
prefererence and the 
reasons behind it 
• Organize meetings to 
discuss governance 
statements and 
preferences with 
involved practitioners as 
a management exercise  
The direct or indirect 
involvement of politicians 
is crucial to safeguarding 
the performance of 
community-based 
collectives (Chapters 4, 6) 
Politicians play a role in the 
authoritative resolution of 
conflicts between different 
values (and therefore the 
allocation of public 
resources). Increase their 
knowledge and involvement 
with collectives  
• Involve politicians in the 
governance of self-
organization 
• Formulate clear 
agreements on how to 
safeguard the autonomy 
of collectives in this 
process 
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Rejection of controlling 
and performance-oriented 
governance strategies 
while, generally, they are 
still needed and used in 
practice (Chapters 3, 5) 
There is a need to develop 
tailor-made governance 
strategies in which 
traditional and horizontal 
elements and values are 
recombined 
• Develop a tailor-made 
governance approach in 
co-creation with 
collectives that mixes 
elements from traditional 
and novel governance 
approaches  
• Adjust the internal 
incentive and appraisal 
systems for public 
officials to allow for 
flexibility in 
collaborative working 
Public officials who act as 
boundary spanners are 
crucial to fostering trustful 
and collaborative 
relationships between 
collectives and 
municipalities (Chapters 4, 
5) 
Prevent and overcome 
deadlocks in the contact 
between collectives and 
municipalities by using 
entrepreneurial, mediating 
and hierarchical boundary 
spanning strategies 
 
 
• Appoint fixed contact 
persons within the 
municipality 
• These contact persons 
streamline and monitor 
the progress of the 
contact between 
collective and 
municipality 
 
7.6 Closing remarks 
 
This dissertation has focused on the governance of self-organization: a topic that has 
increasingly received political and societal attention for its important role in 
safeguarding the development and performance of community-based collectives in 
today’s highly institutionalized and regularized society. Our research has provided 
several new insights into governance strategies and the corresponding challenges and 
tensions to which practitioners should relate. We hope that our findings and 
recommendations will provide useful assistance to practitioners in dealing with 
community-based collectives in their daily practice.  
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Skelcher, C., Klijn, E. H., Kübler, D., Sørensen, E., and Sullivan, H. 2011.  
Explaining the democratic anchorage of governance networks: Evidence  
from four European countries. Administrative theory and Praxis, 33(1), 7–
38. 
Smith, S.R. and Lipsky, M. 1994. Nonprofits for Hire. The Welfare State in the Age  
of Contracting. Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press.  
Sørensen, E. 2006. Metagovernance: The Changing Role of Politicians in  
Processes of Democratic Governance. The American Review of Public 
Administration, 36 (1): 98–114.    
Sørensen, E. and Torfing, J. 2007. Theories of Democratic Network Governance.  
London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Sørensen, E. and Triantafillou, P. 2009. The Politics of Self-Governance: An  
Introduction. In: E. Sørensen and P. Triantafillou (eds) The Politics of Self- 
Governance. New York: Routledge.  
Sørensen, E. and Triantafillou, P. 2009. Conclusion. In: E. Sørensen and P.  
Triantafillou (eds) The Politics of Self-Governance. New York: Routledge.  
Sørensen, E. and Torfing, J. 2016. Political leadership in the age of interactive  
governance: reflections on the political aspects of metagovernance. In: J. 
Edelenbos and I. van Meerkerk (eds). Critical Reflections on Interactive 
Governance: self-organization and participation in public governance, pp 
444-466. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.  
Stamper, C.L., and Johlke, M.C. 2003. The Impact of Perceived Organizational  
Support on The Relationship between Boundary Spanner Role Stress and  
Work Outcomes. Journal of Management 29 (4): 569–588.  
Stewart, J. and Walsh, K. 2009. Performance measurement: when performance can  
never be finally defined. Public Money and Management, 14(2): 45-49 
Strauss, A. L., and Corbin, J. 1990. Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded  
Theory Procedures and Techniques. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Stoker, G. 2006. Public Value Management. A New Narrative for Networked  
Governance? American Review of Public Administration, 36, 1, 41-57. 
Stone, D. 2011. Policy Paradox. The Art of Political Decision Making. 3rd ed.  
New York: Norton.  
Strauss, A.L. and Corbin, J. 1990. Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory  
procedures and techniques. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.  
Streeck, W., and Thelen, K. 2005. Institutional Changes in Advanced Political  
Economies. In: W. Streeck and K. Thelen (eds) Beyond Continuity: 
Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies, 1–39. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
 
| References 
185 
Suarez, D.F. (2011). Collaboration and Professionalization: The Contours of Public  
Sector Funding for Nonprofit Organizations. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 21(2): 307-26. 
Sullivan, H., and Skelcher, C. 2002. Working across Boundaries: Collaboration in  
Public Services. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Taylor, M. 2007. Community Participation in the Real World: Opportunities and  
Pitfalls in New Governance Spaces. Urban Studies 44 (2): 297–317.  
Termeer, C. 2009. Barriers to new modes of horizontal governance. Public  
Management Review, 11(3): 299-316.  
Termeer, C., Stuiver, M., Gerritsen, A. And Huntjens, P. 2013. Integrating Self- 
Governance in Heavily Regulated Policy Fields: Insights from a Dutch 
Farmers’ Cooperative. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning, 
15(2): 285-302.  
Thomann, E., Van Engen, N. and Tummers, L. 2018. The Necessity of Discretion:  
A Behavioral Evaluation of Bottom-Up Implementation Theory. Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, 28(4): 583-601.   
Thomas, G. 2011. A typology for the case study in social science following a  
review of definition, discourse, and structure. Qualitative inquiry, 17(6): 
511–21.  
Thomas, J.C. 2013. Citizen, customer, partner: Rethinking the place of the public 
in public management. Public Administration Review, 73 (6): 786–96.  
Thornton, P. H., and Ocasio, W. 2008. Institutional Logics. In: R. Greenwood, C.  
Oliver, K. Sahlin, and R. Suddaby (eds) The Sage Handbook of  
Organizational Institutionalism Vol. 840, 99–128. Thousend Oaks, CA: 
Sage.  
Torﬁng, J., Peters, B. G., Pierre, J. and Sørensen, E. 2012. Interactive Governance.  
Advancing the Paradigm. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Torfing, J., Sørensen, E. and Roiseland, A. 2016. Transforming the Public Sector  
into an arena for co-creation: barriers, drivers, benefits, and ways forward. 
Administration and Society, DOI: 10.1177/0095399716680057  
Tushman, M. L., and Scanlan, T. J. 1981. Characteristics and External  
Orientations of Boundary Spanning Individuals. The Academy of 
Management Journal, 24 (1): 83–98.  
Uzzi, B., and Spiro, J. 2005. Collaboration and Creativity: The Small World 
Problem. American Journal of Sociology, 111: 447–504.  
Van Buuren, A., and Loorbach, D. 2009. Policy Innovation in Isolation? Public  
Management Review, 11 (3): 375–392.    
Van der Steen, M., van Twist, M. and Bressers, D. 2016. The sedimentation of  
public values: How a variety of governance perspectives guide the practical  
actions of civil servants. Public Personnel Management, 38(4): 387-414. 
Van Dorp, E. J. 2018. Trapped in the Hierarchy: The Craft of Dutch City  
Managers. Public Management Review, 20 (8): 1228–1245.  
Van Meerkerk, I. 2014. Boundary Spanning in Governance Networks. Doctoral  
Dissertation.  
References | 
 186 
Van Meerkerk, I., Boonstra, B. and Edelenbos, J. 2013. Self-organization in urban  
regeneration: A two-case comparative research. European Planning 
Studies, 2 (10):1630–52.  
Van Meerkerk, I. and Edelenbos, E. 2016. Complementary boundary-spanning  
leadership: making civic-induced interactive governance work. In: J.  
Edelenbos and I. van Meerkerk (eds). Critical Reflections on Interactive 
Governance, pp 467-490. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Van Meerkerk, I., and Edelenbos, J. 2018. Facilitating Conditions for Boundary  
Spanning Behaviour in Governance Networks. Public Management Review 
20 (4): 503–524.   
Van Meerkerk, I. and Edelenbos, J. 2018. Boundary Spanners in Public Management 
and Governance: an Interdisciplinairy Assessment. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing.   
Van Meerkerk, I., Kleinhans, R. and Molenveld, A. 2018. Exploring the durability  
of community enterprises: a qualitative comparative analysis. Public  
Administration, 96 (4): 651-667. 
Van Oorschot, W. 2006. The Dutch welfare state: Recent trends and challenges in  
historical perspective. European Journal of Social Security, 8 (1): 57–76.  
Van Steenbergen, F., Buchel, S. Schipper, K. and Loorbach, D. 2017. Een maat op  
de wijk. Evaluatie van de pilot wijkgestuurd werken in Rotterdam. 
Rotterdam: DRIFT for transition.  
Verhoeven, I. and Tonkens, E. 2013. Talking active citizenship: Framing welfare  
state reform in England and the Netherlands. Social Policy and Society, 
12(3): 415–26.  
Verschuere, B., Brandsen, T. and Pestoff, V. 2012. Co-production: The state of  
the art in research and the future agenda. Voluntas: International Journal 
of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 23(4): 1083–101.  
Verweij, S., and Gerrits, l. M. 2013. Understanding and researching complexity  
with qualitative comparative analysis: evaluating transportation 
infrastructure projects. Evaluation, 19(1), 40-55.  
VNG 2015. Hervorming Langdurige Zorg 2014 
https://vng.nl/ onderwerpenindex/maatschappelijke-ondersteuning/wmo 
2015/wetstrajectwmo-2015  
Voorberg, W.H., Bekkers, V.J.J.M. and Tummers, L.G. 2015. A systematic  
review of co-creation and co-production: Embarking on the social  
innovation journey. Public Management Review, 17(9): 1333–57.  
Wagenaar, H. and Van der Heijden, J. 2015. The promise of democracy? Civic  
enterprise, localism and the transformation of democratic capitalism. In: S. 
Davoudi and A. Madanipour (eds) Reconsidering localism, pp 126–46. 
Abingdon: Routledge.  
Wang, W. 2016. Exploring the Determinants of Network Effectiveness: The Case of 
Neighborhood Governance Networks in Beijing. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 26(2): 375-388.  
 
| References 
187 
Warsen, R., Klijn, E.H. and Koppenjan, J. 2019. Mix and Match: How  
Contractual and Relational Conditions are combined in succesful public-
private partnerships. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, 29(3): 375-393.  
Watts, S., and Stenner, P. 2012. Doing Q methodological research: Theory,  
method, and interpretation. London, England: Sage. 
Weber, M. 1978. Economy and Society. An outline of interpretive sociology.  
Berkley, CA: U. California Press. 
Whitehead, M. 2003. In the Shadow of Hierarchy: Meta-Governance, Policy  
Reform and Urban Regeneration in the West Midlands. Area, 35 (1): 6–14.  
Williams, P. 2002. The Competent Boundary Spanner. Public Administration,  
80:103–124.  
Wilson, J.Q. 1989. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why they Do  
it. New York: Basic Books.  
Yerkes, M., Achterberg, P. and Van Der Veen, R. 2011. The transformation of  
Solidarity. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
Yin, K. 2003. Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
  
References | 
 188 
 
 189 
  
  190 
Samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
 
 
| Samenvatting 
191 
Het sturen van zelforganisatie 
Een analyse van de sturingsrelatie tussen gemeenten en burgercollectieven 
 
Introductie en onderzoeksvragen  
In Nederland heeft de groei van de verzorgingsstaat haar grenzen bereikt. Doordat 
het aantal oude mensen in rap tempo toeneemt ten opzichte van het aantal jonge 
mensen, staat het aanbieden van betaalbare en effectieve zorg en ondersteuning 
onder druk. Het benutten van de eigen kracht van mensen en hun netwerken wordt 
daarom steeds belangrijker. We zien dan ook een forse toename van 
burgercollectieven als wijkondernemingen en zorg coöperaties die lokale 
welzijnsdiensten aanbieden. Het aanbod loopt uiteen van het organiseren van sociale 
activiteiten tot het aanbieden van zorgwoningen. Alhoewel overheden doordrongen 
zijn van het belang van dit soort collectieven, laat onderzoek zien dat politici en 
ambtenaren worstelen met hoe ze met deze ontwikkeling om moeten gaan. Wat is 
precies hun rol, en wat voor soort sturingsstrategie is passend bij deze rol? De vraag 
hoe gemeenten zich zouden moeten verhouden tot dit soort burgercollectieven staat 
in dit proefschrift centraal.  
 
Een centraal concept binnen dit proefschrift is sturing. Sturing kunnen we 
omschrijven als de strategische en reflexieve poging van politici en ambtenaren om 
maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen en uitkomsten te beïnvloeden, teneinde bepaalde 
publieke doelen te bereiken. In dit proefschrift staan vier theoretische 
sturingsmodellen centraal: (1) traditionele sturing, waarin gebruik wordt gemaakt 
van regels en procedures; (2) prestatie sturing, waarin gebruik wordt gemaakt van 
performancemeting en bedrijfstechnieken, (3) netwerk sturing, waarin gebruik wordt 
gemaakt van netwerkmanagement en procesregels, (4) responsieve sturing, waarin 
gebruik wordt gemaakt van faciliterende instrumenten als kleine subsidies en het 
weghalen van barrières.  
 
De doelstelling van dit proefschrift is drieledig. Ten eerste in kaart brengen hoe de 
ideale sturingsstrategie van gemeenten gepercipieerd wordt door de nationale 
overheid, gemeenteambtenaren en burgercollectieven zelf. Ten tweede in kaart 
brengen welke sturing strategieën gemeenten daadwerkelijk gebruiken, en met welk 
gevolg. Ten derde, in kaart brengen onder welke condities burgercollectieven goed 
presteren (als in het aanbieden van effectieve, kwalitatieve, legitieme en 
veerkrachtige diensten). We bestuderen hier of en hoe de effecten van sturing 
afhangen van het sociale netwerk van burgercollectieven.  
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De studie bestaat uit vijf empirische hoofdstukken die gezamenlijk antwoord geven 
op de hoofdvraag: hoe moeten gemeenten burgercollectieven aansturen om hun 
prestatie te waarborgen? Deze vraag is opgedeeld in drie deelvragen:  
1. Hoe percipiëren belanghebbenden effectieve gemeentelijke sturing van 
burgercollectieven?  
2. Welke sturing strategieën gebruikt de gemeente om burgercollectieven te 
sturen, en met welk effect?   
3. Onder welke condities presteren burgercollectieven goed?  
 
Resultaten  
 
Studie 1: Inhoudsanalyse van beleidsdocumenten Rijksoverheid 
Het eerste empirische hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 2) richt zich op hoe 
de Rijkoverheid effectieve gemeentelijke sturing van burgercollectieven percipieert. 
Welke rol zien zij voor gemeenten? Hiervoor is gebruik gemaakt van een 
inhoudsanalyse van 37 beleidsdocumenten over zorg en welzijn die gepubliceerd 
zijn tussen januari 2012 en december 2015. Uit deze studie blijkt dat de rol van 
gemeenten drastisch verandert. Naast de meer traditionele rol als aanbieder van 
diensten, moet de gemeente een activerende, ondersteunende en partner rol gaan 
vervullen om het netwerk van zorgbehoevenden te mobiliseren en te betrekken in 
het zorgproces. Aangezien de gemeente verantwoordelijk blijft voor de kwantiteit en 
kwaliteit van de zorg, ziet de Rijksoverheid een blijvende rol voor gemeenten om te 
bepalen waar de verantwoordelijkheid moet worden verschoven naar burgers en 
waar niet. Ondanks de nieuwe rol, blijft de gemeente dus sterk in de lead. Deze 
bevinding toont dus aan dat ondanks, of juist door, flinke bezuinigingen, er een 
belangrijke sturende rol voor de gemeente weggelegd blijft volgens de 
Rijksoverheid.  
 
Studie 2: Q-Methodology studie naar percepties van ambtenaren en collectieven 
In het tweede empirische hoofdstuk (hoofdstuk 3) hebben we onderzocht hoe 
gemeenteambtenaren en burgercollectieven de ideale sturingsrol van gemeenten 
percipiëren. De onderzoeksmethode Q-Methodologie stelt ons in staat om de 
percepties van 40 beleidsambtenaren en 40 burgercollectieven op het gebied van 
zorg en welzijn op een systematische wijze in kaart te brengen en onderling te 
vergelijken. Deze studie laat zien dat er grofweg twee typen opvattingen te 
onderscheiden zijn. Het eerste type ziet geen directe rol weggelegd voor ambtenaren. 
Het is beter als ze afstand houden tot burgercollectieven om hen de vrijheid te geven 
hun eigen koers uit te stippelen. Op deze manier komt het eigenaarschap en de 
bijbehorende passie en energie van initiatiefnemers en vrijwilligers het beste tot zijn 
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recht. Ambtenaren zouden gebruik moeten maken van responsieve sturing met 
elementen van netwerk sturing. Zowel ambtenaren als burgercollectieven maken 
onderdeel uit van dit type. Het tweede type ziet een meer directe en interactieve rol 
weggelegd voor ambtenaren. Dit type ziet de potentie van een partnerschap tussen 
collectieven en ambtenaren. Enerzijds kan het contact collectieven helpen om hun 
ambities op te schalen en verwezenlijken, anderzijds kan het ambtenaren helpen om 
belangrijke beleidsdoelen te behalen. In het contact is het belangrijk dat traditionele 
waarden als betrouwbaarheid, gelijkheid en transparantie centraal staan (traditionele 
sturing). Alhoewel zowel ambtenaren als burgercollectieven onderdeel uitmaken van 
dit type, verschilt hun precieze focus. Waar ambtenaren hun betrokkenheid meer zien 
in het verbinden van partijen (netwerk sturing), zien collectieven de betrokkenheid 
van ambtenaren meer zakelijk als in het belonen van de impact van hun inspanningen 
(prestatie sturing).  
 
Waar deze studie interessante verschillen laat zien in de gewenste sturingsvorm van 
gemeenten, laat het ook tegelijkertijd opvallende overeenkomsten zien als het gaat 
om het identificeren van ongewenste sturingsvormen. Volgens ambtenaren en 
burgercollectieven is het sturen van burgercollectieven op een controlerende en 
resultaatgerichte manier ongewenst omdat dit soort traditionele en prestatiegerichte 
sturing het zelforganiserende vermogen van collectieven aantast, of zelfs vernietigt. 
Ook voor politici moet geen bepalende rol weggelegd zijn.  
 
Na de verkenning van de sturingspercepties, richten de hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6 zich 
op het in kaart brengen van de daadwerkelijke sturingspraktijk door middel van 
casestudies.  
 
Studie 3: Vergelijkende casestudy naar gemeentelijke sturing strategieën 
In hoofdstuk 4 hebben we onderzocht welke sturing strategieën wethouders en 
gemeenteambtenaren van de gemeente Amsterdam en Amersfoort gebruiken in hun 
contact met de burgercollectieven ‘De Meevaart’ en ‘Het Klokhuis’, en welk effect 
deze strategieën hebben. Deze studie toont op basis van 31 interviews aan dat sturing 
strategieën verschillende schaduwen van hiërarchie kunnen werpen over 
burgercollectieven: een bedreigende en een welwillende schaduw. Deze schaduwen, 
die ingegeven zijn door traditie, macht- en afhankelijkheidsrelaties, beïnvloeden de 
ontwikkeling van de collectieven. Waar een sterk hiërarchische betrokkenheid van 
de gemeente Amersfoort door middel van afvinklijsten en regels leidde tot een sterk 
gefocust burgercollectief, leidde een meer verbindende en responsieve 
betrokkenheid van de gemeente Amsterdam tot een los georganiseerd 
burgercollectief. Een belangrijke conclusie op basis van deze studie is dat ondanks 
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het verschil in gebruikte sturing strategieën, in beide gevallen succesvolle 
burgercollectieven ontstonden. Dit betekent dat er niet één maar meerdere 
‘sturingswegen’ naar Rome leiden. Wat de twee casussen gemeen hadden was de 
betrokkenheid van wethouders en ambtenaren als bruggenbouwers om de 
verschillende interne gemeentelijke belangen te overbruggen en verbinden.    
 
Studie 4: Casestudy naar ervaringen van gemeentelijke bruggenbouwers  
In hoofdstuk 5 zijn we dieper ingegaan op de rol van deze bruggenbouwers. Van 
welke strategieën maken ze gebruik om de gezichten binnen de gemeentelijke 
organisatie dezelfde kant op te krijgen ten aanzien van verzoeken van bijvoorbeeld 
burgercollectieven? Deze studie laat op basis van interviews met 16 wijkmanagers 
binnen de gemeente Rotterdam zien dat er drie zogenaamde boundary-spanning 
strategieën gebruikt worden: een ondernemende, mediërende en hiërarchische 
strategie. De ondernemende strategie wordt gebruikt om binnen de gemeente de 
juiste aansluiting te vinden qua beleidsdossier en qua persoon die burgercollectieven 
verder kan brengen. Deze strategie wordt gezien als effectief in het vermijden van 
potentiele barrières. De mediërende strategie wordt gebruikt om door middel van 
praten en onderhandelen het voorliggende issue verder te brengen. Deze strategie 
wordt niet alleen gezien als effectief om barrières te voorkomen, maar ook om 
barrières te beslechten. Mits de gesprekspartners dan een constructieve houding 
aannemen. De hiërarchische strategie wordt gebruikt om de machtsbronnen van 
wethouders en managers te mobiliseren. Hoewel het soms volstaat om met deze 
strategie te dreigen bij ambtenaren om ze in beweging te krijgen, wordt deze strategie 
soms ook juist samen met ambtenaren ontwikkelt om meer bronnen of ruimte vrij te 
kunnen spelen. Deze strategie is effectief, maar wordt vaak enkel als laatste 
redmiddel ingezet. Een belangrijke conclusie van deze studie is dus dat 
bruggenbouwen niet enkel een kwestie is van verbinden, communiceren en 
vertrouwen, maar ook draait om het mobiliseren van macht (e.g. hiërarchie).  
 
Studie 5: QCA-studie naar excellente en duurzame prestatie van burgercollectieven  
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt onderzocht onder welke condities burgercollectieven excellent 
en duurzaam presteren. Om dit te onderzoeken hebben we 14 casestudies uitgevoerd 
naar burgercollectieven in verschillende gemeenten: kleine, middelkleine, 
middelgrote en grote gemeenten. De kwantitatieve survey- en kwalitatieve 
interviewdata van 54 respondenten, verspreid over de 14 cases, hebben we 
vervolgens gecombineerd en systematisch met elkaar vergeleken door gebruik te 
maken van de QCA-methode. Deze studie zien dat het effect van sturing afhangt van 
het politieke en maatschappelijke netwerk van burgercollectieven. Als 
burgercollectieven geen intensieve samenwerkingsrelatie met de gemeente hebben, 
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maar wel een sterk politiek netwerk – presteren ze excellent. Als burgercollectieven 
geen intensieve samenwerkingsrelatie met de gemeente hebben, maar wel een sterk 
politiek netwerk en een zwak maatschappelijk netwerk – presteren ze duurzaam. 
Bovendien laten de resultaten zien dat het hebben van een sterk politiek netwerk 
zelfs noodzakelijk is om duurzaam te presteren. Dit betekent echter niet dat elk 
collectief met een politiek netwerk automatisch duurzaam presteert. De resultaten 
van deze studie laten kortom zien dat het hebben van een politiek netwerk zeer 
belangrijk lijkt voor het verklaren van de prestatie van burgercollectieven.    
 
Conclusies  
Het antwoord op de hoofdvraag ‘’Hoe moeten gemeenten burgercollectieven 
aansturen om hun prestatie te waarborgen?’’ is niet eenduidig te beantwoorden. De 
empirische bevindingen uit de verschillende hoofdstukken uit dit proefschrift laten 
twee centrale spanningen zien omtrent de sturing van burgercollectieven.  
 
1. Spanningen omtrent effectieve sturing  
De eerste spanning die wordt geconstateerd in dit proefschrift is de spanning tussen 
de gewenste sturing en de sturing zoals deze in de praktijk voorkomt. Dit proefschrift 
laat zien dat de voorkeur over het algemeen wordt gegeven door ambtenaren en 
collectieven aan ‘zachte’ en ‘procesmatige’ strategieën. Deze strategieën stellen 
gemeenten in staat om van een gepaste afstand het zelforganiserend vermogen van 
collectieven te bevorderen. Het is zaak dat de gemeente zich zo min mogelijk 
bemoeit met de collectieven om zo de motivatie, passie en energie van 
initiatiefnemers en vrijwilligers veilig te stellen. Ondanks dat ‘harde’ controlerende 
en prestatie gerelateerde strategieën door zowel wetenschappers als practitioners 
worden gezien als niet passend in de context van zelforganisatie, zijn ze nog steeds 
alive and kicking in de dagelijkse praktijk. Traditionele instrumenten worden door 
gemeenten bijvoorbeeld gebruikt om te monitoren hoe het uitgeven van publieke 
middelen bijdraagt aan het behalen van beleidsdoelen of om burgers die afhankelijk 
zijn van de diensten van collectieven te beschermen tegen uitsluiting, het arbitrair 
uitoefenen van macht en persoonlijke grillen.   
 
2. Spanningen omtrent de rol van politici 
De tweede belangrijke spanning die dit proefschrift constateert is de spanning tussen 
het wel of niet betrekken van politici bij het sturen van burgercollectieven. De 
onderzoeksresultaten laten zien dat politici een belangrijke rol spelen in het sturen 
van burgercollectieven. Zo is politieke steun vaak nodig om publieke middelen en 
capaciteit vrij te maken om de collectieven op weg te helpen. Verder lijken politieke 
connecties cruciaal voor collectieven om de duurzaamheid van hun prestatie te 
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garanderen. Collectieven met een sterk politiek netwerk kunnen beter weerstand 
bieden tegen controle- en prestatiedruk vanuit de gemeente. Door de korte politieke 
lijnen behandelen ambtenaren de collectieven voorzichtig: de machtsverhoudingen 
liggen in dit geval gelijker. Ondanks de cruciale rol die politici kunnen spelen, 
vinden betrokken ambtenaren en collectieven een sterke politieke betrokkenheid bij 
de koers van collectieven ongewenst. Volgens hen zou sturing minder moeten 
draaien om persoonlijke connecties en de ‘politieke waan van de dag’ maar meer om 
stabiele en rationele afwegingen.    
 
Aanbevelingen voor toekomstig onderzoek en de praktijk  
Deze studie is een van de eerste waarin gemeentelijke sturing verbonden wordt aan 
de prestatie van burgercollectieven. We hebben deze relatie specifiek getest in de 
sector zorg en welzijn. Een eerste aanbeveling voor vervolgonderzoek is dan ook om 
dit onderzoek te herhalen in andere sectoren, zoals de energiesector waar het praten 
over prestatiemeting wellicht meer standaard bevonden wordt. Een andere 
aanbeveling gaat om het meten van prestatie. In dit proefschrift hebben we de 
prestatie gemeten door gebruik te maken van zelfevaluatiescores van collectieven en 
ambtenaren. Vervolgonderzoek zou er goed aan doen ook de evaluatie van burgers 
als gebruikers van de diensten mee te nemen. Ten slotte wordt onderzoekers 
aangeraden om gebruik te maken van een longitudinaal onderzoeksdesign. Dit maakt 
het mogelijk om de gewenste en effectieve sturing te koppelen aan de levensfase 
waarin collectieven zich bevinden. Op deze manier kunnen de aanbevelingen gaan 
gemeenten een nog gerichter karakter krijgen.    
 
Op basis van dit proefschrift kunnen een viertal aanbevelingen voor de praktijk 
geformuleerd worden. De eerste twee aanbevelingen focussen op ‘zachte’ 
procesmatige aspecten van het sturen van zelforgansiatie, terwijl de laatste twee 
aanbevelingen voornamelijk focussen op de wat meer ‘harde’ institutionele aspecten. 
Een eerste aanbeveling is om bewustzijn te creëren op het gebied van de persoonlijke 
en gezamenlijk sturingsvoorkeuren. Door deze voorkeuren met elkaar te delen en 
daarop te reflecteren wordt een gezamenlijk leerproces opgestart. Door elkaars 
werelden en motivaties te leren kennen wordt het gemakkelijker om gezamenlijke 
acties te benoemen en ontwikkelen. De tweede aanbeveling omhelst de rol van 
politici in de sturing van burgercollectieven. Het ondersteunen van collectieven is 
een politieke aangelegenheid waarin conflicten tussen verschillende waarden en 
rolopvattingen beslecht dienen te worden, e.g. op het gebied van de rechtmatige 
overheid, de prestatiegerichte overheid, de samenwerkende overheid en de 
responsieve overheid (zie Van der Steen et al. 2016). Door de betrokkenheid van 
politici gedurende het proces vast te leggen is de kans op onverwachte interventies 
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doordat sommige waarden ondergesneeuwd zijn in het proces kleiner. Belangrijk is 
hierbij wel om heldere afspraken te maken over tot hoever de betrokkenheid van 
politici binnen collectieven reikt om de autonomie van collectieven te beschermen. 
Een derde aanbeveling richt zich op het herontwerpen van het traditionele 
sturingsinstrumentarium van de gemeente. Zo kan sturing op belangrijke waarden 
als effectiviteit en gelijkheid die vaak plaatsvindt met behulp van een eenzijdige top-
down instrumentarium, juist op een meer collaboratieve en horizontale manier 
worden ontwikkeld en ingezet. De laatste aanbeveling is om gemeentelijke 
bruggenbouwers aan te wijzen die als vast contactpunt fungeren voor collectieven. 
Deze bruggenbouwers helpen ambtenaren en collectieven met het stroomlijnen en 
monitoren van het onderlinge contact.  Ze spelen een belangrijke rol in het verbinden 
van en het maken van een vertaalslag tussen de leefwereld en de systeemwereld. Een 
overzicht van deze aanbevelingen is te vinden in Tabel 1.  
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Tabel 1. Aanbevelingen voor de praktijk 
Hoofdbevinding Significantie   Praktische voorbeelden hoe 
de bevinding te gebruiken  
Twee dominante percepties 
op hoe gemeenten 
burgerinitiatieven zouden 
moeten sturen, meer op 
afstand versus meer 
betrokken (Hoofdstuk 2, 3) 
Bewustwording over 
sturingsvoorkeuren van 
ambtenaren en collectieven 
vergemakkelijkt de dialoog 
over onderlinge 
verwachtingen   
• Reflecteer individueel op 
de dominante 
sturingsvoorkeur 
• Organiseer 
bijeenkomsten om 
sturingsvoorkeuren te 
bespreken als 
managementoefening  
De directe of indirecte 
betrokkenheid van politici 
lijkt cruciaal om de prestatie 
van burgercollectieven 
veilig te stellen (Hoofdstuk 
4, 6) 
Bij het gezaghebbend 
beslechten van conflicten 
tussen verschillende 
waarden (en dus de 
toekenning van publieke 
middelen) spelen politici 
een rol. Vergroot hun 
kennis en betrokkenheid bij 
collectieven 
• Betrek politici bij de 
sturing van 
zelforganisatie 
• Maak heldere afspraken 
over de betrokkenheid en 
tot hoever deze reikt om 
de autonomie van 
collectieven te 
beschermen 
Traditionele sturing 
strategieën als 
controlerende en 
prestatiegerichte sturing 
worden afgewezen, terwijl 
ze in de praktijk nog 
gebruikt worden en relevant 
zijn (Hoofdstuk 3, 5) 
Herontwerp het traditionele 
sturingsinstrumentarium. 
Zo kan sturing op 
belangrijke waarden als 
effectiviteit en gelijkheid 
die vaak plaatsvindt met 
eenzijdige top-down 
instrumenten, juist op een 
meer collaboratieve en 
horizontale manier worden 
ontwikkeld en ingezet 
  
 
• Ontwikkel een op maat 
gemaakte 
sturingsstrategie in co-
creatie met collectieven 
in welke elementen van 
traditionele en 
horizontale modes 
gecombineerd worden  
• Pas het interne 
beoordelingssysteem van 
ambtenaren aan zodat ze 
flexibeler zijn in het 
samenwerken 
Gemeentelijke 
bruggenbouwers zijn 
cruciaal om het contact 
tussen gemeente en 
collectieven vlot te laten 
verlopen (Hoofdstuk 4, 5) 
Voorkom en overwin 
barrières in het contact 
tussen collectieven en 
gemeente door gebruik te 
maken van ondernemende, 
mediërende en 
hiërarchische boundary-
spanning strategieën 
 
• Stel bruggenbouwers aan 
binnen de gemeente  
• Deze bruggenbouwers 
helpen collectieven en 
ambtenaren met het 
stroomlijnen en 
monitoren van het 
onderlinge contact  
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This dissertation focuses on the governance of self-organization - a
topic that has increasingly received political and societal attention 
for its important role in upholding affordable and effective 
community services. Although the importance of community-based 
collectives, as a form of self-organization, has been widely
acknowledged by governments, research has shown that many 
collectives in reality function with difficulty.
To date, there has been a lack of systematic insight into preferred 
and effective governance strategies of municipalities to support 
community-based collectives. This lack of knowledge is 
problematic as governance efforts are essential to safeguard the 
development and performance of community-based collectives in 
today’s highly institutionalized and regularized society. In response 
to this gap, this dissertation uses a mixed-methods design to 
investigate the dynamics surrounding the governance of self-
organization in the Dutch welfare sector by combining governance 
and institutional theory with detailed empirical analysis.
The conclusions of this dissertation point to a new form of public 
governance where the government not only gives space, but also 
actively facilitates the self-governing capacities of community-
based collectives. This dissertation demonstrates that despite 
dominant academic and practitioner’s preferences, the governance 
of self-organization not only involves ‘soft’ processual strategies, 
but also requires ‘hard’ institutional governance strategies to 
safeguard the performance of community-based collectives. As 
such, this dissertation opens the way for a better understanding of 
the governance of self-organization, by demonstrating the 
importance of hierarchy, power, and politics.
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